Life Without Papers: Aspirations, incorporation and transnational activities of irregular migrants in the Low Countries by Meeteren, M.J. (Masja) van
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIFE WITHOUT PAPERS 
Aspirations, incorporation and transnational activities of irregular 
migrants in the Low Countries 
 
LEVEN ZONDER PAPIEREN 
Aspiraties, incorporatie en transnationale activiteiten van irreguliere 
migranten in de Lage Landen 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de 
rector magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. H.G. Schmidt 
 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op 
donderdag 24 juni 2010, om 11.30uur 
 
door 
Masja Jolande van Meeteren 
geboren te Wageningen 
 
 
 
 
 
PROMOTIECOMMISSIE 
 
Promotor:   Prof.dr. G.B.M. Engbersen 
Overige leden:  Prof.dr. J.P.L. Burgers 
Prof.dr. H.B. Entzinger 
Dr. R. Staring 
 Copromotor:  Dr. W. Schinkel 
 
 
 
LIFE WITHOUT PAPERS 
 
 
ASPIRATIONS, INCORPORATION AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF 
IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN THE LOW 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
MASJA VAN MEETEREN 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coverdesign: Masja van Meeteren 
Copyright © Masja van Meeteren 2010 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, 
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of 
the author. 
Printed in the Netherlands 
Printed on FSC paper 
ISBN 978-90-9025462-3 
NUR 747
 
 
 
 
 
In loving memory of Petra van ‘t Padje 
 

 
 
CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... XIII 
CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION: IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS A FACT OF LIFE ............................................................. 1 
1.1  Irregular migration as a common feature of western economies .............................................. 1 
1.2  Research questions .................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3  Conceptual considerations ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.3.1 Irregular migrants ............................................................................................................................. 6 
1.3.2 Incorporation ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................... 13 
BEYOND VICTIMS AND COMMUNITIES: BRINGING ASPIRATIONS IN ............................................... 13 
2.1 Current research practice on incorporation ............................................................................ 13 
2.2 Common perspective focused on survival ............................................................................... 15 
2.3 Social mobility and incorporation ........................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1 Conceptualizing community ............................................................................................................... 20 
2.3.2 Social networks as ethnic community networks .............................................................................. 22 
2.3.3 The situational character of social capital .......................................................................................... 23 
2.3.4 Contextual perceptions of solidarity .................................................................................................. 24 
2.4 Comparative designs based on migration motives .................................................................. 25 
2.5.  Bringing aspirations in .......................................................................................................... 27 
2.5.1 Prior research involving aspirations .................................................................................................. 27 
2.5.2 Towards an analysis based on aspirations ........................................................................................ 29 
2.5.3 Outline of this dissertation .................................................................................................................. 32 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................... 35 
STUDYING ASPIRATIONS: DATA AND METHODS ............................................................................... 35 
3.1 Grounded theory approach ..................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 Data ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews ............................................................................................................ 38 
3.2.2 Participant observation .................................................................................................................. 39 
3.2.3 In-depth interviews with irregular migrants .............................................................................. 42 
3.2.4 In-depth interviews with organizations ....................................................................................... 45 
3.3 Use of data throughout this study .......................................................................................... 46 
3.4  Methodological issues ............................................................................................................. 46 
3.4.1 Establishing trust ............................................................................................................................ 47 
3.4.2 Reflections on the personal identity of the researcher ............................................................... 49 
3.5  Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................... 51 
IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE LOW COUNTRIES ............................................................................. 51 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 51 
4.2 History .................................................................................................................................... 52 
4.3 External control policies ......................................................................................................... 54 
4.4 Internal control policies .......................................................................................................... 56 
4.4.1 Exclusion from public services ...................................................................................................... 56 
4.4.2 Policies of identification ................................................................................................................. 58 
4.4.3 Detention and expulsion ................................................................................................................ 60 
4.4.4 Labor market control ...................................................................................................................... 61 
4.5 Legalization ............................................................................................................................ 63 
4.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 68 
CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................... 71 
INVESTMENT, SETTLEMENT AND LEGALIZATION ASPIRATIONS ....................................................... 71 
5.1  Three types of aspirations ....................................................................................................... 71 
5.2 Background characteristics ..................................................................................................... 78 
5.3 Changing aspirations ............................................................................................................. 84 
5.4 Aspirations and strategies ...................................................................................................... 86 
5.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 87 
CHAPTER 6 .................................................................................................................... 89 
LIVING DIFFERENT DREAMS (I): ASPIRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL INCORPORATION ....................... 89 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 89 
6.2 Housing .................................................................................................................................. 90 
6.2.1 Type of accommodation ................................................................................................................. 90 
6.2.2 Spatial distribution ......................................................................................................................... 94 
6.2.3 Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands ................................................................... 97 
6.3 Employment ........................................................................................................................... 98 
6.3.1 Work hours ...................................................................................................................................... 99 
6.3.2 Type of work .................................................................................................................................. 102 
6.3.3 Exploitation .................................................................................................................................... 110 
6.3.4 Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands ................................................................. 113 
6.4 Other sources of income or assistance ...................................................................................115 
6.4.1 The gift and barter economy ........................................................................................................ 116 
6.4.2 Formal and informal support from organizations .................................................................... 125 
6.5 Changing aspirations ............................................................................................................132 
6.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................134 
CHAPTER 7 .................................................................................................................. 137 
LIVING DIFFERENT DREAMS (II): ASPIRATIONS AND SOCIAL INCORPORATION ..............................137 
7.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................137 
7.2 Leisure time ...........................................................................................................................140 
7.3 Social contacts .......................................................................................................................146 
7.4 Shifts in aspirations ...............................................................................................................153 
7.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................156 
CHAPTER 8 .................................................................................................................. 159 
ASPIRATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES .............................................................................159 
8.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................159 
8.2 Economic transnational activities .........................................................................................162 
 
 
8.3 Social transnational activities ...............................................................................................165 
8.4 Political transnational activities ............................................................................................170 
8.5 Shifts in aspirations ...............................................................................................................173 
8.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................174 
CHAPTER 9 .................................................................................................................. 177 
STRIVING FOR A BETTER POSITION: ASPIRATIONS AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND 
SOCIAL CAPITAL ....................................................................................................................................177 
9.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................177 
9.2 Forms of capital .....................................................................................................................179 
9.3 Required forms of capital for realization of aspirations .........................................................180 
9.3.1 Investment aspirations ................................................................................................................. 180 
9.3.2 Settlement aspirations .................................................................................................................. 184 
9.3.3 Legalization aspirations ............................................................................................................... 188 
9.4 Shifts in aspirations ...............................................................................................................191 
9.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................192 
CHAPTER 10 ................................................................................................................ 195 
CONCLUSION: ASSESSING A NEW PERSPECTIVE ................................................................................195 
10.1 Main findings ........................................................................................................................195 
10.1.1 Investment aspirations: preferring work over leisure and comfort while oriented towards 
‘home’  .................................................................................................................................................... 196 
10.1.2 Settlement aspirations: enjoying a better life in quiet suburban neighborhoods ............ 198 
10.1.3 Legalization aspirations: sacrifices in the pursuit of a legal status .................................... 200 
10.1.4 Overview ................................................................................................................................... 203 
10.1.5 Shifts in aspirations .................................................................................................................. 206 
10.2 Implications ...........................................................................................................................207 
10.2.1 Beyond a ‘victim perspective’ ................................................................................................. 207 
10.2.2 Functional incorporation and ethnic community patterns ................................................. 208 
10.2.3 Social mobility: objective measures? ...................................................................................... 211 
10.2.4 Social incorporation ................................................................................................................. 212 
10.2.5 Transnational perspective ....................................................................................................... 213 
10.3 Suggestions for future research .............................................................................................215 
NOTES .......................................................................................................................... 219 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 221 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 245 
Appendix 1: Semi-structured interviews – overview of respondent characteristics ..............247 
Appendix 2: In-depth interviews with irregular migrants – overview of respondent 
characteristics ..................................................................................................................................251 
Appendix 3: Interviews with organizations ................................................................................253 
Appendix 4: Fictitious names and respondent numbers .............................................................255 
DUTCH SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 259 
CURRICULUM VITAE .............................................................................................. 271 
 
xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Over the past four and a half years I have learned that writing a PhD thesis is by no 
means the solitary effort people often take it to be. In one way or another, many 
people, to whom I want to express my gratitude here, contributed to the completion 
of this book.  
First of all I want to thank those who enabled me to carry out my project. I 
could never have started this research without the support of my promoter Godfried 
Engbersen, who has greatly inspired my enthusiasm for the subject of irregular 
migration. I am indebted to him for allowing me to pursue my own research 
interests and for giving me the room to turn initial research ideas into something 
completely different, and I am very lucky that he always seems to have the right 
project available at the right time. I want to thank my co-promoter Willem Schinkel 
for encouraging me throughout my scientific career. After he had successfully 
supervised my master’s thesis, I was pleased that he agreed to support me in my 
PhD research as well. I am especially grateful for his valuable insights and 
constructive criticism. For the funding of this project, I owe Habiforum, The 
Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Rotterdam Institute for Social-scientific 
Policy Research (RISBO). RISBO deserves additional thanks for providing me 
various kinds of necessary practical and material support, and I wish to thank 
Marion van San for being such a fun and inspiring person to work with. 
Furthermore, I owe her for her help in finding my way through the Belgian labyrinth 
and for teaching me all kinds of peculiarities about Belgium I was unaware of at 
first.  
Second, there are people I want to thank in relation to my fieldwork. This has 
been the most surprising and memorable part of the whole research project. During 
my fieldwork I did in fact experience solitude. I realized that there are no textbooks 
from which to learn how to be ‘streetwise’ or that can provide comforting words in 
times of confusion. I learned that fieldwork among irregular migrants involves plain 
and continuous hard work, getting your hands dirty and your feet in the mud, 
learning how to do things while you do them. It only gets romantic when it is over. I 
am very grateful to Malini Sur who stayed with me in Antwerp for a few weekends 
to interview Bangladeshi irregular migrants. The time she was there provided great 
relief from the solitude I otherwise experienced. Furthermore, I owe her much 
xiv 
gratitude for being there to exchange ideas and to discuss fieldwork-related issues 
that have proved very valuable.  
This dissertation could not have been written if it were not for my 
respondents who openly shared their stories and opinions with me. I want to thank 
them for letting me into their lives. I have experienced great moments, and these 
have profoundly enriched my life and changed my eating preferences forever. 
Furthermore, I owe a great number of people who worked for organizations and 
provided me with relevant information and data.  
Third, I wish to express my gratitude to several colleagues whose critical 
commentary and support have been very valuable. I want to thank the participants 
of LOBOCOP for helping me out during the initial stages of my research design. I 
am grateful to the members of the GVB research group for critically reflecting on my 
work in progress. I want to thank the people of the IMISCOE A2 cluster who took 
the time to listen and critically comment on my work. Next to my supervisors, 
special thanks go out to Willem de Koster for his many insightful comments and for 
critically commenting on every comma and Arnoud van Meeteren and Miriam 
Youngerman Miller for checking and correcting the remaining textual flaws. My 
colleagues at the Sociology department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam have 
provided and continue to provide me with a pleasant working environment. I am 
very pleased with the open intellectual climate that exists there. Lunch breaks and 
occasional karaoke events are always great fun. I am happy to be able to continue to 
work there on a new research project.  
Finally, a few persons deserve special mention for their generous support. 
First of all, I want to express gratitude to my mother Petra van ‘t Padje for her 
unconditional love and support of my educational career. I find it very sad that she 
cannot experience this day, and I therefore dedicate this book to her memory. 
Second, I am greatly indebted to my aunt Joke van ‘t Padje. If it had not been for her 
ample encouragement and support, I never would have arrived at the start of this 
whole endeavor. Finally, I cannot express enough gratitude to my colleague, best 
friend and love of my life Willem de Koster. He has provided the basis for 
everything.  
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: IRREGULAR 
MIGRATION AS A FACT OF LIFE 
1.1  IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS A COMMON FEATURE OF 
WESTERN ECONOMIES 
Irregular migration has emerged in all western economies after the Second World 
War (Sassen 1999), and it has increased considerably in the last decades (Arango 
2004; Castles and Miller 2003; Jahn and Straubhaar 1999). In northern Europe, this 
increase has partly been an unforeseen consequence of the end of recruitment of 
foreign labor introduced in the 1970s (Brochmann 1999b). In addition, the 1990s 
witnessed large numbers of asylum seekers in search of protection who were not 
granted asylum, but nevertheless stayed in these destination countries illegally 
(Koser and Lutz 1998). The increased numbers of irregular migrants in northern 
European countries is thus also partly the result of the incapacity of these states to 
deal with refused asylum seekers.  
In reaction to these growing numbers, governments have developed policies 
to prevent irregular immigration (Albrecht 2002). Initially, these were mainly 
targeted at controlling the external borders of the European Union. However, in 
recent years border controls have proved to have little effectiveness in preventing 
irregular immigration (Brochmann 1999a; Cornelius 2005). Moreover, beyond a 
certain level of control the costs of avoiding irregular migration exceed the economic 
damage caused by irregular immigration. This means that, from an economic 
perspective, the “optimal” degree of irregular immigration is greater than zero 
(Entorf 2002; Hillman and Weiss 1999; Jahn and Straubhaar 1999). Therefore, 
policymakers in Europe have increasingly turned their focus towards internal 
control mechanisms (Brochmann 1999a; Broeders and Engbersen 2007). Border 
controls are still important, but they have been increasingly supplemented by 
policies of exclusion and discouragement. According to Broeders and Engbersen 
(2007:1593) exclusion from formal institutions of society is the main thrust of current 
policies aimed at irregular migrants: “for those illegal aliens who cannot be 
discouraged or deterred to come, exclusion is meant to complicate and frustrate 
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living and working conditions to such a degree that they will turn round and try 
their luck elsewhere.” Examples of such internal control policies are exclusion from 
public services, increased surveillance by the police, increased employer sanctions, 
incarceration and expulsion.  
Although governments increasingly try to exclude and discourage irregular 
migrants, this does not mean that they are successful in doing so. Many irregular 
migrants for example still manage to find work (Engbersen et al. 2006; Paspalanova 
2007, Van Meeteren 2008), and in case irregular migrants are arrested, successful 
expulsion is only occasionally realized (Broeders 2009; Van der Leun 2003a). 
Moreover, even though some irregular migrants are successfully expelled, most 
Eastern Europeans simply come back the next day (Paspalanova 2006). Irregular 
migrants are difficult to expel, because they may hide their identity, and sending 
countries are reluctant to take migrants back whose identities have not been 
established. The keywords for recent internal control measures for irregular 
migrants have therefore increasingly become surveillance and identification 
(Broeders and Engbersen 2007). States need to make irregular migrants ‘legible’ 
(Scott 1998) in order to successfully expel them. Migrants obviously try to 
circumvent such policy innovations. Recent news reports for example indicate that 
some migrants mutilate their fingertips so that they cannot be properly identified 
(Trouw, 24 april 2009). As a consequence, policies aimed at irregular migrants and 
the actions of irregular migrants to circumvent these resemble an arms race in which 
action provokes reaction (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). So far, the irregular 
migrants who live in the destination countries appear to be the winners of this ‘tug-
of-war’ (Düvell 2006a: 8).  
It appears that neither countries that rely on strong external controls, nor 
countries that have a dense system of internal controls are successful in managing 
irregular migration (Düvell 2006a). One of the most important reasons is that there 
exists a demand for the informal labor that irregular migrants can provide. Many 
companies would not be able to compete on the international market were it not for 
the benefits they derive from employing informally. In Western Europe, employers 
have strong incentives to hire informal workers in order to avoid paying relatively 
high minimum wages and social insurance contributions (Jordan and Düvell 2002). 
Moreover, the continuing search for flexibility among firms under pressure from 
international competition is thought to be responsible for the fact that some firms 
aim to avoid the costs of employment regulations associated with regular jobs 
(Sassen 1999). The specific demand for informal labor is considered to be one of the 
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reasons why irregular immigration continues to exist in spite of unemployment 
among legal citizens and increasing deployment of employer sanctions (Castles and 
Miller 2003). The extent to which employer sanctions are enforced differs from 
country to country and even from sector to sector: whereas some labor sectors are 
relatively unaffected by labor checks, others are controlled on a more regular basis 
(Abella 2000).  
Consequently, it is both impossible and partly undesirable for governments 
to completely avoid irregular immigration, and once irregular immigrants are there, 
they are difficult to expel, making the presence of irregular immigrants a fact of life 
in European countries (see also Baldwin-Edwards 2008). All European countries 
experience irregular migration, albeit on different scales and in different ways 
(Düvell 2008). The presence of irregular migrants in western societies has inspired 
social scientific investigations into the ways these migrants live in countries in which 
they are not allowed to reside. These studies have analyzed the different ways in 
which irregular migrants are incorporated in receiving societies (see for example 
Adam et al. 2002; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Chavez [1992]1998; Engbersen et al. 
2006; Hagan 1994; Jordan and Düvell 2002; Leman et al. 1994; Mahler 1995; Düvell 
2006, Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). The next section provides a concise overview of 
these studies and formulates three interrelated research questions within the context 
of this branch of research.  
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Although the presence of irregular migrants has been a common feature of western 
economies for decades, the bulk of social research has traditionally been aimed at 
studying its causes and finding ways to solve the ‘problem’ (Portes 1978: 469). More 
recently, attention has also been directed to its consequences in terms of its effects on 
native employment and the level of wages (see e.g. Ambrosini 2001; Amir 2000; 
Carter 2005; Chiswick 2000; Gosch 2000; Hazari and Sgro 2000; Martin 2009; Sarris 
and Zografakis 1999; Tapinos 2000; Venturini 1998; Yoshida and Woodland 2005). 
The first efforts to study the way irregular migrants live were made in the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s (see for example Chavez [1992]1998; Cornelius 1982; 
Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Bach 1985; Rodriguez 1987). European studies 
followed from the mid-1990s and are therefore relatively recent (see for example 
Adam et al. 2002; Alt 1999; P. Anderson 1999; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Devillé 
2006; 2008; Düvell 2004; Engbersen et al 1999; Engbersen et al. 2002; Jordan and 
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Düvell 2002; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998; Leerkes et al. 2004; Leman et al. 1994; 
Paspalanova 2006; Slimane 1995; Staring 2001; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006; Van 
der Leun 2003; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2007). As a consequence, the number of 
European studies of the lives of irregular migrants in receiving societies is still 
limited, especially compared to the United States, where the quality of the research 
also seems most encouraging (Düvell 2006c). 
Some of these efforts to study the ways in which irregular migrants live 
consist of exploratory research involving irregular immigrants from multiple ethnic 
backgrounds within one region (Krasinets 2005; Slimane 1995) or country (Adam et 
al. 2002; Alt 1999; P. Anderson 1999; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Engbersen et al. 
2002; Lianos 2001; Gibney 1999). Other studies focus on a single ethnic group within 
one nation-state (Düvell 2004; Kalir 2005a; Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999; 
Massey et al. 2004; Portes and Bach 1985; Rivera-Batiz 1999; Staring 2001) or within 
one city (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005). Furthermore, scholars have increasingly begun 
to compare two or more ethnic groups that have been strategically selected within 
one nation-state, a region or a city (Engbersen et al. 1999; Jordan and Düvell 2002; 
Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998; Leerkes et al. 2004; Leman 1997; Mahler 1995; 
Paspalanova 2006; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). Apart from a few edited books 
(for example Düvell 2006), only one study that I know of has systematically 
compared the lives of irregular migrants in two national contexts (Van 
Nieuwenhuyze 2009). This case involved migrants with a similar ethnic background 
who were compared across two countries.  
The questions that are typically addressed in these studies concern irregular 
migrants’ migration histories, their work practices and job search activities, housing 
conditions, access to health care, social contacts and everyday strategies to remain 
undetected by the authorities. Because much of this research is exploratory in 
nature, many findings remain primarily empirical (Devillé 2006; Paspalanova 2006). 
As a result, there has been relatively little attempt at comparison or theory-building 
beyond specific empirical contexts (Black 2003; cf. Portes 1997). However, these 
limited attempts have increased our understanding of the ways in which irregular 
migrants live in western societies, and they have spurred the evolution of some 
theoretical debates. By far most work yielding theoretical contributions has been 
undertaken in two closely connected areas of research. The first area involves the 
description and explanation of different patterns of incorporation of irregular 
migrants, and the second concerns analyses of the significance of different forms of 
capital for irregular migrants. These theoretical concerns are related to the questions 
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of how irregular migrants manage to incorporate in receiving societies where they 
are not allowed to be and what makes them more or less successful at achieving this. 
These areas are also the theoretical focus of this dissertation.  
 The main problem with the current research practice on the incorporation of 
irregular migrants, which is discussed in detail in chapter 2, is its scattered nature. 
Although attempts are made to arrive at theoretically meaningful findings by means 
of comparative research, I will argue that this common research practice has 
important limitations. To arrive at more comprehensive theoretical insights, I will 
propose an alternative approach in chapter 2 to address the first research question: 
 
1. What patterns of incorporation can be distinguished among irregular 
migrants, and how can these be understood?  
 
Another point of attention is the one-sided focus on incorporation within the 
receiving societies and the associated neglect of irregular migrants’ transnational 
engagements. As there are good reasons to study the transnational activities of 
irregular migrants – which are discussed in chapter 8 – the second research question 
is: 
 
2. Which types of transnational activities do irregular migrants engage in, and 
how can this be understood? 
 
As will be discussed in chapter 9, important controversies exist in the debate on the 
significance of different forms of capital for irregular migrants. While some scholars 
argue that social capital is the most important form of capital for irregular migrants, 
others argue that cultural capital is decisive. In order to find a way out of this 
stalemate, a contextualized answer will be sought to the third research question: 
 
3. What is the significance of different forms of capital for irregular migrants? 
 
In answering these interrelated questions, this dissertation contributes to the most 
important theoretical debates with respect to the way irregular migrants live in 
western societies. In doing so, naturally I did not study all western societies, but 
rather chose to focus on Belgium and the Netherlands. The choice of these two 
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countries stems from very practical considerations. I already had at my disposal 
interviews with irregular migrants from the previous studies my promoter had been 
involved in, and I was involved in large-scale research in Belgium at roughly the 
same time. As there were no theoretical or methodological objections to the choice of 
these two countries, I decided to profit from the previous experiences of my 
promoter as well as my own. The fact that the choice of countries in which the 
research was to take place was mainly based on practical reasons does not mean that 
the choice of these countries is not theoretically interesting. The relevance of these 
national contexts is discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 2 outlines a new approach to the 
study of incorporation and social mobility of irregular migrants after a critical 
discussion of the current research practices. Chapter 3 discusses the methods used in 
this dissertation. The next subsections discuss some conceptual considerations 
concerning the terms ‘irregular migrants’ and ‘incorporation’ that are used 
throughout this study. 
1.3  CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.3.1 Irregular migrants 
The topic of irregular migration has received increasing attention in political and 
public debates over the last decades (Düvell 2006b). As irregular migration is mostly 
perceived as a threat to European societies and economies, these debates tend to 
focus on the question of how to prevent irregular migration (Paspalanova 2006; 
Uehling 2004). At the basis of this perceived threat lies social myths or stereotypical 
images of irregular migrants as criminals (Coutin 2005b), welfare abusers or 
suppliers of unfair job competition (Broeders and Engbersen 2007; Devillé 2008; 
Düvell 2006; Eaton 1998). Research has indicated that few irregular migrants engage 
in criminal acts (Leerkes 2009; Van Meeteren et al. 2008), and few use welfare 
provisions (Cyrus and Vogel 2006; Düvell 2006c; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Van der 
Leun 2003a; Van Meeteren et al. 2008). Moreover, the labor irregular migrants 
provide generally plays a complementary instead of a substitutional role (Jordan 
and Düvell 2002; Samers 2005; Venturini 1998). Nevertheless, these myths are widely 
accepted as common knowledge (Devillé 2008). Some scholars claim that it is 
because of the terminology that is used to denote this group of migrants that they 
have become surrounded with negative connotations which feed these social myths. 
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Some blame social scientists who have labeled them ‘illegals’ or ‘illegal aliens’ for 
their role in this process. Consensus among scholars on what the proper terminology 
should be has not been reached (see also Paspalanova 2006; Uehling 2004). It is 
therefore important to explain what I mean by ‘irregular migration’ and ‘irregular 
migrants’. Moreover, it should be made clear why I choose to use these concepts.  
Irregular migration is sometimes referred to as ‘undocumented’, 
‘unauthorized’ or ‘illegal’ migration. Likewise, irregular migrants are denoted 
‘undocumented’ or ‘illegal’ migrants. While referring to migration, the adjective 
‘illegal’ is mostly used uncritically. However, the practice of labeling migrants as 
‘illegal’ has been the cause of much discussion. While in legal systems and in most 
public discourses the term ‘illegal migrants’ or even ‘illegals’ is usually employed, 
social scientists often prefer to refer to ‘undocumented’ or ‘irregular’ migrants in 
order to avoid any discriminatory connotation and to prevent criminalization 
(Düvell 2006b). Moreover, some argue that the term ’illegal’ should not be used, 
because it is incorrect, as it wrongfully refers to a state of being (Schinkel 2005). After 
all, a person cannot be illegal; only his or her stay or employment can be. According 
to Paspalanova (2006) it is precisely this practice – the use of the word ‘illegal’ to 
refer to people – which has fuelled the perception of irregular migrants as a threat 
and as criminals. Because of these critiques most social scientists have stopped using 
the term. Recently however, a small group of scholars purposefully employed the 
term and justified its use by arguing that it is precisely migrants’ illegality which 
should be at the center of research, as it is central to the lives irregular migrants lead. 
In their opinion, researchers ought to ask the question of what it means to ‘be 
illegal’. Willen (2007a; 2007b) argues that migrant illegality should not only be seen 
as a juridical status and a socio-political condition; the impact of illegality on 
migrants’ everyday lives, on their experiences of being-in-the-world should be 
considered as well. De Genova (2005; 2007) likewise claims that migrants’ 
experiences of their illegality should be studied.  
As the latter arguments have been put forward relatively recently and have 
remained exceptional or outsider positions, the majority of scholars have tried to 
find a substitute word for ‘illegal’. In this connection, the term ‘undocumented’ has 
been coined. Although less subject to debate, the term lacks precision. After all, 
migrants who reside illegally may very well possess documents. Furthermore, they 
may currently lack proper documentation, but they might have crossed the border 
using legitimate papers. Moreover, some migrants own an abundance of 
documentation owing to their struggles to become legalized. This means they not 
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only possess a lot of legal documents themselves, but they may have been 
documented by the state. As a consequence, they are not necessarily undocumented 
vis-à-vis the receiving state. As a means to avoid the shortcomings of terms such as 
‘illegal’ or ‘undocumented’, the term ‘irregular migrants’ has recently been coined. 
This term avoids the practice of labeling people as ‘illegal,’ while it simultaneously 
makes clear that these are not migrants who have followed the regular legal paths.  
Unfortunately, there is a downside to all the terminology discussed that the 
concept ‘irregular migrants’ has not been able to avoid either. Distinguishing 
between irregular and regular migrants offers a simple dichotomy, implying that a 
migrant is regular or irregular in the same way that a migrant is legal or illegal, 
authorized or unauthorized, documented or undocumented. However, there are 
three aspects that determine migrant status: entry, residence and employment 
(Düvell 2008; Gosh 1998). The tendency to conflate entry, employment and residence 
is probably a result of the fact that these are often intertwined (Gosh 1998; Samers 
2001). With all this confusion surrounding the terminology, it is important to be clear 
about what is meant in the present study. In this dissertation, I define irregular 
migrants as people who stay in the country without official permission to do so at 
the time of research, regardless of whether they entered the country legally and 
regardless of whether they are economically active or not.  
Although this may sound like a solid definition, even this definition requires 
further explanation due to the complexity of the subject at hand. Developments 
surrounding European integration have significantly diversified irregular migration 
in terms of legal categories (Jandl et al. 2009). Large groups of people – such as 
Bulgarians and Rumanians – do not need a visa to enter the European Union, but are 
allowed to cross the border with their passports. These migrants may stay legally (as 
tourists) for usually three months, but they are not allowed to work. However, many 
of them settle down and engage in informal employment. During the first period of 
their stay, their employment is irregular, but their stay is not. In this situation, I 
would not label them irregular migrants. It is only when their legal stay expires that 
they become the subject of this dissertation.  
Although a uniformly accepted term still does not exist (Paspalanova 2006), I 
believe that the term ‘irregular migrants’ is gaining in popularity and has potential 
to become the new standard. For this reason and because it avoids stigmatizing 
migrants by labeling them ‘illegal,’ I am content to use the term ‘irregular migrants’. 
Additionally, I should technically speak of ‘immigrants’ instead of ‘migrants’. 
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However, for reasons of readability of the text I chose to use the version that reads 
most easily. In most cases, whenever I speak of ‘migrants’, the reader should read 
‘immigrants’.  
1.3.2 Incorporation 
Various concepts are used to analyze the ways in which immigrants live in receiving 
societies. Traditionally scholars have employed the concept of assimilation, which 
refers to a linear process by which immigrants give up past languages, identities, 
cultural practices and loyalties to gradually become full members of the receiving 
society (Asslin et al. 2006). In such a view, different processes of integration or 
incorporation are thought to follow one another in progressive stages towards full 
assimilation. Hence, assimilation is regarded as the inevitable outcome of 
subsequent processes of incorporation (Bloemraad et al. 2008). In time, scholarly 
attention has shifted from the study of assimilation to the scrutiny of processes of 
incorporation or integration. American studies usually use the concept of 
incorporation, while European scholars often use the concept of integration.  
Studies of integration have not traditionally had such a linear conception of 
these processes. However, they do conceive the concept to comprise some kind of 
hierarchy: it is used as a scale on which an immigrant or a group of immigrants can 
‘score’ better than another. What ‘better’ exactly refers to usually differs from study 
to study. Social scientists compare groups of immigrants to each other based on 
certain criteria they have developed to measure integration (Schinkel 2010). 
Traditional markers of integration are for example economic advancement, 
educational attainment or cultural acceptance. In practice, these are measured in 
diverse ways. Practical issues such as the availability of data often play a role in the 
use of different indicators for integration. 
In spite of the different ways in which integration is measured, there is a 
general consensus among scholars that integration is a multi-dimensional concept. 
Views on what the relevant dimensions of integration are differ only slightly among 
authors. In the Netherlands, the most common distinction is the one between socio-
economic integration and socio-cultural integration (see for example Liem and Veld 
2005; Nugter 2004; SCP 2004). Others distinguish among the functional, the 
expressive and the moral dimensions of integration (see for example Engbersen 
2003; Engbersen and Gabriels 1995; Peters 1993), among economic, social, cultural 
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and political integration (see for example Fermin 1997), between structural 
integration and socio-cultural integration (see for example Dagevos 2001; Vermeulen 
and Penninx 1994), or between social and ethnic-cultural integration (see for 
example Dagevos et al. 2003). All in all, many slightly different dimensions of the 
concept integration are being used, and there is no consensus on the best 
conceptualization, let alone of what elements these dimensions are best composed. 
Social scientists thus supply the concept integration with different content by 
distinguishing different dimensions and items. Moreover, scholars do not usually 
provide definitions of the concept of integration itself. As a consequence, scholars 
provide the concept integration with different contents, usually those best suited to 
their research objective.  
Not only is this lack of clarity among social scientists responsible for the 
existing ambiguity surrounding the concept of integration: the public and political 
debate on the integration of immigrants in Europe has changed as well. As a 
consequence, the discursive meaning of integration has changed. The word now has 
a stronger cultural connotation than before (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Schinkel 2010, 
Snel 2003; Van Meeteren 2005). Integrating is something that immigrants are obliged 
to do according to current mainstream discourse. The term has become normative 
and has lost its neutral meaning as a tool for analysis. I discovered that this new 
connotation complicated my fieldwork – my respondents were very sensitive to 
issues concerning integration, especially when I asked questions that could be 
interpreted as having something to do with their cultural integration. Many 
respondents were for example quick in assuring me that they associated with 
Belgians or Dutch people. I usually had to make some effort to find out that they 
were referring to their employers with whom they occasionally had a brief chat and 
not to long-lasting friendships. 
It has become clear that these days, the concept of integration deserves a 
proper introduction, before it can be used as a tool for analysis. One can even argue 
that it has become useless for these purposes, as it is no longer regarded a neutral 
concept. I noticed myself how much confusion it can generate – not only among 
respondents, but also in academic circles. In the beginning of my project I used the 
term integration, but each time I presented my work at a conference or in some 
informal gathering, I noticed how it led to huge misunderstandings. It slowly 
dawned on me that it would not be convenient to use the concept, because people 
had too many normative preconceptions.  
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After careful consideration, I chose to skip the concept of integration because 
of the confusion it generated and to use the concept of ‘incorporation’ instead. This 
concept has often been used in connection with the study of the ways immigrants 
live in receiving societies (see for example Chavez 1991; Hagan 1998; Itzigsohn and 
Giorguli-Saucedo 2005; Leerkes 2007; Nee and sanders 2001; Portes 1995a; Portes 
and Rumbaut 1996; Rusinovic 2006; Van der Leun 2000; 2003a; Van der Leun and 
Kloosterman 2006; Van Tubergen et al. 2004; Yurdacul and Bodemann 2007). The 
way incorporation is conceptualized and measured does not differ much from the 
way this is done with integration. However, 'incorporation' offers the benefit of not 
causing too much confusion in Europe. In spite of a similar practical use of the 
concept among social scientists, its connotations are more neutral. 
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature on the 
incorporation of irregular migrants, so I only discuss those elements of incorporation 
which figure in an implicit or explicit scholarly debate to which I can contribute. In 
the context of this dissertation, incorporation should therefore be considered not so 
much as an unambiguous theoretical concept, but more as a heuristic device 
providing structure and links to relevant literature. I found it helpfull to distinguish 
two dimensions of incorporation: functional incorporation and social incorporation. 
Functional incorporation includes housing, work and other sources of income and 
thus refers to the way irregular migrants are able to sustain themselves. Social 
incorporation includes the way migrants spend their leisure time and their social 
contacts in the receiving society. Chapter 6 discusses functional incorporation, and 
social incorporation is dealt with in chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BEYOND VICTIMS AND 
COMMUNITIES: BRINGING 
ASPIRATIONS IN 
This chapter first deals with the current research practice involving the 
incorporation of irregular migrants. In sections 2.1 to 2.4 the discussion of the 
literature is focused on its main findings and its inherent problems, which mostly 
stem from the common practice of comparing groups of migrants. In section 2.5 an 
alternative approach is suggested.  
2.1 CURRENT RESEARCH PRACTICE ON INCORPORATION 
Although the presence of irregular migrants has been a fact of life in western 
societies for decades, attempts to study their lives in these countries have long 
remained limited to the United States (see for example Chavez [1992]1998; Cornelius 
1982; Hagan 1994; Mahler 1995; Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Bach 1985; Rodriguez 
1987). The question of how irregular migrants are incorporated in the receiving 
societies has only started to take hold in Europe since the mid-1990s. After the 
pioneering Dutch project The Unknown City (Burgers and Engbersen 1999), studies of 
other European countries soon followed. These countries include Belgium (Adam et 
al. 2002; Devillé 2008; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005; Leman et al. 1994; Paspalanova 
2006; Slimane 1995; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2007; 2009), Germany (Alt 1999), the United 
Kingdom (P. Anderson 1999; Jordan and Düvell 2002) Greece (Lazaridis and 
Romaniszyn 1998), Italy (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004) and Portugal (Eaton 1998).  
Even though these studies deal with various ethnic or nationality groups in 
different national or local contexts, many parallel outcomes are reported. These 
similarities usually concern the problems irregular migrants face due to their 
difficult position, ranging from finding affordable and adequate housing to getting 
access to medical care. While some of the older studies have reported that irregular 
migrants managed to find ways to work legally, recent studies document that 
irregular migrants are nowadays only able to access the informal labor market.  
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Parallel to these similar findings, the same studies report rather different 
results on other aspects, for example concerning the relevance of ethnic networks or 
the importance of cultural capital for irregular migrants. The potential reasons for 
the diverging outcomes are plentiful, considering the diversity in groups and 
contexts studied. For example, whereas Engbersen et al. (2006) find high levels of in-
group solidarity among Turkish irregular migrants in The Hague, Mahler (1995) 
finds co-ethnic exploitation among Salvadoran and South American migrants in 
Long Island. Such contradictory findings can be attributed to differences in the 
organization of the respective communities or their migration histories, to distinct 
national or local policy contexts, or to other significant variations between the two 
research settings. However, one does not know what factors are in fact responsible 
for these different outcomes; only tentative post-hoc interpretations can be made.  
The variety in groups and contexts therefore complicates theoretical 
generalization (Mahler 1995). Due to the impossibility of random sampling, drawing 
inferences is always a problem in research on irregular migrants, but the broad 
range of groups and contexts involved makes it an even bigger challenge. Therefore, 
many researchers have forsaken the attempt to arrive at general theories on the way 
irregular migrants are incorporated into western societies. Instead, some have 
turned to (historical) particularistic explanations by offering thick descriptions of the 
conditions of a distinct ethnic group in a certain area, allowing for increased 
understanding of how these specific conditions of this particular group of irregular 
migrants have become the way they are now (see for example Hagan 1994; Kalir 
2005a; Massey et al. 2004).  
However, most researchers have started to try to contextualize theories and 
develop sophisticated comparative research designs in order to single out factors 
responsible for different outcomes. These attempts usually involve two or more 
strategically selected ethnic or national groups within one receiving nation-state, 
region or city. For example, Engbersen et al. (2006) have compared Turks and 
Bulgarians in The Hague, Leman (1997) has studied Columbians and Poles in 
Brussels, Lazaridis and Romaniszyn (1998) have compared Albanians and Poles in 
Greece, and Jordan and Düvell (2002) have analyzed the lives of migrants from 
Brazil, Turkey and Poland in the United Kingdom. Although these studies have 
offered many insights, they share various problems which are discussed in the 
following sections.  
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2.2 COMMON PERSPECTIVE FOCUSED ON SURVIVAL 
One major aspect that studies on irregular migrants have in common is their 
perspective on the lives of irregular migrants. Scholars have extensively shown how 
irregular migrants’ pre-migratory expectations are often unrealistically high (Adam 
et al. 2002; Staring 1999; Mahler 1995). Stories of migrants who thought that the 
streets in the destination country are paved with gold are quoted frequently (see for 
example Staring 1999: 64). Consequently, when migrants find out that the society 
they encounter does not offer the opportunities they envisioned, their adaptation 
processes are automatically oriented downwardly. Many studies indicate how dreams 
are broken and how irregular migrants have to deal with difficult conditions. In so 
doing, scholars equate the adaptation process that irregular migrants go through 
with a process of learning ‘how to survive’ in these societies. The story that is 
portrayed in most studies is a narrative of how irregular migrants struggle to 
survive. While they had high expectations before they came, little is left of these once 
they have arrived, and survival becomes the central theme in their lives.  
The implicit assumption that the original expectations of irregular migrants 
fade upon arrival has been strengthened by the commonly held idea that irregular 
migrants have little control over their lives. Mahler (1995: 7) for example claims that 
migrants’ efforts “are largely conditioned by macro-structural forces over which 
individuals have little, if any, power.” She consequently does not differentiate in 
terms of newly developed motivations, but instead emphasizes “the common 
experiences and dilemmas” (p. 28) her informants face. Devillé (2006) denoted this 
dominant perspective, which implicitly assumes that irregular migrants have little to 
no control over their lives, a ‘victim perspective’. She observes that most researchers 
describe irregular migrants as victims of laws and policies who are unable to 
undertake much action to improve their situation.  
While in Mahler’s work the notion of ‘survival’ remains implicit, many other 
scholars do explicitly use this term (see Adam et al. 2002; Chavez [1992]1998; 
Cvajner and Sciortino 2009; Datta et al. 2007; Düvell 2004; Düvell and Jordan 2006; 
Engbersen 1996; Jordan 2006; King and Mai 2004; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; 
Psimmenos and Kassimati 2006; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006; Van 
Nieuwenhuyze 2009). Adam et al. (2002: 115) for example write that “il s’agit de 
rendre compte de la manière dont les étrangers sans documents vivent, ou plus 
exactement survivent en situation de clandestinité.” [Italics added] Another example 
of the explicit use of the notion ‘survival’ stems from the work of Chavez 
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([1992]1998: 6) – one of his main research questions is: “What kind of strategies do 
migrants and settlers employ to survive?” Along the same lines, in the work of 
Jordan and Düvell (2002), the chapter called ‘why they come’ is succeeded by a 
chapter entitled ‘how they survive,’ and Triandafyllidou and Kosic (2006: 106) 
analyze the ‘survival strategies’ of irregular migrants.  
While most scholars uncritically use the notion ‘survival’, others feel they 
have to explain themselves, for example,Van Nieuwenhuyze (2009: 97) who writes 
that “the uncertainty and the insecurity of their existence justify the notion of 
survival strategy.” According to Datta et al. (2007: 405) the notion of survival 
strategies is even too strong, as it does not do justice to the “powerlessness” migrants 
experience. They therefore prefer to speak of the “tactics” migrants employ to 
“survive.” 
Paspalanova (2006: 293) also occasionally uses the notion of survival, even 
while she simultaneously notes that the Polish irregular migrants she interviewed 
generally “perceive their income as sufficient and enough to provide a comfortable 
standard of living.” This illustrates how much the notion of survival has become a 
convention: the concept is used even if the empirical findings point in a different 
direction. Perhaps the most telling indication that the notion of survival has become 
a matter of course is that at the world congress of sociology organized by the 
International Sociological Association (ISA) in 2010, the only session devoted to 
irregular migration is entitled: “Survival strategies of irregular migrants: survey and 
ethnographic evidence.”1 
In short, studies of the incorporation of irregular migrants into receiving 
societies have in common that they tend to emphasize structure over agency (see 
also Black 2003). While irregular migrants had agency before they came, once they 
arrive they become puppets subjected to the control of structural forces. As a result, 
many studies first deal with migration motives (‘why they come’), after which they 
turn to a section on ‘how they survive’.  
This dominant perspective obviously has implications for our understanding 
of the ways in which irregular migrants live. Although irregular migrants do indeed 
experience many limitations, the emphasis on survival has obstructed our 
understanding of the ways in which irregular migrants manage to improve their 
situation. We can gather from Paspalanova’s work, quoted above, that some 
irregular migrants do in fact manage to create a comfortable standard living (see also 
Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Roer-Strier and Olshtain-Mann 1999). Even though the 
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stories of ‘success’ might just make up a small percentage of the total experiences of 
irregular migrants (although we can never be completely sure of that of course), the 
attention that has been awarded to these cases is disproportionally meager to say the 
least.  
 This is not surprising considering the focus on survival, but also because of 
the fact that the upward social mobility that has been reported is limited, not so 
much in numbers of migrants who are able to achieve it, but in terms of the height 
they are able to gain in climbing up the ladder. Although some migrants manage to 
make more money than others, and some get better working conditions over time, 
they still usually occupy the lower strata in the receiving societies. Middle class jobs 
are mostly not available to them. As people usually do not surpass class boundaries, 
the social mobility reported is considered insignificant from the perspective of the 
social scientist. Most scholars regard legalization as the only true way to achieve 
upward social mobility for irregular migrants, because only then can class 
boundaries be surpassed. At the same time, research has found that even after 
legalization few manage to improve their situation considerably (Bailey 1985; 
Donato and Massey 1993; Fakiolas 2003; Glytsos 2005; Hagan 1994; Powers et al. 
1998; Tienda and Singer 1995). Therefore, if scholars do document upward social 
mobility in terms of income or housing, it is usually framed in terms of how some 
manage to survive better than others. 
To conclude, a common perspective focused on survival has developed in 
studies on irregular migrants. The omnipresent implicit emphasis on structure is 
problematic, because it attracts attention away from the agency irregular migrants 
have and from the upward social mobility that some do in fact experience. As a 
result, both phenomena have remained relatively understudied. This is a deficit, as 
studies report that the limited amount of social mobility that is sometimes achieved 
is mostly considered reason enough for irregular migrants to stay in the receiving 
society and is consequently likely to foster new arrivals. After all, the amount of 
upward social mobility might be insignificant from the perspective of the receiving 
society, but that is not the way irregular migrants themselves evaluate their success. 
They have a more transnational outlook and compare their current situation with 
the situation they had in their country of origin (cf. Chavez [1992]1998; Fozdar and 
Torezani 2008; Mahler 1995; Piore 1979; Sladkova 2007). Hence, it is advisable to 
break with the current research practice and consider irregular migrants as active 
agents instead of mere victims determined by social forces.  
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2.3 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCORPORATION 
As noted previously, the issue of social mobility of irregular migrants has been 
understudied, although the question of why some irregular migrants survive better 
than others has been raised in many previous studies. To be more precise, the 
question of why some groups of irregular migrants survive better than other groups 
has usually been answered. These studies have yielded some valuable insights, but 
they also have some limitations. Both are discussed in this section. 
The answer to the question what makes one category of irregular migrants 
more successful at survival than another is usually sought for within the social 
networks of ethnic communities. Two viewpoints about the role that ethnic social 
networks play in this process can be derived from literature. Scholars embracing the 
first viewpoint emphasize the positive effects of ethnic networks and document how 
co-ethnics help each other migrate and take care of newcomers when they arrive (see 
Adam et al. 2002; Engbersen 1996; Hagan 1998). Fellow countrymen assist each other 
in finding work and accommodation. Therefore, well-developed organizational 
forms (‘strong communities’) explain a successful settlement-experience (Hagan 
1994). The concept of ‘social capital’ is often used in this regard and is thought to be 
the most important resource for irregular migrants:  
 
This network of compatriots from which irregular immigrants are able 
to mobilize resources is of vital importance for irregular immigrants. 
Social capital is therefore the most important currency for irregular 
immigrants (Engbersen 2001 cited in Engbersen et al. (2006: 223)).  
 
As a result, migrants who can rely on strong migrant community networks are better 
off than migrants who do not belong to such communities (Leerkes et al. 2007). 
However, Mahler (1995: 225) suspects that such “portrayals of solidarity may reflect 
a romanticization of the immigrant experience” that has become conventionalized. 
As a representative of the second viewpoint, she tones down the significance of 
social capital, arguing that these communities can be exploitative as well (see also 
Cranford 2005; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005; Staring 1998). In her study of 
Salvadorans and South Americans in Long Island, she paints a picture of two highly 
exploitative immigrant groups. As they are cut off from mainstream society, their 
greatest potential for socioeconomic mobility lies within their own communities, by 
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means of exploitation of their own compatriots. Although she does also see instances 
in which migrants help each other, the overall picture portrayed is one of 
competition, distrust and deceit, and clearly not of solidarity.  
While these two viewpoints seem contradictory, they are in fact two sides of 
the same coin called ethnic community networks. One side points to the positive 
effects of embeddedness in an ethnic community, whereas the other underlines the 
negative consequences. At the same time, both sides explain the differences between 
the relative success of communities in terms of differences in social capital between 
these ethnic communities. As this might come across as a bit abstract, let me give an 
example to illustrate how such explanations are put forward in practice. Engbersen 
et al. (1999; 2006) claim that ‘ethnic community patterns of incorporation’ play a 
substantial role in the explanation of the relative success of irregular migrants and 
come up with three patterns of incorporation. The first pattern they observe is 
labeled communal sharing and is widely found among the Turkish community. 
Within this community, permanent support is provided to irregular migrants for 
reasons of enduring solidarity. The second pattern entails bounded solidarity, where 
incidental support is provided to irregular migrants based on reasons of situational 
loyalty. This pattern was discovered among the Moroccan and the African 
communities. The third incorporation pattern the authors describe is based upon 
market relations, and refers to the co-ethnic exploitation Mahler observed in the 
communities she studied.  
In short, the relative amount of ‘success’ of communities that are compared is 
explained by the difference in the dominant support pattern within those 
communities. In other words, the degree of success is explained by the type of 
solidarity that is dominant within that community. While there is primarily 
permanent solidarity in one group, there is mainly situational solidarity or 
instrumental solidarity (which is perceived as exploitation) in the other, and this 
explains why these groups have different outcomes in terms of income, labor, and 
housing conditions. However, it remains to be seen whether the causal relation does 
indeed work in that direction. Although success is now explained by solidarity, the 
direction of the relation might also be the other way around. It might be that there is 
a lot of solidarity in a community, because its members are doing well and can 
afford mutual support, or that people restrict reciprocity because they are not doing 
well. So we only know that high levels of solidarity and success go hand in hand. 
Therefore, the results of the studies discussed above have offered us a preliminary 
understanding of the relative success of different groups of migrants by indicating 
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that certain support patterns go together with ethnic community patterns of 
incorporation. However, in order to further develop our understanding, we need to 
gain insight into the underlying mechanisms responsible for their correlation.  
Although research has not systematically studied the reasons for this 
correlation, some scholars have suggested possible interpretations of why different 
support patterns exist in different communities. Engbersen (1996: 102) for example 
writes that Turkish irregular migrants in the Netherlands can rely more on their own 
community than Moroccans, because it is less divided: “The Moroccan community is 
a divided community where discordant relations cause disruption and limit mutual 
solidarity and trust.” Furthermore, he indicates that Moroccans have limited entry to 
the informal economy, because informal employment generated by ethnic business 
is far less available to Moroccans than to Turks. In another publication, the authors 
refer to the Turkish saying ‘hemserim’, which means ‘I am compelled to help 
someone from my area of origin’ when they want to explain why Turks take care of 
each other (Engbersen et al. 2006), suggesting it has something to do with their 
culture. Furthermore, scholars who have pointed to the negative effects of ethnic 
networks claim that harsh economic circumstances weaken displays of solidarity 
(Cranford 2005; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005).  
As researchers have so far only provided such tentative interpretations, it 
appears that studying the mechanisms responsible for the patterns of incorporation 
that have been distinguished in previous studies is the logical next step to take. 
However, in order to do so, we do need to resolve some issues and eliminate some 
problems that are present in the current research practice involving social capital 
and irregular migrants.  
2.3.1 Conceptualizing community 
The first issue relates to the fact that social capital is considered to be derived from 
‘communities’ that are often poorly conceptualized. It is interesting to see how the 
concept of community is applied to groups using different denominators, and how 
these ‘communities’ are nevertheless subsequently compared to each other. 
Sometimes people from different African countries are for example seen as separate 
communities, and sometimes they are not. Whereas Leman (1997) analyzed migrants 
from Nigeria and Zaire in Brussels separately, Engbersen et al. (1999:157) have 
studied the “African community” in Amsterdam, referring to all migrants 
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originating from “countries south of the Sahara” as Africans (p. 156). A brief look 
into Africa’s history of civil war and tribal warfare is enough to convince anyone 
that Africans – even if they are from the same country – do not necessarily get along, 
let alone form one cohesive community. Nevertheless, the “African community” in 
Amsterdam is compared to the “Turkish community” in Rotterdam. The same 
variation in conceptualizations of community is found in studies of Eastern 
Europeans. Whereas Paspalanova (2006) compares Poles and Bulgarians (and does 
indeed find significant differences between them), Burgers and Engbersen (1999: 
249) regard Eastern Europeans as one “ethnic group”, to be contrasted with other 
“ethnic groups” such as Turks or Surinamese (the latter being people from one of the 
most ethnically diverse countries in the world).  
The same logic is applied when it comes to migrants from Latin America. 
Hagan for example (1994) studies Maya Indians from Guatemala as a distinct ethnic 
group, and Portes and Bach (1985) compare Cubans and Mexicans. However, in 
most other studies, all migrants from South and Central America are lumped 
together and regarded one big Latin American community (see for example Adam et 
al. 2002; Leman 1997; Roer-Strier and Olshtain-Mann 1999). The fact that they both 
speak Spanish does not automatically imply that a migrant from Cuba trusts or 
associates with a migrant from Chile. It is not so surprising then that respondents do 
not label this ‘Latin American community’ as one with high levels of solidarity. 
Moreover, it is not always clear who comes up with the notion of a community, the 
respondents or the researcher. Do respondents feel they belong to an African 
community, or was it the researcher who analyzed them as one community, because 
he or she chose the level of the group as a starting point of analysis? And can groups 
that are so different in terms of composition be compared properly? Such questions 
have usually not been elaborated upon, while in fact they are crucial for our 
understanding of the ways in which irregular migrants are incorporated in receiving 
societies. After all, considering the differences in makeup, it is not very surprising to 
find that the Turkish ‘community’ displays more solidarity than the African 
‘community’.  
Community is also poorly conceptualized in terms of legal status. Scholars 
often remain unclear with regard to the question of what kind of legal status the 
migrants who make up this community have, who is helping whom, or who is 
exploiting whom. Engbersen et al. (1999) have explicitly studied regular migrants 
and asked them about the assistance they provide to irregular migrants. In other 
studies, it is not always made explicit what the legal status of care providers is, while 
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this might be very important. For example, whereas Engbersen et al. (1999) found 
that regular migrants are irregular migrants’ main care providers, P. Anderson 
(1999) showed that established migrants are not always welcoming of new arrivals. 
Staring (1998) also emphasized the dependent position irregular migrants are in vis-
à-vis their legal compatriots who sometimes take advantage of the irregular 
migrants' vulnerability. And Van Nieuwenhuyze (2009) indicates that high levels of 
solidarity are also found among irregular migrants themselves, regardless of their 
nationality.  
The result of these poor conceptualizations is that different ‘communities’ are 
compared to each other, while these can refer to entirely distinct empirical 
phenomena such as categorizations based on ethnicity, geographical origin, or legal 
status. And it might be that precisely these differences shape distinct community 
patterns of incorporation. In order to study the mechanisms responsible for the 
patterns found, it is therefore crucial to take the considerable differences in 
composition of these communities into account.  
2.3.2 Social networks as ethnic community networks 
The second issue is closely related to the previous one and involves the practice that 
social networks are equated with ‘ethnic community’ networks (see also Düvell 
2006c). Obviously, this practice has developed with good reason. Time and again 
researchers found that many migrants almost exclusively associate with people from 
their country of origin. However, this does not mean that assistance provided by 
fellow countrymen can automatically be equated with social capital from the ‘ethnic 
community’. Adam et al. (2002) for example found that several of their respondents 
had close contacts with their family members (who obviously are their co-ethnics) 
and were often assisted by them in getting jobs and accommodation. At the same 
time, these same migrants did not want to have anything to do with their co-ethnics 
in general. Hence, the fact that these migrants are assisted by co-ethnics has nothing 
to do with their ethnic community or the social capital invested in community 
networks, but stems from their family relationships. If strong family relationships 
are frequent within a certain community, they could shape a spurious ethnic 
community pattern. If the focus of analysis is on the community as a whole, this is 
obscured. This means that we cannot properly understand how patterns develop if 
the unit of analysis is the level of the community instead of the individual.  
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Furthermore, not all migrants associate primarily with their co-ethnics. Some 
migrants, especially those migrants whose ‘community’ is relatively small in 
numbers (Adam et al. 2002), do mingle with other migrant groups. These migrants 
are usually not taken into account in research, because migrant communities are 
mostly selected on the basis of their relatively large size (see for example Düvell 
2006b; Engbersen et al. 1999; Paspalanova 2006; Portes and Bach 1985). In such large 
communities, social and ethnic networks do indeed more frequently overlap than is 
the case with smaller migrant groups. As a consequence of this practice, those 
migrants who are part of relatively small communities, or who are embedded in 
networks that span community boundaries, are overlooked (see also Staring 1998). 
 If one intends to study patterns of incorporation of irregular migrants, one 
obviously should not only select migrants from large communities. After all, 
irregular migrants can possibly mobilize social capital from more sources than 
ethnic community networks. Moreover, the insights we can get from studying 
networks that span ethnic communities might be very valuable and should not be 
excluded beforehand. Hagan (1994) has shown that although ethnic community 
networks can be very beneficial in the initial phase of settlement, they tend to lock 
migrants in and restrict opportunities of social mobility in the long run, as migrants 
do not develop resources outside these networks. Others also emphasize the 
importance of contacts beyond the own community (see for example Cyrus and 
Vogel 2006; Psimmenos and Kassimati 2006). As these cross-community contacts are 
considered the most likely suppliers of upward social mobility, we could learn a 
great deal from social networks that span community boundaries. 
2.3.3 The situational character of social capital 
The third issue that needs to be resolved relates to the fact that even if there is 
abundant social capital present in some community, this does not mean that every 
individual is able to mobilize it to the same extent. Scholars do acknowledge that 
there are differences within ethnic groups in terms of the ability to mobilize social 
capital, but there is not much attention paid to these differences as the level of 
analysis is the group as a whole. In other words, internal differentiation is noted, but 
not elaborated upon. Staring (1998: 226) presents a similar critique: “Although (…) 
social capital [is] linked to membership of an (ethnic) group, [it is not] a constant and 
omnipresent element within those communities as is suggested by a network 
approach. Instead, both are situational and have to be activated.” Furthermore, he 
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points out that within one community, both acts of solidarity and exploitation can 
occur simultaneously: “In addition to the solidarity displayed and help offered to 
these migrants, many were also confronted with distrust, disloyalty and deceit by 
members of their own community.”(p. 227) This illustrates how solidarity is 
situational as well. By looking at some sort of general level of solidarity, or a 
dominant support pattern for the whole group, one fails to see that migrants are 
assisted in some situations and exploited in others. In order to develop better 
understanding of the mechanisms that shape patterns of incorporation and social 
mobility, we therefore need to take the situational character of solidarity into 
account by differentiating between situations in which assistance is provided.  
2.3.4 Contextual perceptions of solidarity 
The fourth issue that needs to be resolved refers to the fact that social scientists 
usually rely on their informants’ understanding of solidarity, which complicates 
comparison. For example, the Turkish respondents Engbersen et al. (2006) studied 
reported high levels of solidarity among Turks even though they had to pay money 
to their caregivers in exchange for their accommodation, whereas Mahler (1995) 
contrastingly indicated that her respondents felt exploited by co-ethnics for precisely 
the same reason. Whether or not someone perceives an act as an act of solidarity or 
as an act of exploitation is highly contextual. For example, some people experience 
exploitation if they have to work for five euros, while others perceive this to be an 
opportunity. For someone who has migrated with the aim of returning to his 
country, five euros per hour is likely to be considered a lot of money, because he 
desires to spend it there, whereas for someone who wants to settle in the receiving 
society, such an amount might not suffice. How someone perceives an act 
consequently depends on the migration motives of individual migrants and the 
contexts they live in. It makes little sense to compare the levels of solidarity 
respondents report without taking these differences into account. This constitutes a 
good reason why an approach that starts with the motivations of the individual 
migrants seems a fruitful course of action for uncovering the factors that shape 
ethnic patterns of incorporation. The arguments presented above indicate that this 
works better than to continue along the line of comparison of incomparable groups. 
However, the next section indicates that comparative designs based on migration 
motives are problematic as well.  
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2.4 COMPARATIVE DESIGNS BASED ON MIGRATION MOTIVES 
In the design of comparative studies, groups of migrants are often selected based on 
their presupposed motives for migration. This way, scholars intend to compare 
different types of migration, as these are believed to underlie distinct patterns of 
incorporation. Portes and Bach (1985) have for example compared Mexicans and 
Cubans in the United States. While the first group was assumed to consist of 
economic migrants, the latter was believed to be made up of political refugees. 
Although such designs look very promising, the selection of groups based on a 
priori assumptions regarding migration motives is problematic for three reasons.  
First, because of practical difficulties involved in the selection of migrants 
with a specific migration motive, the selection of migrants is based on a proxy – 
ethnic groups – which does not work out well in practice. For example, not all 
migrants from countries with political problems are necessarily political refugees. 
Furthermore, Poles or Bulgarians are often selected, because they are believed to 
represent a new type of migration in Europe that largely consists of commuters. 
Closer inspection teaches us that not all Polish or Bulgarian irregular migrants 
necessarily commute. Paspalanova (2006) tellingly divided Bulgarians – a 
supposedly homogeneous group in terms of migration motives – into commuters (12 
persons), settlers (45 persons), false students (14 persons), and migrants who have 
lost their residence documents (4 persons). This clearly shows how heterogeneous 
nationality groups can be in terms of motivations, which is strikingly at odds with 
the assumptions underlying comparative research designs. When researchers set out 
to compare two or more groups of migrants based on country of origin as a proxy 
for migration motive, it usually turns out that these nationality categories are not 
internally homogeneous in terms of motivations and therefore not as easy to 
compare as presupposed.  
Second, even if one were to take the motives themselves as a starting point, 
instead of a proxy, it turns out that migration motives are not always so easily 
divided into analytical categories. Political and economic motives are for example 
often intertwined (Mahler 1995; Portes and Bach 1985; Rodriguez 1987). While they 
are easy to distinguish theoretically, they have proved difficult to disentangle 
empirically. As Portes and Bach (1985: 74) observe: 
 
Individuals labeled political refugees have been found, on closer 
inspection, to have very definite economic motivations to leave their 
  Life Without Papers 
26 
home country. (…) Conversely, movements that on the surface appear 
to be economic may turn out to have direct political roots. (…) Political 
processes may turn out to induce migration, directly or indirectly, as 
they constrain the economic opportunities available to the general 
population or particular segments of it. 
 
This mix of motives hampers the development of contextual theoretical insight, as it 
remains unclear which motive underlies observed patterns of incorporation.  
A third reason why selecting groups based on migration motives is 
problematic is that these motivations usually do not remain the same. As indicated 
in section 2.2., several studies have documented that irregular migrants’ aspirations 
are often unrealistic and that many are therefore forced to adapt their expectations to 
the newly encountered reality once they arrive. This means that, regardless of their 
original intentions and regardless of the factors that initiated their migration, 
irregular migrants who come with false expectations are forced to develop new 
aspirations that fit the situation they encounter. Moreover, according to Mahler, 
“even those who had been well-informed by their relatives about life in the United 
States still did not anticipate how they would have to realign both their expectations 
and their strategies after arrival.” (p. 89) Consequently, as irregular migrants have to 
adjust their migration motives to the situation they find upon arrival, their initial 
motives are likely to be altered, possibly to a considerable degree. This is illustrated 
most clearly by studies that have demonstrated that many migrants who come with 
the intention of staying for a short period end up settling down (Chavez [1992]1998; 
Paspalanova 2006; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). 
Moreover, Van Wijk (2007) demonstrated that migrants sometimes apply for 
asylum, because that is what their smugglers tell them to do, while they initially 
migrated with the intention of working. The finding that some economic migrants 
profit from the opportunities that asylum procedures provide has been noted before 
(see for example Düvell and Jordan 2006).  
In short, when it comes to explaining patterns of incorporation of irregular 
migrants in the receiving society, it is all the more important to look at their current 
intentions and not just their initial migration motives. Irregular migration and 
settlement are complex processes that cannot be captured by simply looking at 
migration motives in order to develop straightforward explanations for the patterns 
of incorporation found. These initial motives of irregular migrants can change 
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significantly during the incorporation process and not necessarily always in the 
same direction. I do not mean to say that migration motives are not important when 
it comes to explaining patterns of incorporation. Research on regular migration has 
indicated their relevance (Castles and Miller 2003). However, in case of irregular 
migration the relationship is much more complex than is assumed when developing 
comparative research designs based on (a proxy for) migration motives.  
All in all, it seems better to compare migrants on the basis of their own 
motives and not to rely on categories thought to represent their motives. Moreover, 
for analytical purposes, it seems better to take irregular migrants’ current goals and 
intentions, and not their initial motives, as a starting point of analysis, as the latter 
can significantly change during the incorporation process and are in any case 
difficult to disentangle. Such goals and intentions are usually referred to as 
aspirations (MacLeod 2009, Portes et al. 1978). I would be the last to claim that other 
scholars have not acknowledged the inherent difficulties in research on migration 
and settlement processes before. However, they have surprisingly not considered 
this to be a reason to make aspirations a central focus of their research. In the next 
section the suggestion of an alternative approach that takes aspirations as a starting 
point of analysis is elaborated upon in terms of prior research, problems and 
theoretical background.  
2.5.  BRINGING ASPIRATIONS IN 
2.5.1 Prior research involving aspirations 
A very limited number of previous studies have distinguished among irregular 
migrants’ aspirations; only in the field of anthropology I did encounter these. In the 
United States, Chavez ([1992]1998) has distinguished between migrants who want to 
stay temporarily and migrants aiming to settle down. This distinction draws heavily 
upon the classic literature on migration in which (regular) migrants are classified as 
either sojourners (Siu 1987[1953]) or settled migrants (Piore 1979). In Europe, Leman 
(1997) makes a distinction between those who primarily migrate to work – usually 
temporarily – and make money (employment illegality) and migrants who come to 
reside and legalize their status (residence illegality). In my opinion, these 
anthropological studies have brought us increased understanding of the ways 
irregular migrants live by distinguishing between these aspirations. However, most 
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sociologists active in the field of irregular migration deem it irrelevant to make such 
analytical distinctions: 
 
Même si certain sans-papiers, et plus précisément les clandestins, 
espèrent ne rester en Belgique qu’une brève période pour gagner de 
l’argent et puis rentrer dans leur pays d’origine, nombreux sont ceux 
qui connaissent la même destine que les travailleurs immigrés 
traditionnels. Le provisoire devient permanent, et tout en maintenant 
le rêve du retour, ils se fixent dans le pays d’arrivé. Ce constat montre 
qu’il n’est pas pertinent d’établir une distinction nette entre les 
migrants en situation d’illégalité de travail et les migrants en situation 
d’illégalité de séjour, comme le soutient Johan Leman (1997). (Adam et 
al. 2002: 207) 
 
Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994:17) also writes that “settlement often derives from 
sojourner or circular migration, and hence settlement cannot be treated as a discrete 
condition.” Scholars such as these argue that because many temporary migrants 
eventually become settlers, we must not study them as separate categories. Others 
likewise state that irregular migrants’ aspirations are too fluid to capture and use for 
analysis. Mahler (1995) for example claims that irregular migrants’ lives are 
characterized by changing opinions with regard to temporary versus permanent 
settlement, sometimes even on a daily basis. And Hagan (1994: 94) argues that 
irregular migrants rarely make long-term plans. Their decisions “are often based on 
a constantly changing set of attitudes, options, conditions and relations in both the 
home community and host society.” She writes: “ultimately, immigrant options are 
left open and remain flexible until one is forced to make a decision.”(p. 95) 
Furthermore, Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) found that even if migrants are committed to 
staying, unanticipated events in their home country could sidetrack such plans. For 
this reason she claims that “a research strategy based on simply asking respondents 
about their settlement intentions has serious limitations.” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994: 
xxii) 
Obviously, these scholars rightly observe that irregular migrants’ aspirations 
can and do change over time. They are also correct in noting that this fluidity in 
aspirations makes it hard to capture them with standard survey techniques. Indeed, 
because of the insecurity of their situation, it is hard to construct a typology of 
 Beyond Victims and Communities: Bringing Aspirations in 
29 
migrants based on their aspirations, as these change during their careers. After all, 
irregular migrants’ evaluation of the opportunity structure can change, for example 
through increased migrant experience, but also resulting from changes in 
government policies which open doors that were previously closed. However, even 
though there are many difficulties involved in studying the aspirations of irregular 
migrants, that does not mean that it is not instructive to try to make these a starting 
point of analysis by using other than standard survey techniques. The possible 
merits of such an approach are underlined by the fact that the classic migration 
literature indicates that migrants’ incorporation processes undergo many changes as 
a result of shifting aspirations. Piore (1979) for example argues that the shift from 
temporary ambitions toward settlement almost invariably includes a shift in job 
aspirations. While temporary migrants are able to accept certain work conditions, 
because their frame of reference is the country of origin and not the host country, 
such tolerance does not exist among those with residence ambitions. And according 
to Massey (1986) migrants send fewer of their earnings back home and start to spend 
more money in the destination country when they decide to settle down. Such 
changes occur, even though they remain undecided about returning to their home 
country some day. Piore (1979: 65) writes: “However settled they actually become, 
they continue to see themselves in a certain sense as belonging to some other place 
and retain an idea, albeit increasingly vague and undefined, of returning ‘home’.” 
Although this option is always kept open, they do make significant changes in their 
lives that we can only understand with reference to their changing aspirations. So if 
we want to understand how certain patterns of incorporation are shaped, we have to 
look at irregular migrants’ aspirations. Thus, one can analytically distinguish 
between aspirations, while at the same time recognizing that aspirations can develop 
into other aspirations over time.  
2.5.2 Towards an analysis based on aspirations 
In the above it has become clear that we have good reason to take aspirations as a 
starting point of analysis. First, focusing on aspirations helps to avoid the 
overemphasizing of structure common to most other studies. Second, the problems 
and issues mentioned above related to the comparison of groups indicate that 
although explanations which take communities as a starting point of analysis have 
considerably advanced development of theoretical insights, they can only do so up 
to a certain point. Third, current aspirations are a better analytical category than 
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migration motives as aspirations can allow change to be incorporated into the 
model. Fourth, the classic literature on migration and two anthropological studies 
indicate that distinguishing between aspirations can provide useful insights into the 
question of how patterns of incorporation are shaped.  
This means that in order to take our understanding of the ways in which 
irregular migrants are incorporated in the receiving societies a step further; we need 
to apply a more inductive approach and take the aspirations of individual migrants 
as a starting point of analysis. Now that we know what the dominant patterns in the 
large groups are, time has come to also assess the lives of those who do not conform 
to the general pattern. Moreover, instead of merely describing different patterns of 
incorporation, we need to increase our understanding of how these are shaped.  
The literature has overemphasized structure and thereby neglected human 
agency. However, by putting aspirations at the center of our analysis we have to 
make sure we do not fall into the opposite trap by overemphasizing agency: we 
might fail to contextualize attitudes and actions as responses to objective structures. 
I will therefore briefly outline how the present study aims to prevent this hazard.  
Aspirations form parts of wider ethical and metaphysical ideas which derive 
from larger cultural norms (Appadurai 2004). Aspirations to the good life are for 
example part of some sort of system of ideas of what constitutes a good life. 
However, aspirations also mediate what an individual desires and what society can 
offer (MacLeod 2009). Aspirations are therefore inextricably linked to an assessment 
of available opportunities. In other words, while aspirations partly stem from larger 
cultural systems, they also feed upon evaluations of the opportunity structure. 
Aspirations are thus about wants and preferences, but also about choices and 
calculations. As a consequence, aspirations neither reflect untamed migrant dreams, 
nor are they necessarily rational in the sense that they are the result of the purposive 
and pre-planned pursuit of calculated goals (cf. MacLeod 2009; Portes et al. 1978).  
Aspirations are constructed in the habitus of the individual (MacLeod 2009: 
15). The habitus is informed through socialization into larger cultural structures and 
by the objective opportunity structure. However, although the habitus is informed 
by the objective opportunity structure, there is no direct relationship: all perceptions 
of the opportunity structure are necessarily subjective and influenced by a host of 
intervening factors (MacLeod 2009). This means that there is not a mechanistic and 
simplistic relationship between aspirations and real-life opportunities. Instead, there 
is a relationship between aspirations and opportunities migrants perceive they have. 
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This difference between objective and perceived opportunities is important, as 
irregular migrants are people who, par excellence, are usually not well informed 
about their opportunities and have limited experiences exploring or navigating them 
(Appadurai 2004).  
In summary, both cultural and social structures constrain and enable 
irregular migrants (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994), and aspirations draw from both. 
Consequently, placing aspirations at the center of analysis does not imply 
overemphasizing agency. To the contrary, aspirations provide “a conceptual link 
between structure and agency in that they are rooted firmly in individual proclivity 
(agency) but also are acutely sensitive to perceived societal constraints (structure)” 
(MacLeod 2009: 139). 
This means that, although the lives of the respondents in this dissertation 
take place within distinct structural settings – Belgium and the Netherlands – I do 
not aim to assess the effects of these national contexts. After all, I am primarily 
interested in perceived opportunities and how these influence the aspirations and 
the behavior of irregular migrants. At the same time, I certainly do not want to turn 
a blind eye to the possibility that one national context may in fact provide better 
opportunities for upward mobility than the other. However, experience in trying to 
localize the effects has taught us that is almost an impossible task. Only recently has 
such an effort has been made. Van Nieuwenhuyze (2009) has compared the lives of 
migrants from the Senegambian area in Belgium and Spain and came to the 
conclusion that there were differences in many respects between the group in Spain 
and the group in Belgium. Unsurprisingly, she found it difficult to attribute the 
differences she found in the lives of the two groups of migrants to differences in 
policy contexts. The respondents she interviewed in Spain appeared to differ from 
those in Belgium in so many respects that it was impossible to ascertain that this was 
in fact attributable to differences in policy contexts. The observed differences could 
also have been the result of her sampling, differences in migration histories of the 
two groups she compared, or the geographical location of the receiving societies. In 
other words, the variation in other factors made it difficult to ‘isolate’ possible effects 
of policies. This is not an uncommon problem when it comes to comparative 
research on irregular migration and is likely to be one of the reasons why so few 
systematic comparative efforts have been undertaken on the level of the nation-state.  
For these reasons, this study also does not aim to systematically study the 
effects of policies. Even though the lives of my respondents are situated in two 
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different policy contexts, these different contexts do not mechanically constrain or 
construct irregular migrants’ actions. Instead, irregular migrants take advantage and 
react to this window of opportunity in different ways (Elrick and Ciobanu 2009; 
Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Kyle and Siracusa 2005). I therefore find it more 
relevant to focus on the interaction between irregular migrants and the context in 
which they find themselves than to try to localize the effects of policies through 
deductive reasoning.  
As argued, we should start our analyses with the individual and his or her 
aspirations. For analytical purposes, we have to determine if there are patterns to be 
distinguished in the aspirations of irregular migrants, which is very likely to be the 
case. These categories of aspirations can be used as a first analytical framework 
instead of ethnic groups. Instead of starting with ethnic groups and then discovering 
that migrants belonging to the same ethnic group have different aspirations, we start 
with their aspirations and then see how incorporation into communities influences 
opportunities. After all, people must first aspire to something, such as work, before 
they have a certain opportunity structure in an ethnically stratified labor market.  
In arguing that one should take aspirations as a starting point of analysis, 
some smaller comments and suggestions for improvement of the study of irregular 
migrants and their incorporation have been made as well. In the section below, I 
briefly outline how these issues are dealt with in this dissertation.  
2.5.3 Outline of this dissertation 
Transnational activities are important to take into account. As said before, irregular 
migrants mostly have a transnational outlook on their lives in the receiving societies. 
If we do not consider the transnational contacts they have and the activities they 
undertake, this hampers our understanding of the way irregular migrants live 
within the receiving societies as their transnational engagements heavily influence 
the choices migrants make. According to Mahler (1995), the transnational obligations 
that migrants have are the prime mover toward their suspension of solidarity. The 
migrants she interviewed restricted their acts of solidarity in the receiving society in 
order to fulfill transnational obligations. The role of transnational activities is dealt 
with in chapter 8.  
Closely related, it is crucial not to look at social mobility from the perspective 
of the receiving society. Such a perspective does not take the transnational outlook 
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that irregular migrants use to judge their own success into account, but instead tries 
to objectively determine social mobility. However, migrants’ pre-migratory 
situations cannot be compared to their current situations without possessing a great 
deal of background information. In order to be able to correctly interpret societal 
positions in sending countries, we need extensive information on their historical, 
cultural and social contexts. This kind of information, from such a variety of 
countries is of course nearly impossible to obtain and process in practice. So it is 
difficult to construct a standard by which social mobility of irregular migrants can 
appropriately be determined and compared to other irregular migrants. Therefore, it 
is best to take the perceptions of irregular migrants as a starting point instead. The 
question is then not focused on objective social mobility, but on the realization of 
aspirations. The question becomes: What kind of aspirations do irregular migrants 
have and what does it take to realize these?  
While this first question is dealt with in chapter 5, the second is linked to the 
debate on the significance of different forms of capital and therefore requires an 
additional introduction. The present chapter has only discussed social capital, while 
this is not the only resource irregular migrants can deploy to realize their 
aspirations. Other resources such as the ability to master foreign languages, 
educational credentials or professional skills are most likely relevant as well. 
Moreover, as said before, there is a need to differentiate between the situations in 
which their social capital avails irregular migrants. The conceptual scheme 
developed by Briggs (1998) seems especially useful. He conceptualizes two types of 
social capital available in social networks: social support and social leverage. Social 
support helps people ‘get by’ or cope, while social leverage helps people ‘get ahead’ 
(Briggs 1998: 178). Social support thus ensures that irregular migrants' basic needs 
are met which enables them to ‘survive’, whereas networks that provide social 
leverage can help people to realize their aspirations (cf. Domínguez and Watkins 
2003).  
These considerations lead me to reformulate the third research question, 
which was described in the previous chapter: 
 
3. What forms of capital do irregular migrants need to realize their 
aspirations?  
 
This third research question is dealt with in chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDYING ASPIRATIONS: DATA 
AND METHODS 
This chapter discusses the data and methods that I used in my research. The first 
section explains why I have adopted a grounded theory approach. The subsequent 
section discusses the different types of data I have collected to answer my research 
questions and is followed by a section on how these data are used throughout this 
study. The chapter finishes with a discussion of relevant methodological issues and 
a concise conclusion. 
3.1 GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
Since I aim to study irregular migrants as active agents, I need methods that enable 
me to study the practices and actions of irregular migrants. The grounded theory 
approach provides a suitable methodological framework. In the grounded theory 
approach, human beings are “viewed as active agents in their lives and in their 
worlds rather than as passive recipients of larger social forces.” (Charmaz 2006: 7). 
Furthermore, as the aim of grounded theorists is to construct theory, it perfectly 
suits the inductive approach argued for in the previous chapter.  
Grounded theory methods are advocated by Glaser and Strauss in their book 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Grounded theory methods “consist of systematic, 
yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct 
theories ´grounded´ in the data themselves.” (Charmaz 2006: 2). The aim of 
researchers who adopt this approach is to develop theories from research grounded 
in data rather than to test existing theories by deducing testable hypotheses from 
them. Instead of verified or falsified, theory is constructed through comparative 
analyses (Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006). The aim is not “to provide a perfect 
description of an area” like ethnography aims to do, “but to develop a theory that 
accounts for much of the relevant behavior” (Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006: 30). The 
formation of analytical categories – typologies – is what grounded theorists aim for. 
These analytical categories should “yield a ´meaningful´ picture, abetted by apt 
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illustrations that enable one to grasp the reference in terms of one’s own experience” 
(Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006: 38). 
According to Glaser and Strauss ([1967]2006) researchers adopting a 
grounded theory approach should not start their research endeavors by analyzing 
the literature, because the theory should emerge inductively from the data. This idea 
that researchers approach reality as a ‘tabula rasa’ has been heavily criticized for 
being naïve (Charmaz 2006; Layder 1998; Strauss and Corbin [1990]1998). According 
to this new branch of scholars, it is best not to develop systematic theoretical ideas 
before entering the field, but to have a sense of theoretical direction. This way, 
researchers ensure that preconceived ideas or theories are not forced upon the data, 
but that concepts emerge from the data. Instead of a fully outlined theory, they 
argue that it is advisable to enter the field with some sensitizing concepts (Blumer 
1969), providing the researcher with some initial ideas to pursue (see Charmaz 2006; 
Layder 1998; Strauss and Corbin [1990]1998). For me, concepts such as 
incorporation, social mobility and transnationalism offered valuable “points of 
departure” (Charmaz 2006: 17) to form interview topics and questions and to think 
analytically about the data I gathered. Sensitizing concepts primarily serve to guide 
the research process; the theoretical concepts are filled with content and are adjusted 
while the research unfolds. The sensitizing concepts provided me with “theoretical 
openings that avoid importing and imposing packaged images and automatic 
answers” (Charmaz 2006: 135): they enabled me to form meaningful analytical 
categories inductively, while still having a sense of direction.  
Grounded theory methods offer a “set of principles and practices” rather than 
“prescriptions or packages” (Charmaz 2006: 9). One of its core principles is that data 
collection and analysis are not separate phases in the research process, but take place 
simultaneously (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006). The research process 
unfolds in different stages, and in each stage data analysis and collection inform one 
another. Crucial to all phases in the research process are “constant comparative 
methods” (Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006): researchers constantly look for patterns in 
the data. Coding and writing memos are crucial tools for making comparisons in 
grounded theory.  
Grounded theory coding consists of at least two phases: initial coding and 
focused coding (Charmaz 2006). Initially, data are compared to data to find 
similarities and differences. Using this process, a focused code is developed that is 
more conceptual than the initial codes. In the next phase the data are compared to 
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these focused codes. In other words, new incidents are compared to properties of the 
category that resulted from the initial comparison of incidents. Through the process 
of writing memos a theory emerges from the data. Writing memos prompts 
researchers to analyze the data and codes early in the research process, helping to 
increase the level of abstractions of ideas that emerge. Memo writing allows 
researchers to make conjectures, after which they can go back to the field and gather 
more data to check these conjectures. Through writing memos and focused codes I 
built and clarified categories, and I became aware of variations within and between 
categories. Furthermore, I could identify gaps in my analysis, which I could go back 
to the field with to fill by sampling theoretically. Theoretical sampling involves 
sampling to develop the properties of the categories until no new properties emerge. 
In other words, the categories are saturated with data and subsequently sorted to 
integrate an emerging theory (Charmaz 2006).  
In the previous chapter it may have seemed as if I conducted my research by 
taking aspirations as a starting point, but this is by no means the case. During my 
research, a typology of aspirations was constructed. When I started my research I 
began with some of the same preconceptions I argued against in chapter 2. It was 
only during my fieldwork – especially the writing of memos – that aspirations 
became my central categories: I originally set out with the research questions listed 
in chapter 1 seeking to answer them by means of inductive research.  
Inductive research does not easily fit the standard formats for scholarly 
writing because the latter use deductive logic. As there are no clear-cut answers to 
deal with this tension in terms of typical formats used in qualitative studies, I have 
decided to present the reader ´reconstructed logic´ instead of ´logic in use´ (Kaplan 
1964). Kaplan (1964) argues that science as a process is guided by ´logic in use´ and 
science as a product by ´reconstructed logic´, and it is the product of my scientific 
endeavor that is relevant and therefore presented here.  
3.2 DATA 
From the outset of my project I was in the privileged position of already having 
relevant data at my disposal: more than 300 semi-structured interviews with 
irregular migrants. These have been gathered by research assistants in connection to 
some of the large scale projects in Belgium2 and the Netherlands3 that my promoter 
and I have been involved in. The initial plan was to lump these interviews together 
for analysis. However, after I carefully studied these, the data seemed less suitable 
  Life Without Papers 
38 
than originally thought. In the previous chapter it has become clear that researching 
irregular migrants as active agents by means of standard survey techniques can be 
problematic. Even though the available interviews I had at my disposal included 
open questions and contained a lot of relevant information, they did not provide me 
with enough understanding of irregular migrants’ actions. I felt a strong need to 
gain more understanding by entering the field myself. The semi-structured 
interviews offered me valuable information, allowing me to distinguish different 
patterns of incorporation. In addition, they provided preliminary understanding of 
how these patterns are shaped. However, in order to arrive at a more profound 
understanding that included dynamics and practices, additional fieldwork was 
required. 
During the course of my project I have chosen to supplement the semi-
structured interviews with participant observation in combination with in-depth 
interviews. I have therefore lived in the cities of Antwerp and The Hague in 2006 
and 2007 for several months each. For purposes of fieldwork, I rented a room in both 
cities in centrally located areas where many irregular migrants live. The different 
types of data that were gathered during this period are discussed below, following a 
discussion of the data that were already available.  
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews  
Research assistants, who were selected because of their specific ethnic backgrounds, 
their experience with the research group and their interviewing skills, carried out 
120 semi-structured interviews in Belgium in 2004 and 2005. The interviews 
generally lasted between one and a half and two and a half hours and were 
conducted in respondents’ mother tongues, except for those with Congolese 
respondents, which were held in French. The quotations of respondents that are 
used in the empirical chapters were translated into English by me. The interviewers 
had successfully localized respondents through important community members, 
and they contacted respondents in bars, teahouses, or churches. Furthermore, 
respondents were asked if they could refer the research team to other irregular 
migrants. This so-called ‘snowball method’ has been successfully applied in other 
studies involving irregular migrants (e.g. Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Chavez 
[1992]1998; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Paspalanova 2006; Van Nieuwenhuyze 
2009) and helps to develop a measure of rapport, since contact is made through an 
established and trusted personal relation (Chavez 1994). Snowball-sampling is now 
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widely recognized as a virtual prerequisite for meaningful surveys in the field of 
irregular migration (Black 2003). The downside of snowball-sampling is that it tends 
to produce a sample bias, which is why the number of referrals per respondent was 
kept to a minimum. In total, 120 semi-structured interviews with irregular migrants 
in Flanders and Brussels were held (see appendix 1 for an overview). In order to 
capture variety in aspirations and social networks, various migrant groups were 
interviewed in different localities (cf. Chavez 1994). Moroccans were interviewed in 
Antwerp, Turks and Bulgarians in Ghent, and Congolese in Brussels, because these 
groups are heavily represented in these cities (Van Meeteren et al. 2007b). The 
Bulgarians in Ghent are of Turkish origin. The Congolese group largely consists of 
former asylum seekers. 
Unfortunately, the interviews that were held with irregular migrants in the 
Netherlands did not provide enough information about the aspirations of the 
respondents. After aspirations became a central focus, I therefore chose to use only 
the semi-structured interviews collected by research assistants in Belgium and to 
leave those carried out in the Netherlands out of my analysis.  
3.2.2 Participant observation  
Participant observation is a research method that is not standardized and that can be 
applied in multiple ways. It is therefore important to be clear about how this method 
has been used in this study. To be able to judge the quality of the research, it is 
necessary to have insight into the research process. This section therefore describes 
my fieldwork, especially with regard to the observations of irregular migrants that I 
made during this period.  
I conducted fieldwork in Belgium for almost six months. When I started my 
fieldwork in Belgium in the spring of 2006, I was lucky to discover that at that time, 
irregular migrants were actively engaged in large public actions in order to enforce 
‘regularization for all’. The emergence of this ‘pro-regularization movement’ 
(Laubenthal 2007) made it easy for me to get into contact with irregular migrants. All 
over Belgium they had occupied churches, held protest marches and some were 
even engaged in hunger strikes. These actions were organized by UDEP (Union pour 
la Défense des Sans-Papiers), which is a collective of irregular migrants who fight for 
the rights of irregular migrants. In Flanders, their actions were coordinated with 
local churches and welfare organizations and became known as ‘church asylum’. 
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UDEP consists of several local departments that cooperate on both the local and 
national levels. I took part in the weekly meetings of the local department in 
Antwerp, and I visited all the events they organized during church asylum. I also 
joined them in the national protest marches held by UDEP.  
During the time that the Antwerp branch occupied a church (June-July 2006), 
I visited the church and its temporary inhabitants almost every day. Thirty irregular 
migrants slept in the church they occupied, and many other irregular migrants 
visited them throughout the day. These others helped those who slept in the church 
in many ways, for example by cooking, being present at organized events, and 
attending the meetings that took place. Usually however, they just came by to keep 
up with the latest news on UDEP’s actions and to keep the sleepers company. 
During these daily visits, I got to see them in their daily routine, and I was able to 
build up trusting relationships with them, as they were there every day, almost the 
entire day, playing cards or chatting with each other and with their visitors. One of 
the most important recurring events was the change of church that took place about 
every two to three weeks. Holding their mattresses under their arms, the irregular 
migrants loudly paraded, as they moved from one church to the other, escorted by 
the police.  
I was also often invited to eat with them, which gave me the opportunity to 
follow the discussions they held amongst each other. Because not everybody knew 
everybody intimately, I heard some life stories told over the dinner table or over 
coffee afterwards. After each day I wrote many field notes when I got home. From 
the moment I introduced myself to the participants in church asylum, I was clear 
about my objectives. I told them I was a PhD student in sociology writing a thesis (or 
a book) about irregular migrants. I have never expressed my own views on their 
political demands, yet some introduced me to others as “Masja, our biggest 
supporter, she comes to see us every day”. I am therefore aware of the possibility 
that some of the irregular migrants involved in church asylum might have 
interpreted my presence as support. Every now and then I therefore found it 
appropriate to remind them that I was ‘writing a book’ about irregular migrants. 
Nevertheless, I was under the impression that they appreciated my daily company, 
especially on those days when I was their only visitor.  
Whereas I met close to a hundred irregular migrants in connection to church 
asylum, I chose to interview only nine of them more intensively, as described in the 
next section. Irregular migrants who are involved in such political actions constitute 
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a very particular group and should therefore not be regarded as representative for 
the population of irregular migrants. Although I did not strive for a representative 
sample, I did aim for variety. I therefore also observed many other irregular 
migrants, some of whom were even unaware of the political actions taking place on 
their behalf.  
Apart from the observations I made in church asylum, I met many other 
irregular migrants whom I managed to observe in their daily activities. In order to 
capture variety, I used as many entries as I could think of (cf. Burgers 1998). I 
encountered irregular migrants to observe in the streets, in churches that were not 
involved in church asylum, through organizations, and through snowball sampling 
of my own personal network, as well as those of irregular migrants. Over the course 
of my fieldwork, I have often been invited to lunch or dinner with informants in 
their houses and on occasion in a restaurant. In return, I have invited some of them 
for dinner or drinks in my fieldwork apartment in Antwerp or The Hague. 
Furthermore, I often went for a drink in a bar with a respondent, especially during 
my stay in Belgium when the world soccer championships were held. With my 
respondents, I supported various countries and many respondents showed their 
sympathy towards me by supporting the Netherlands. Belgium did not qualify that 
year, but Ecuador and Ghana came very far, much to the joy of some of my 
respondents.  
In addition to social gatherings connected to food and drinks, I often went for 
a walk through the city or in one of Antwerp’s parks with respondents. On Sundays, 
I accompanied some of them to church. Moreover, I was invited to (birthday) parties 
and went swimming in a local lake with a group of 25 Latin American migrants. 
Some introduced me to their friends who then invited me to dinner in their house. 
The Sunday dinners were particularly special, as in many cultures, extended 
families, neighbors and friends are all invited to dine together on this day. In all 
these different ways I gathered a lot of field notes. Again, all of these people knew 
that I was a PhD student writing a book about irregular migrants. Outside church 
asylum, the irregular migrants I observed always introduced me to others as such. 
Nevertheless, I realize that it is possible that people forgot about my social scientific 
preoccupations on occasion. Although data tend to get better when they do (see also 
Hagan 1994), I made a habit of subtly reminding people every once in a while.  
In exchange for the information they provided me with, some respondents 
sometimes asked me for a favor in return. I have therefore translated letters that 
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people received and did not understand, I have arranged for payment by installment 
in case someone received a fine he or she could not afford to pay at once, and most 
importantly I have given a lot of advice. This usually concerned places to go for free 
language teaching, shopping or medical care. I did not give any advice in terms of 
possibilities for legalization. Other research has indicated that living amongst the 
research population and assuming multiple roles besides being a researcher has 
proved to be successful method of assuring good data (see for example Hagan 1994; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Mahler 1995).  
 I tried to spend most time with those migrants I also interviewed in in-depth 
interviews to see how they ´lived´ what they reported to me in those interviews. This 
way, I was able to validate the answers they gave to me during the interviews, and I 
was able to reflect, together with the respondents themselves, on their actions in 
relation to what they told me in the interviews. Thus I was able to ensure that the 
combination of participant observation with interviewing yielded a more accurate 
portrayal of the lives of irregular migrants than I would have gathered if I had used 
methods of self-report alone (see also Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).  
Unlike in Belgium, there were no political actions in the Netherlands in which 
irregular migrants were actively involved for me to observe. I did however observe 
irregular migrants in other contexts in both countries. Nevertheless, I gathered more 
material in Belgium than I did in the Netherlands. This is because I started my 
fieldwork in Belgium, and by the time I started fieldwork in the Netherlands my 
categories were becoming theoretically saturated. After almost three months of 
fieldwork there, I therefore decided to stop, even though I did not collect the same 
amount of information as I did in Belgium. Furthermore, as my research does not 
aim to systematically compare experiences in the two countries and consequently 
does not need two comparable sets of data, this seemed to be a good decision.  
3.2.3 In-depth interviews with irregular migrants 
I selected only a few of the irregular migrants I observed for an in-depth interview. I 
usually only invited a person after I had gathered enough information through 
participant observation to determine if the respondent’s story would be interesting 
for an interview. This way, I was able to determine beforehand if a respondent 
would provide me with a story that I had more or less heard before or if an 
interview would yield new insight. In other words, participant observation allowed 
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me to sample theoretically. This way I could fill incomplete categories or gaps in my 
analysis. The participant observation enabled me to predict which respondents 
would help me in this process. The basic criterion governing the selection of 
respondents was their predicted theoretical relevance for furthering the 
development of emerging categories and their properties (see Glaser and Strauss 
[1967]2006). Although in grounded theory methods, theoretical sampling is about 
saturating conceptual categories and not about representing a population or 
increasing the statistical generalizibility, I did try to capture as much variety as I 
could (see chapter 2) – not only in terms of stories but also with respect to gender, 
socio-economic background, education, country of origin, age, and length of stay.  
All respondents orally consented to serve as ‘human subjects’, although their 
perceptions of what this entails diverged considerably. I always tried to explain as 
best I could, but I am aware of the fact that some might not have fully understood 
what social scientific research entails. In any case, I did my best to convince my 
respondents that I would guard their anonymity, though their concerns for this 
aspect varied greatly as well. While some people were initially anxious about 
supplying personal data, others straightforwardly asked if their picture could be on 
the cover of my book. In cases such as the latter I chose not to interview the person 
for reasons of personal protection, as I believed such persons could not properly 
foresee the consequences of participating in my research. In other word, in some 
cases I felt I had to protect the migrants in question, even though I had their consent, 
because I felt that they did not have proper knowledge of what they consented to.  
Most respondents agreed to be interviewed because they wanted to help me 
get ahead in my career. After all, I knew most respondents quite well through my 
involvement in their lives by participant observation. In other cases, they granted me 
an interview as a favor to an intermediate person or to ask for attention for the 
situation of irregular migrants. The latter category could be particularly difficult to 
interview, as these people tended to talk about the injustice they felt was being done 
to irregular migrants in general. They often talked about other people who had been 
less fortunate, because their own lives did not serve well as illustrations for the 
struggles they believe many irregular migrants go through. In some of these cases, it 
took much effort to get them to talk about their own lives instead. 
I did not give participants any monetary compensation for their time, 
although I always bought them a small gift as a token of my appreciation. Gifts 
usually consisted of fresh fruits. After the interview, most people were thankful, not 
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so much for the gift, but for the fact that someone had taken that much time to 
properly listen to their story. All respondents offered to answer more questions if 
necessary, and many asked if I wanted to interview other people they knew. As I did 
not want to interview too many people belonging to the same social networks, I 
accepted this offer only in a limited number of cases.  
I used a reflexive and conversational approach in the interviews, because this 
had proved useful in other studies involving irregular migrants (see for example 
Hagan 1994). During the first few interviews I brought a paper listing the interview 
topics I wanted to discuss, but I no longer needed this structure in later stages. The 
shortest interview took about an hour, whereas the longest interview lasted over 
nine hours (in three sessions). Most interviews took between two and three hours 
and were held in Dutch, English, French or Spanish. Quotations were translated into 
English by me. Many of the respondents invited me to their homes, so the interview 
could take place there. In case someone did not want the interview to take place in 
their home, I invited them to mine. Apart from the comfort of private homes, I have 
also interviewed in a park (depending on the weather conditions), in a public library 
or in an office supplied by organizations for welfare work. Two respondents did not 
want the conversation to be recorded. In one of those cases the woman said that she 
did not like the way her voice sounded on tape, and in the other case the man was 
very emotional and indicated that he did not want evidence of his crying on tape. In 
these two cases I made extensive notes. 
Because I asked open questions I could pick up and pursue specific themes 
that came up during an interview. Furthermore, after each interview I listened to it 
again and wrote codes and memos. Following grounded theory methods, I analyzed 
my data while I was still in the process of gathering material. By comparing each 
new interview to the previous interviews, I could return to the field and gather 
focused data that enabled me to answer analytic questions or to fill conceptual gaps 
(see Charmaz 2006). In this sense, the interviewing I did came to differ from 
conventional interviewing, because I narrowed the range of interview topics as I 
proceeded with my research in order to develop my theoretical framework. 
Because the migrants who were interviewed by the research assistants 
belonged to large ethnic communities, I made sure to interview members of smaller 
communities as well in order to capture enough variety. The migrants I interviewed 
myself were from countries as diverse as Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Iran, 
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Kazakhstan, Morocco, Mauritania, Moldova, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Surinam, Syria, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. In total, I have conducted 45 in-depth 
interviews with irregular migrants, 37 in Belgium and 8 in the Netherlands (see 
appendix 2 for an overview). This explicit aim for variety is what distinguishes my 
research from many other studies, as these have mostly focused on one or a few 
nationality groups or on a specific type of migration, such as labor migration (see for 
example Engbersen et al. 2006; 1999; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005; Leman 1997; 
Mahler 1995; Hagan 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, Jordan and Düvell 2002; Kalir 
2005a; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998; Leerkes et 
al. 2004; Massey et al. 2004; Paspalanova 2006; Portes and Bach 1985; Roer-Strier and 
Olshtain-Mann 1999; Staring 2001; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). 
3.2.4 In-depth interviews with organizations 
I have conducted open-ended interviews with organizations in Flanders and 
Brussels in 2006 and in The Netherlands in 2007. These organizations all had contact 
with irregular migrants, albeit in very different ways. The organizations included for 
example those involved in general welfare work, (semi-)governmental policy 
institutions, local authorities, and NGO’s. Other respondents who worked for 
government-sponsored organizations were active in the fields of drug addiction, 
education, health, local welfare, and prostitution. I used some of these organizations 
to get in contact with irregular migrants. In total, I conducted 61 in-depth interviews 
with organizations, 51 in Belgium and 10 in the Netherlands (see appendix 3 for an 
overview). The organizations I interviewed in Belgium were located in Antwerp, 
Brussels, Ghent, Mechelen, Sint-Niklaas and Leuven, and the organizations in the 
Netherlands were in The Hague and Utrecht. The interviews provided me with 
insight into what both non-governmental and governmental organizations can do 
and do do for irregular migrants in practice. The interviews with semi-governmental 
and governmental organizations provide me with insight into local policy practices 
beyond the level of policy documents. Moreover, the experiences of several 
organizations that have daily contact with irregular migrants allowed for cross-
validation of the material I gathered from irregular migrants themselves.  
Almost all interviews with organizations were conducted in Dutch and 
recorded on tape. In only a few cases I assessed that notes were enough. These 
concerned organizations that were active in the so-called second or third line, which 
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involved policy-related work rather than daily contact with irregular migrants. All 
quotations were translated into English by me.  
3.3 USE OF DATA THROUGHOUT THIS STUDY 
The typology that is constructed in this thesis mostly relies on the in-depth 
interviews with irregular migrants and the participant observation. The semi-
structured interviews with irregular migrants mainly served as a means of 
comparison in the first stages, and later on they served as checks for the conjectures I 
developed during the research process. Hence, whereas the analytical categories 
were formed during my own fieldwork – in the interaction with irregular migrants – 
the semi-structured interviews provided me with much empirical content and 
allowed me to achieve saturation of my categories much faster than I would have 
without them. In other words, the typology is grounded in both types of interviews, 
as well as in the participant observation.  
The interviews with organizations mostly served as a means of cross-
validation and do not form the backbone of my analysis. After all, this thesis is about 
the lives of irregular migrants, and they do not necessarily interact with 
organizations. The interviews greatly helped me to get a sense of the context in 
terms of laws and regulations and have therefore highly informed the next chapter. 
Sometimes they gave me ideas about themes to pursue in interviews or talks with 
irregular migrants. All in all, although the typology is not so much grounded in this 
data source, the research process and hence the process of theory construction have 
been informed by these interviews.  
3.4  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Scholars who use qualitative research methods – especially when participant 
observation is included – often face questions about the methods they have used to 
collect, analyze and interpret their data. Unlike quantitative research, methods are 
not standardized, and the success of qualitative research heavily depends on the 
competences of the researcher and his or her actions during the research process. To 
be able to judge the quality of the research, it is therefore important to have insight 
into the research process. I have already provided much information on the research 
process in the previous sections. This section deals with a more detailed discussion 
of how I have tried to ensure I gathered high quality data.  
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Validity is considered a major strength of participant observation because 
researchers live with their respondents for a long period during which they get to 
know people well (Schensul et al. 1999). This allows for both continuous data 
analysis and opportunities to refine constructs so that they match sociological 
categories as well as participant realities. However, participant observation also 
brings some threats to validity, threats that I tried to avoid as much as possible. 
Observation is for example always filtered through the researcher’s interpretative 
frames. The challenge for me has therefore been to transform the observations I 
made during my fieldwork into complete and accurate field notes. Doing so, I have 
always separated the observations themselves from my reflections on them, and I 
have kept exact quotes made by respondents intact as much as possible.  
3.4.1 Establishing trust 
The most important threat to validity in my research is that the irregular migrants I 
observed and interviewed might have lied to me. A major issue in research on 
irregular migrants concerns the establishment of trust between the researcher and 
the irregular migrant. Very few migrants would consent to be interviewed without 
properly knowing the researcher and the context and objectives of his or her 
research. To a certain extent this is an issue in all social science research, but there 
are reasons why it is more problematic in research on irregular migrants compared 
to other social groups (cf. Düvell et al. 2009). First, irregular migrants are not 
allowed to live in the receiving society; their presence is illegal. Respondents must 
therefore trust the researcher not to report them to the police. Second, many 
irregular migrants engage in illegal activities, such as informal employment, in order 
to make a living. The researcher must therefore be trusted by respondents not to 
report their illegal activities to the police. Third, some irregular migrants engage in 
activities that many people find morally questionable, such as bogus marriages. 
Many people are reluctant to talk about such issues with a stranger who ‘might not 
understand’. Fourth, some people live with lies such as untruthful asylum or 
regularization applications and do not want their true stories to become known out 
of fear of some kind of repercussion. Fifth, some irregular migrants may not want to 
talk about their engagements in illegal or morally questionable activities, not so 
much out of personal fear for the police, but because they do not want to damage the 
image of irregular migrants in general.  
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All this means that research on irregular migrants is difficult, as the 
researcher has to make sure that any initial distrust is removed and that trust is 
constructed, which involves hard work and thorough planning. With regard to the 
semi-structured interviews, trust was usually established because the interviewers 
had similar ethnic backgrounds. But even then, it was very useful if respondents 
were referred by people they knew, as this greatly contributed to the establishment 
of trust. The interviewers made notes concerning the behavior of the respondents 
during the interview. From these notes, it appeared that most respondents were very 
open and cooperative. Only a few respondents refused to answer some questions. 
These mainly concerned questions about the area they lived in.  
I used participant observation and referral by other people as a means to 
establish trust for the interviews I conducted myself, which I believe worked out 
very well. However, in a few cases I met irregular migrants in the street, which 
meant that trust had to be build from scratch. In such cases, I met a few times with 
these respondents for more casual talks before I asked them for an interview. These 
casual talks took place in public spaces to ensure my own safety. Partly for the same 
reason, I usually waited until I had met some of their close friends or family 
members before inviting them for an interview. Being acquainted with their kin and 
friends also enabled me to verify a lot of the information these respondents gave me 
and thus contributed to validity.  
Overall, I have good reasons to suppose that the people I interviewed told me 
the truth about their lives. If I questioned an individual’s honesty and openness, I 
chose not to interview this person. Moreover, during participant observation people 
told me about their lives. Later on some of them confided in me and told me that 
they had lied to me before and offered to tell me their real life story. This is 
especially salient since for some of them, this new story differed from the story they 
continued to sell to the press and to the organizations and churches that supported 
them. This means that because of the participant observation, I noticed how some 
irregular migrants initially distrusted me and told me the ‘politically altered 
versions’ of their lives. After winning their trust they told me that they had lied 
before. In all these cases, I had not interviewed these respondents before because I 
doubted their honesty. These turned out to be valid judgments. Moreover, many 
people told me things which were not in their interest. Some have for example told 
me that they had applied for asylum using made-up stories. Others told me that they 
were engaged in a bogus marriage in order to get legalized or that they intended to 
do so. Most importantly, because I was involved in their lives through participant 
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observation I could verify their stories to a great extent. Because I also interviewed 
people in organizations who deal with irregular migrants, I was even able to cross-
validate much data in multiple ways. 
3.4.2 Reflections on the personal identity of the researcher 
Apart from validity issues concerning trust, I am also highly aware of the fact that 
my personal identity as a Dutch woman might have influenced the answers 
respondents gave me. While it was easy for respondents in Belgium to talk badly of 
Belgium or Belgians, interviewees in the Netherlands might have refrained from 
criticizing Dutch customs out of fear of offending me. I do not believe that such 
issues have seriously affected the quality of the data, as respondents in the 
Netherlands usually openly expressed negative opinions of the Dutch and the 
Netherlands. However, it is possible that they toned down their criticism. It is 
therefore important to be aware of this possibility to be able to see how it might have 
influenced the results.  
My identity as a woman has obviously had the benefit of making it relatively 
easy to interview and observe women. A man could for example not have 
participated in the monthly event in The Hague where irregular migrant women 
from all kinds of nationalities came together to cook and dine. At the same time my 
female identity has also inspired some male respondents to participate. From the 
outset of my study I noticed how some men were eager to talk to me and how they 
actively tried to acquire information about my marital status. Few have gone as far 
as actually proposing marriage, and in only one case was I made an indecent 
proposal. Nevertheless, I was aware that my identity as a woman affected the 
willingness of people to participate. However, I believe my attitude in dealing with 
men who made marriage-related inquiries ensured that they usually stopped these 
attempts after a while, and consequently this has not seriously affected the quality of 
the data. These men ceased their efforts after I told them nicely that I knew what 
they were doing and why they did it, but that their attempts were futile. On 
occasion, my bluntness inspired a lively discussion on the ethics of bogus marriages. 
My identity as a woman could have caused a sample bias towards men who were 
trying to get papers through marriage. That is why I made sure to also include in my 
sample men who were married already or who morally opposed bogus marriages.  
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Furthermore, I do not believe that my female identity influenced the answers 
men or women gave me on gender-related issues. Although I have never expressed 
my opinion on such matters, respondents could have believed that I do not adhere to 
traditional gender roles, because I am both highly educated and working fulltime. 
Nevertheless, many men and women did not hesitate to express very conservative 
opinions concerning the division of housework and care for children. Some men felt 
free to label women as bitches and whores or to claim that men and women are 
unequal in other than biological respects. Perhaps my efforts to come across as 
gender neutral in terms of clothing have been successful. Overall, I think my identity 
as a woman has more likely been a benefit than a disadvantage.  
3.5  CONCLUSION 
I have argued that I use a grounded theory approach in my research because it fits 
with my aims to inductively focus on agency. I have used multiple data sources such 
as participant observation and in-depth interviews with irregular migrants to 
theoretically saturate the core categories that emerged during my fieldwork which 
ensures validity through triangulation. The population of irregular immigrants in 
Europe is extremely diverse (Düvell 2006a), and long-term fieldwork within one 
neighborhood alone would not capture the variation in lifestyles among irregular 
migrants (Chavez 1991). I have therefore located respondents to observe and 
interview in numerous settings, neighborhoods and cities, and I have sampled 
theoretically to make sure that my sample contained enough diversity in terms of 
gender, socio-economic background, country of origin, length of stay, education and 
age. My sample therefore contains much more variety than those of many other 
studies.  
Researching a hidden population like irregular migrants is always 
problematic in terms of methodology. I have described how I have tried to ensure 
the quality of the data that I gathered. Nevertheless, some problems may have 
remained. In such cases, awareness of how these might have influenced the results 
and openness about such possible effects are crucial in enabling people to evaluate 
the quality of my research properly. In this chapter and throughout this thesis, I 
have therefore tried to be as open as possible, without giving away too much 
information that could lead to the identification of individual participants (cf. Düvell 
et al 2009).  
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CHAPTER 4 
IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE 
LOW COUNTRIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policies play a decisive role in the allocation of life chances to irregular 
migrants (Baganha et al. 2006; Burgers 1998; Engbersen et al. 2007; Menjivar 2006b; 
Samers 2003). As governments create opportunities and impose barriers to irregular 
migrants, state policies shape their window of opportunity and their room to 
maneuver. In addition, policies may also affect the choices that irregular migrants 
make within this window of opportunity (Cyrus and Vogel 2006; Hollifield 2004). 
Furthermore, the room to maneuver that policies create is not limited to the 
boundaries of the receiving nation state: policies are believed to affect even irregular 
migrants’ transnational interactions (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).  
Next to the impact governments can have by formulating laws and policies, 
the ways in which these are implemented in practice affect the lives of irregular 
migrants as well (Van der Leun 2003b; 2006). Research findings indicate that 
migrants actively react to the ways in which they perceive the implementation of 
policies (Cyrus and Vogel 2006), and it is widely acknowledged that the gaps 
between policies on irregular migration and their implementation can be large (Van 
der Leun 2003b). Any study of the lives of irregular migrants should therefore not 
only look at how policies are formulated, but also at how these are implemented in 
practice. However, so far “there is little insight into the concerted processes that take 
place within these gaps.” (Van der Leun 2006: 311).  
I have interviewed informants who work in organizations which deal with 
irregular migrants. Some of these informants interact with irregular migrants on a 
daily basis, while others are active on the level of policy-making. These 
organizations are active in fields such as health care, education, welfare and 
integration. Because I interviewed staff at these organizations I have gathered some 
insight into the processes that take place within these ‘gaps’ between policies and 
practices. However, I chose not to devote a separate chapter to describing these 
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processes, as this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. This chapter therefore 
mostly describes how laws are formulated. Implementation practices are discussed 
in this and in the next chapters where they are relevant, which is in those cases 
where they affect the incorporation or transnational activities of irregular migrants 
discussed there or their aspirations.  
The same applied to the rights irregular migrants can claim in the receiving 
society. According to Hollifield (2004: 901) we have seen a gradual extension of 
rights granted to non-nationals after the First World War, to the point where 
individuals have acquired a sort of international legal personality. Irregular 
migrants are therefore not totally excluded, but they have some rights that are partly 
rooted in supranational agreements and international human rights discourses. They 
for example have the right to imperative medical care and publicly financed legal 
assistance, and children have the right to education (Bafekr 1999; Kromhout et al. 
2008; Van der Leun 2003b; 2006). Because of their supranational roots these rights are 
the same in Belgium and the Netherlands, but the way they are implemented in 
practice differs between the countries. In both countries, irregular migrants can for 
example get access to urgent medical care, but it is organized in different ways. In 
those cases where they are relevant for the scope of this dissertation, I deal with 
these diverging practices in the following chapters.  
Most of the information from organizations applied to the level of 
implementation, but sometimes it also concerned the level of policy formulation. As 
governments are not always transparent in the information they provide on their 
policies of immigration control, this sometimes proved very helpful.  
4.2 HISTORY 
Regulation of migration is not a new phenomenon, but something that has taken 
place for centuries (Eijl 2008; Schrover et al. 2008b). However, for a long time states 
did not formulate rules on entry, stay and exit of aliens, but local authorities have 
(Schrover et al. 2008b; Torpey 2000). In the Netherlands, it was not until 1849 that the 
Aliens Act was passed and that conditions for entry and deportation were 
transferred from the local to the national level (Eijl 2008). At that time, rules were not 
enforced; state control on mobility of people only increased when the governments’ 
interest in welfare and labor market regulation rose in the early twentieth century 
(Schrover et al. 2008b) and as a result of the First World War (Moch 2003). But even 
then, migration was not referred to as ‘illegal’. In the Netherlands, Jewish refugees 
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who arrived in 1938 and onwards were the first group of aliens who were referred to 
as ‘illegal’ in public discourse and government documents (Eijl 2008).  
The birth of the idea of irregular migrants in the Low Countries is generally 
associated with the emergence of the modern nation state after the First World War 
(Düvell 2006b; Moch 2003; Torpey 2000). Yet it was not until after the Second World 
War that irregular migrant workers started to arrive in the Low Countries in 
unprecedented numbers (Moch 2003). At this time, irregular migration emerged as a 
generalized fact in all western economies, because these started to recruit guest 
workers due to labor market shortages (Sassen 1999). Belgium and the Netherlands 
were among the main receiving countries of immigration in this post-war period 
(Düvell 2006b; Moch 2003). Workers from Southern European countries as well as 
from Northern Africa and Turkey could travel freely to these receiving countries and 
could formalize their stay after they had started to work (Martiniello and Rea 2003; 
Van Amersfoort et al. 1999). These irregular migrants were considered welcome 
‘guests’ needed to alleviate the shortages in the labor market. However, when labor 
shortages decreased due to the economic downturn in the seventies, immigration 
policies became more restrictive, and efforts were increasingly directed towards the 
prevention of irregular immigration (Martiniello 2003). Whereas irregular migrants 
had been welcomed as ‘spontaneous labor migrants’ in the past; from the 1980s 
onwards these immigration flows were regarded as a problem in the Low Countries 
(Burgers 1999b; Engbersen 1997; Entzinger 2003; Martiniello and Rea 2003).  
Since the early eighties, European governments have steadily become more 
concerned with controlling immigration (Brochmann 1999a). Irregular immigration 
was declared a topic on the level of the European Community in 1985 (Düvell 2006b: 
26). In the early nineties the first references were made to policies to “combat” 
irregular immigration (Düvell 2006b: 28). Most western states have now developed 
exclusionary policies to avoid irregular migration (Engbersen et al. 2007) and have 
become increasingly inventive in creating measures to exclude, apprehend and expel 
irregular migrants as effectively as possible (Engbersen and Broeders 2009; Uehling 
2004). Irregular migrants are now at the top of policy agendas (Broeders and 
Engbersen 2007), but in spite of all the attention, the presence of irregular migrants 
remains a fact of life. Recent estimates indicate that over 120,000 irregular migrants 
reside in the Netherlands (Van der Heijden et al. 2006) and over 100,000 in Belgium 
(Van Meeteren et al. 2007b). Governments have two types of policies at their 
disposal to control irregular immigration: policies aimed at controlling the external 
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borders and policies aimed at guarding the internal boundaries. These two types of 
control are discussed in the following sections.  
4.3 EXTERNAL CONTROL POLICIES 
Initially, restrictive policies to prevent and control irregular migration were mainly 
targeted at the external borders. The construction of a ‘fortress Europe’ expanded 
during the1990s: visa requirements became stricter, and physical barriers were 
erected along the land borders of Europe in order to keep people out (Albrecht 
2002). Walls similar to those along the Mexican-US border (Andreas 2000) can be 
found in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco and along the new EU 
borders in Poland. These walls have been strengthened with guards, watch towers, 
fences and state of the art technology (Broeders 2009).  
In addition to its land borders, Europe has had to control its large maritime 
borders, which are more difficult to guard because they involve an area instead of a 
line (Carling 2007b). Over the last decade and a half, Spain has invested heavily in 
surveillance of its maritime borders, intercepting along its shores on average 350 
African boat migrants every week (Carling 2007a). Yet in spite of all the increased 
efforts that have been made, border controls have proved only partially effective in 
controlling irregular immigration (Brochmann 1999b; Cornelius 2005). This is 
because many irregular migrants enter legally and only become irregular migrants 
while in the receiving society: once their visas expire or when they are denied 
asylum (Black et al. 2005; Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Van Meeteren et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, even if migrants are apprehended, they have proved difficult to expel 
(Van der Leun 2003b). In 2002 and 2003 only about a quarter of the migrants who 
arrived in Spain – a major destination for irregular migrants from Africa – were 
expelled. The remainder were released from detention and either stayed in Spain or 
travelled to other European countries like the Low Countries (Carling 2007b). In 
addition, European borders are simply too extensive to completely turn into steel 
and concrete, making them difficult to control effectively (Broeders 2009). Moreover, 
beyond a certain level of control the costs of avoiding irregular migration exceed the 
‘damage’ caused by irregular immigration, suggesting that the optimal degree of 
irregular immigration is greater than zero (Entorf 2002; Hillman and Weiss 1999; 
Jahn and Straubhaar 1999). Therefore, it is unlikely that governments will invest in 
making controls hundred percent effective.  
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Furthermore, human smugglers constantly find new ways to circumvent 
controls (Heckmann 2004; Pijpers and Van der Velde 2007), for example by changing 
operating routes (Okólski 2000). Researchers claim that human smugglers have 
become increasingly important in facilitating irregular migration (Cornelius 2005; 
Derluyn and Broekaert 2005; Jandl 2007; Staring 2003). Human smugglers facilitate 
illegal exit, transit and entry; they provide fraudulent or stolen travel documents; 
they provide information on border control, immigration control and asylum 
procedures; and they coach migrants on how to deceive immigration and law 
enforcement authorities (Schloenhardt 2001)., Similarly, smuggled migrants are 
often given detailed instructions by their smugglers on how to use the asylum 
system as part of their migration strategy (Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl 2006). Human 
smugglers have proven to be highly flexible: in response to new migration or asylum 
regulations and to changes in visa regimes, they change their operating routes and 
transit countries. Furthermore, forgers continuously update their equipment for 
forging papers and use modern computer technology to improve the quality of 
falsifications (Jandl 2007). The adaptability that human smugglers display makes it 
very difficult for states to control their external borders effectively and has made 
practices of external control resemble games of ‘cat and mouse’ (Heckmann 2004).  
Apart from external control policy being ineffective, it also has important 
unwanted side-effects. Along with the increased controls, fatal accidents have 
increased and are now the order of the day (Carling 2007b; Spijkerboer 2007). As 
migrant smugglers try to circumvent the most heavily controlled areas, boats now 
leave from as far as Senegal, making the trip all the more dangerous: it is estimated 
that for every 100 interceptions there has been 1 death (Carling 2007b), and the 
number of deaths is increasing (Spijkerboer 2007). In addition, the line between 
human smuggling and trafficking has become blurred: human smugglers sometimes 
use the same ‘safe houses’ to store smuggled irregular migrants and trafficked 
prostitutes (Leman and Janssens 2007). Furthermore, as the risks involved become 
higher (Donato et al. 2008; Eschbach 1999) the financial costs of entry increase as well 
(Baganha et al. 2006; Cornelius 2005). Long distance smuggling fees to Belgium now 
vary between 3,000 and 40,000 euros, medium distance between 1,500 and 6,000 and 
short-distance between 200 and 5,000 (Kaizen and Nonneman 2007). Dutch findings 
indicate that smuggling fees have doubled since 2001 and that irregular migrants 
from Somalia now pay an average amount of 7,000 dollars and migrants from Iraq 
between 3,000 and 10,000 dollars (Van Liempt 2007). The result of these increased 
costs is that irregular migrants tend to stay as long as possible once they get in, 
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whilst migrants from visa-free countries may come repeatedly, but also leave again 
voluntarily after a short period of time. The further away the country of origin and 
the tighter the restrictions, the more likely it becomes that initially mobile migrants 
who otherwise may have come and gone, stay and become irregular migrants 
(Düvell 2006c).  
All in all, external control policies are only partially effective, and they create 
undesired side effects. When governments started to realize that they could not 
control their external borders effectively, they increasingly turned to policies of 
internal control (Brochmann 1999a, Broeders 2009). When irregular migrants cannot 
be stopped from entering the country, the aim becomes to exclude them from formal 
institutions and to discourage them in the hope that they might leave voluntarily. 
The internal control policies exercised by the Belgian and Dutch authorities are 
discussed in the next section.  
4.4 INTERNAL CONTROL POLICIES 
Governments who rely on internal control policies acknowledge that not all 
irregular migrants can be stopped at the external borders and aim to exclude them 
and discourage them from staying. According to Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 
1593), states hope that exclusion and discouragement “complicate and frustrate 
living and working conditions to such a degree that they will turn around and try 
their luck elsewhere.” A wide array of policy measures have been developed both on 
the level of the European Union as well as on the level of individual nation states in 
order to do so (Broeders 2009). Examples include exclusion from public services; 
surveillance by the police; policies of identification, detention and expulsion; and 
labor market control (Engbersen and Broeders 2009). These different forms of 
internal control policies are discussed in subsequent subsections.  
4.4.1 Exclusion from public services 
During the days of labor recruitment migrants could easily open bank accounts, take 
out state medical insurance and enroll in educational programs. Over the years, 
governments in both Belgium and the Netherlands have invented policies to deny 
irregular migrants access to such public institutions. An important centerpiece of 
such policies in the Netherlands is the Dutch Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) 
Act that was enacted in 1998 to exclude irregular migrants from tax-supported 
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public services such as social assistance, public housing, education for adults and 
nonemergency health care (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). This Act is commonly 
referred to as the Linking Act, as it was designed to link access to a whole range of 
public and semi-public provisions to a valid residence status (Engbersen 1999a; Van 
der Leun 2003b). 
Whereas the Linking Act closed access to public services in the Netherlands 
at once, Belgium restricted access to public provisions bit by bit, using different 
decrees and policy measures. These ensured that irregular migrants were much 
more excluded in Belgium than in the Netherlands before the Linking Act was 
introduced there. The level of public exclusion has been very high in Belgium over 
the last decades (Kagné 2000; Suárez-Orozco 1995), yet the organizations I 
interviewed indicate that it is nowadays somewhat higher in the Netherlands than in 
Belgium. In other words, while exclusion in Belgium used to be more stringent than 
in the Netherlands, the cards have been reversed over the recent years.  
The Linking Act in the Netherlands and different policy measures in Belgium 
mean to exclude irregular migrants from all types of social care except for those that 
the government is obliged to provide according to provisions of international human 
rights treaties it has signed. NGO´s and lawyers constantly battle with national 
states over the implementation of international agreements which sometimes leads 
to agreements in which irregular migrants are given access to specific provisions. As 
a result of such actions, parents who have children without a legal residence status 
can for example nowadays get child support.  
Likewise, in Belgium former asylum seekers who have filed a second appeal 
in their asylum procedure – and consequently reside illegally – are granted a limited 
amount of social care by the Belgian government. In practice this usually means they 
are allowed to reside in an asylum center (Berx 2007). In Belgium, in June 2006, more 
than 12,000 people lived in the federal asylum structures, of which almost 7,000 were 
irregular migrants (Van Meeteren et al. 2008). Although in some cases the central 
Dutch government also sponsors the housing of irregular migrants who are allowed 
to stay in the country to await the final decision of an appeal, these numbers do not 
come anywhere near the Belgian figures. The huge numbers in Belgium are believed 
to be caused by the slow administration of this process. Many irregular migrants file 
this appeal, so that they could buy themselves some extra time, on average three 
years (Van Meeteren et al. 2008).  
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While the national governments have invented policies to exclude irregular 
migrants, local authorities have usually been left to cope with the problem of their 
continuous presence. In the Netherlands the government even formally forbids the 
local authorities to provide aid to irregular migrants. Local organizations are 
subsidized for taking care of homeless people and to provide food to people in need, 
but they only receive government funding for people who reside legally (see also 
Rusinovic et al. 2002). Any aid provided to irregular migrants therefore has to come 
out of their own pockets, meaning that it has to be privately financed. Organizations 
therefore tend to be secretive about the help they provide and only do so in locations 
tucked away in areas outside of the city center and out of sight of the general public.  
While this is basically the same in the federal state of Belgium, the Flemish 
authorities have developed policies in order to provide local care to irregular 
migrants. Acknowledging that local authorities have to deal with this group of 
people who may be in need, policies have been developed to do this, and limited 
funds have been allocated for this purpose (Van Meeteren et al. 2008). While in 
practice it also means that organizations have to gather private funding, 
organizations do not have to be secretive about it and can aid irregular migrants out 
in the open.  
All in all, the effectiveness of this strategy of internal control by means of 
exclusion from public provisions has proven to be limited (cf. West and Moore 1989). 
Instead of having a deterrent effect, the restrictions provoke migrants to dive deeper 
into invisible activities (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006). Furthermore, 
irregular migrants are not only increasingly beyond the grasp of enforcement 
authorities, but also out of reach of those institutions that safeguard basic social and 
labor rights (Düvell 2006b: 21). States are therefore increasingly turning to policies of 
identification as a means of internal control.  
4.4.2 Policies of identification 
Since traditional policies of internal control aimed at exclusion and discouragement 
are ineffective, states are trying to develop more effective means of discouraging 
irregular migrants. Broeders (2009) documents a paradigm shift in which 
governments are replacing the traditional policies of exclusion with new methods of 
identification and registration. According to Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 1595) 
“the keywords for the internal control on irregular migrants” have now become 
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“surveillance and identification” because in order to effectively expel people it is 
crucial for states to know their real identity. Northern European Union member 
states have therefore intensified internal surveillance of irregular migrants in recent 
years (Broeders and Engbersen 2007).  
The main examples of these new European policies revolve around 
identification by means of biometrical features. The fingerprints of migrants who 
enter the asylum procedure are for example registered in Eurodac. This system was 
originally designed to prevent migrants from applying for asylum in more than one 
European country, but it is now used in the fight against irregular migration. In 
addition to fingerprints of asylum seekers, the fingerprints of migrants who enter on 
a visa will be registered in the Visa Information System (VIS) that is currently under 
construction (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). This system will make it possible to 
identify irregular migrants who overstay their visa. Furthermore, the information 
stored also includes the details of the person who issues the invitation and hence can 
be held accountable for a possible overstay of the visa (Broeders 2007). While my 
respondents did not yet face the barriers imposed by the VIS-system, Eurodac was 
already in operation during my fieldwork.  
With these new measures, European states counter irregular migrants and 
especially aim at identifying those who try to hide their true identity (Engbersen and 
Broeders 2009). It is no longer sufficient to determine if someone belongs because in 
order to expel someone, it is necessary to establish his or her identity (Broeders 
2009). Migrants in turn are reacting: recent news reports for example indicate that 
some migrants mutilate their fingertips so that they cannot be properly identified 
(Trouw, 24 april 2009). As a consequence, policies aimed at irregular migrants and 
the actions of irregular migrants to circumvent these resemble an arms race in which 
action provokes reaction (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). It remains to be seen who 
will be the winners of this ‘tug-of-war’. According to Hagan et al. (2008) deportation 
policy does not end irregular immigration, but it simply raises the human costs for 
migrants and their families. Moreover, Broeders and Engbersen (2007) argue that it 
is likely that irregular migrants will continue to come, but they will in reaction go 
further underground, which will make them more dependent on human smugglers 
and other intermediaries.  
The creation of databases in which information on identity and itinerary of 
specific groups of immigrants is stored facilitates the strategy of detention and 
expulsion for governments (Engbersen and Broeders 2009). If an irregular migrant is 
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detained his or her identity can more easily be established, which makes it easier for 
the authorities to expel the migrant in question. This strategy of detention and 
expulsion is discussed in the next subsection.  
4.4.3 Detention and expulsion 
Irregular migrants with different migration histories face different risks of being 
stopped by the police. For irregular migrants who do not face visa restrictions and 
can travel with their passports, police controls are often meaningless. Dates of entry 
are not always stamped in passports which means that they can easily avoid internal 
controls by pretending to be tourists (Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). For migrants 
who cannot pretend to be tourists, these controls may be frustrating. Some therefore 
choose to buy false documents. Explicit internal control mechanisms such as ID 
cards make life more difficult for irregular migrants, but they do not prevent them 
from coming (Brochmann 1999b). 
Illegal entry or stay is considered an offense under Belgian law, punishable 
with a fine and/or detention up to three months (Van Meeteren et al. 2008). In the 
Netherlands, it is not punishable (Broeders 2009). Even though the legal grounds are 
different, in both countries the practice is that irregular migrants are incarcerated in 
special detention centers in order to be expelled. Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 
1602) signal a general trend throughout Europe toward increased detention of 
irregular immigrants. Most irregular migrants who are held in detention centers 
have not committed any crime; their only offence is being in a country without the 
necessary documents (Broeders and Engbersen 2007). Detention of irregular 
migrants is therefore different from criminal incarceration: it is detention without 
court trial and referred to as ‘administrative detention’ (Schinkel 2009). Furthermore, 
irregular migrants are not held in regular prisons, but in specially erected detention 
centers or expulsion centers. Whereas irregular migrants can be detained for a 
maximum period of five months in Belgium, there was no such limit in the 
Netherlands when I conducted my fieldwork there (Schinkel 2009). Although the 
goal of imprisonment is expulsion, in the Netherlands, fewer than half of the 
detained irregular migrants are effectively expelled from the country (Van 
Kalmthout et al. 2005 cited in Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1602). In the 
Netherlands, the detention capacity increased from fewer than a thousand places to 
3,100 in 2007 (Van Kalmthout 2007). In Belgium, around 7,000 irregular migrants are 
detained each year, but due to faster processing the average ‘stock’ of irregular 
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migrants in detention is around 500 individuals4. The Belgian authorities are also 
more successful at expulsion: around seventy per cent of detainees are expelled each 
year5.  
Governments hold irregular migrants in detention centers in the hope that 
they will reveal their identity or at least be cooperative in establishing it. According 
to Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 1596) irregular migrants can only be expelled 
“when identity, nationality, and (preferably) migration history can be established.” 
These authors discern two categories of detainees who raise problems for expulsion 
polices. First, migrants who refuse to cooperate and frustrate the progress of 
procedures, for example by stating a false name or by supplying an incorrect 
country of origin. The second group consists of migrants who cooperate in acquiring 
the relevant travel documents, but who cannot return because the authorities in their 
countries of origin refuse to accept them or because of specific political problems 
there (Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1602).  
Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 1606) argue that in the past, the main strategy 
that irregular migrants had to avoid expulsion was telling a lie about their identity. 
This proved to be a very effective weapon of resistance: they had to keep up this lie 
for a while until they were released. However, this ‘weapon of the weak’ is now 
targeted by new policies of surveillance and identification. It remains to be seen to 
what extent the efforts of irregular migrants to hide their identity continue to be 
effective in the future.  
4.4.4 Labor market control 
As many irregular migrants engage in informal labor, controlling the labor market is 
an important tool for controlling irregular migration. According to Brochmann 
(1999b: 323) it seems that “efficiency of immigration policy is more a question of the 
ability to supervise the labor market than of policing the national borders: it revolves 
on the state’s ability to prevent employers from hiring undocumented workers and 
its ability to maintain generally high standards of employment conditions.”  
Both in Belgium and in the Netherlands, irregular migrants are not allowed 
to work, and if they are caught doing informal labor, the authorities try to deport 
them (Broeders 2009; Leerkes et al. 2004; Van Meeteren et al. 2008). Although 
Belgium and the Netherlands take the same stance towards informal work, there are 
important reasons to believe that nowadays, it is easier for irregular migrants to find 
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a job in Belgium than it is in the Netherlands, whereas in the past it was the other 
way around.  
In the Netherlands irregular migrants used to be able to work formally by 
obtaining a ‘social-fiscal number’ (sofi-number) (Engbersen 1999c). In 1991, the 
government made sure that irregular migrants could no longer acquire these. Since 
then the Netherlands has severely tightened the net around the labor market and 
considerably increased its controls (Kromhout et al. 2008). In 1994, identification 
became compulsory at the workplace, and in 1998 the Linking Act was enacted 
which made sure that migrants who had acquired a legal social-fiscal number before 
1991 could no longer work using this number. Since 2000, employers must keep a 
copy of their employees’ identification on file (Broeders 2009). Furthermore, controls 
on irregular labor have intensified over the last years (Kromhout et al. 2008). Since 
2006, employers who do not cooperate in establishing the identity of employees are 
charged with a criminal offense and fined accordingly (Broeders 2009). Since 2005, 
an employer is fined 8,000 euros per illegally employed worker and 12,000 in case of 
repetition (Broeders 2009), while cases that date just a few years back report that 
employers usually had to pay around 1,000 euros (Benseddik and Bijl 2004).  
Contrary to the Netherlands, the possibility of irregular migrants obtaining 
work permits had been precluded long before 1991 in Belgium. Very few irregular 
migrants have therefore managed to find entry to the formal labor market there 
(Adam et al. 2002; Van Meeteren et al. 2007b; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). Like the 
Dutch government, the Belgian authorities have increased their control of informal 
labor over the last few years. Since 1999, employers who hire irregular migrants are 
liable for punishment (Van Meeteren et al. 2008).  
Although it used to be easier for irregular migrants to find employment in the 
Netherlands, as there were legal options there, Belgium seems to be more attractive 
nowadays. The relative size of its shadow economy is much larger than its Dutch 
counterpart (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004) and is consequently likely to attract 
more irregular migrants in search of work (cf. Baldwin-Edwards 1999; Kosic and 
Triandafyllidou 2004; Reyneri 1999; Ribas-Mateos 2004; Ruspuni 2000; Samers 2005; 
Williams and Windebank 1995). This is probably related to the degree of control that 
the governments exercise. Although the number of checks reported by the Belgian 
social inspection have only moderately increased, the number of checks that 
involved the police have increased significantly (Adriaenssens et al. 2009). 
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Nevertheless, the reported increase does not come anywhere near the amount of 
control exercised in the Netherlands.  
4.5 LEGALIZATION 
As irregular migrants can be caught by the police and sent to a detention center in 
order to be expelled, many irregular migrants try to legalize their status. If one is not 
seriously ill or formally unable to return to his or her home country, there are 
basically two ways in which irregular migrants can do this: by getting married to a 
Belgian or Dutch national or someone holding permanent residence rights, or by 
applying for regularization.  
Engaging in marriage seems to be the dominant strategy in the Low 
Countries (Engbersen 1999b; Staring 1998; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). Sometimes 
marriages stem from love relationships, but bogus marriages are also not uncommon 
among irregular migrants (see Mazzucato 2005; Staring 1998). Governments both in 
Belgium and in the Netherlands have developed policies to discourage irregular 
migrants from entering bogus marriages (Broeders 2009; Van Meeteren et al. 2007b). 
Not only are marriages refused if they are suspected to be fake (Van Liempt 2007; 
Van Meeteren 2007b), a couple has to remain married for quite some time: in the 
Netherlands, after 3 years of marriage the partner may receive a temporary stay 
independent of his or her partner (Van der Leun 2003b)6, in Belgium this is possible 
after 2 years.7 
Although both countries have stepped up their measures against bogus 
marriages, it is very difficult to determine the effects, partly because the 
implementation of these policies differs even from city to city. Martijn8, a social 
worker in Antwerp explains: 
It is always Antwerp where most problems arise and most difficulties 
are made around bogus marriages. (...) In Antwerp you become a 
suspect of a bogus marriage very quickly. Sometimes an investigation 
in bogus marriage is started before an official application for marriage 
has been filed. That is actually unlawful but it happens nevertheless. 
And very intimate questions are asked to future partners. Sometimes it 
is really (....) I have the impression that the court in Antwerp is always 
more compliant with the immigration services than courts in other 
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cities. (...) Therefore we advise people to move to another city or town, 
to marry there and then come back. 
In addition to getting married, irregular migrants can apply for regularization. They 
can claim regularization based on ‘exceptional circumstances’. The chances of 
regularization for the average irregular migrants are slim: only about 300 persons 
per year are granted regularization based on exceptional circumstances (Van 
Meeteren et al. 2008). Although the exact numbers are not identifiable in public 
records, news reports have estimated similar numbers in the Netherlands9. Both in 
the Netherlands and in Belgium, criteria for these circumstances are not specified.  
In Belgium, most irregular migrants who apply for regularization claim that 
they should be legalized because they are ‘integrated’. This was also what the 
irregular migrants who engaged in political action advocated (cf. McNevin 2006). 
Efforts made to learn the native language, letters from natives whom they know 
well, children in school, and a long length of stay are often the exceptional 
circumstances migrants try to invoke in order to become regularized. Most lawyers 
and people who work for organizations who give legal advice recommend that 
irregular migrants claim integration as a ground for regularization. Petra, who 
works for a welfare organization in Antwerp, explains how this procedure works in 
practice:  
you have to prove exceptional circumstances (…) So many people who 
have applied for asylum or who have lived here for quite a while 
believe that this is in itself enough to qualify as exceptional 
circumstance (…) There are a number of criteria that can be invoked 
but these are not arranged by law (…) if you can prove social bonds 
(…) if you have clear bonds to people who live here, if your family 
situation is oriented towards Belgium, so this is actually the proof of 
integration (…) if you can prove that you have been here for five years 
and you can prove that you are integrated and that you have built 
your future here, that you have many social ties here, through school, 
neighbors, then you can apply on these grounds.  
Although criteria are not specified by law, the people I interviewed who worked for 
organizations kept insisting on integration as a valid criterion. This is the advice 
organizations and lawyers usually provide to irregular migrants: that they have to 
work on their integration in order to be eligible for application. As ´integration´ is a 
vague criterion that can be interpreted in different ways, these applications have 
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turned into practices of trial and error, making many irregular migrants try and 
often try more than once (Verstrepen 2007). The same woman explains: 
There is a lot of uncertainty and no clear policy, so you have people 
who are in the same circumstances who get positive and the others 
arbitrarily get negative. And this fosters hope, because maybe I am the 
exception who does get it. You never know (…) so the indistinctness of 
the criteria fosters hope for a lot of people but it makes them live in 
miserable circumstances. 
Another reason why around fifteen thousand irregular migrants apply for 
regularization in Belgium each year is that the police tend to tolerate the presence of 
irregular migrants with pending regularization applications (Van Meeteren et al. 
2008). In the Netherlands, the same practice has been common, but the number of 
applications has decreased because of recent policy changes as Joke, who works for 
an organization in the Netherlands, explains:  
that is more or less the same as you have in Belgium. (…) Like in 
Belgium it has the benefit that you cannot be expelled. (…) These types 
of applications are frequent in the Netherlands (…) Very few get a 
positive decision though. But all the care facilities are full with this 
group of people; it is standard procedure that people make this kind of 
applications. It is not for nothing that the Netherlands has decided at a 
certain moment to…..the applications used to be done with the 
municipalities, until last year, and then last year it has been changed to 
the Immigration Services Box Offices. And the Immigration Services 
can refuse applications straight away and they can detain directly. (…) 
so they have created a deterrent and built a system around it to 
prevent people from making too many applications. It used to be a 
nice escape, people just asked for a residence permit based on no 
matter what, and then they would be in the procedure for one and a 
half years, during which you do not have rights to anything but hey 
you cannot be expelled either, and that was just a big advantage.  
The number of applications is much lower in the Netherlands because irregular 
migrants who make applications which are found unqualified for application are 
immediately detained. This way, migrants are discouraged from making false 
applications. In addition, these practices possibly also deter them from trying at all.  
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As the possibilities for individual regularization are limited and uncertain, 
irregular migrants’ best chances of legalization are general campaigns for 
regularization. Such collective regularizations have been carried out all over Europe: 
in Italy (Mingione and Quassoli 2000: 50-51), Spain (Arango 2000; Hartman 2008), 
Portugal (Baganha 2000) and Greece (Fakiolas 2000; 2003; Glytsos 2005; Lazaridis 
and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). Belgium is currently undergoing its third campaign10, 
and the Netherlands has had its share of amnesties as well (Benseddik and Bijl 2004).  
Belgium had its first general regularization in 1974 and its second in 2000 
(Martiniello 2003). During the campaign of 2000, over thirty thousand applications 
were filed, representing roughly fifty thousand people (Bernard 2000) of many 
nationalities, among which Congolese and Moroccans were the largest groups 
(Martiniello 2003). Applicants were required to fulfill one of the following four 
conditions: “having been engaged in the asylum procedure for an abnormally long 
period without having been informed of a decision (4 years in general, 3 years for 
families with minor children); not having the objective possibility of returning to 
one’s country due to, for example, a war; suffering a serious illness; or having lived 
at least six years in the country without having received any official notification to 
leave the country during the last five years. This last category of potential applicants 
is supposed to be integrated in Belgium.” (Martiniello 2003: 229- 230) 
When I was doing my fieldwork in Belgium in 2006, irregular migrants all 
over Belgium were occupying churches, some were demonstrating in the streets and 
some were engaged in hunger strikes. These actions started in reaction to some 
events that took place in 2005, when a group of 130 irregular migrants occupied a 
church in Elsene, a district of Brussels. After a prolonged hunger strike, the Minister 
for Internal Affairs Dewael conceded to their demand for residency, fueling actions 
all over the country. These actions were organized by UDEP (Union pour la Défense 
des Sans-Papiers), which is a collective of irregular migrants who fight for the rights 
of irregular migrants. With the support of several NGOs and semi-governmental 
organizations across the country, this ‘pro-regularization movement’ (Laubenthal 
2007) managed to propel their demands and influence the government debate on 
reforming asylum procedures. Furthermore, they managed to get the government to 
formalize some of the criteria for individual regularization that had informally been 
used since the last collective regularization. For example, the criterion used during 
the campaign in 2000 stipulating that migrants who have been enrolled in the 
asylum procedure for an abnormally long period of time are granted regularization, 
was now made formal policy.  
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In addition to the changes in the asylum procedure and the formulation of 
criteria for regularization, the Belgian authorities decided to issue another general 
amnesty when my fieldwork had long been finished. Starting in September 2009, 
irregular migrants could apply for regularization based on a set of special criteria 
that were valid for a period of three months.11 During this period, irregular migrants 
could claim ‘durable local embeddedness’. In practice this means that persons who 
have been in Belgium for 5 years and who had applied for regularization before 2009 
could apply. Furthermore, persons who were in Belgium before March 2007 and 
who could supply a future work contract for a year meet the criteria. It was only 
possible to claim ‘durable local embeddedness’ during these three months. About 
30,000 people have applied, of which only about 10,000 cases were new applications. 
The others were individual requests for regularization that had been shifted to the 
general regularization campaign. Many of my respondents have been or will be 
legalized as a result of this general amnesty. 
In the Netherlands, the last general regularization schemes date back to 1975 
and 1979 (Groenendael 1986). After that there have not been any general amnesties; 
neither have there been any special regularization schemes close to the size of those 
in Belgium. Throughout the 1990s, there have been a series of amnesties for irregular 
migrants who have legally worked on the formal labour market. These migrants are 
commonly referred to as ‘white illegals’ (Van der Leun 2003b). In 1991 an informal 
arrangement came into existence known as the ‘six years arrangement’. Roughly 
speaking, irregular migrants who were able to prove that they had worked legally in 
the last six years were legalized. In 1999 a series of hunger strikes led to the 
formulation of a similar, yet formal arrangement. In the 1990s, 3,000 people were 
legalized, while over 5,000 persons were rejected under these arrangements 
(Benseddik and Bijl 2004).  
In 2007 the Dutch government announced another limited amnesty, this time 
targeting former asylum seekers. Migrants who had applied for asylum prior to 
April 2001 and who were able to prove that they had stayed in the Netherlands even 
though their asylum was rejected, or who still had not been rejected were able to 
apply. In June 2009, 27,700 persons had been legalized.12 This amnesty coincided 
with my fieldwork in the Netherlands. I interviewed migrants who had not applied 
and were sure they would not do so in the future because they did not meet the 
criteria, either because of their criminal record or because they had never applied for 
asylum. I also interviewed irregular migrants who had applied, but who were still 
waiting for the final outcome at the time of the interview.  
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With each application for regularization, be it a general amnesty or an 
individual application, there are so called contra-indications that stipulate cases in 
which irregular migrants should be rejected even if they meet the criteria. These 
cases involve migrants who have been involved in crime and have been sentenced to 
jail time. Furthermore, migrants who have been caught using false identity papers or 
providing a false name are denied regularization. In addition, irregular migrants 
who have left the country, even for a short period as in the case of a family visit to 
Germany, are rejected. Similar contra-indications apply in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. These contra-indications provide irregular migrants with strong 
incentive to abide by the law and to remain within the boundaries of the country if 
they ever want to have a chance of regularization.  
Both in Belgium and in the Netherlands, it is very difficult to become 
legalized under the individual regularization procedure. General amnesties 
therefore seem to provide the best chances of regularization. Both countries have 
offered possibilities both to asylum seekers, as well as economic migrants. However, 
there is little hope for future irregular migrants of achieving legalization through 
these means, as Europe is in the process of formulating laws against national 
campaigns for regularization (Broeders 2009). Perhaps the best bet therefore 
continues to be to marriage.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter it has become clear that the Low Countries are theoretically suitable 
countries for my research objectives. Both countries experienced labor migration 
after the Second World War, had large numbers of asylum seekers in the 1990s , and 
have had migration resulting from former colonial ties. As I aim for variety, these 
are countries where diversity is expected to be present. Moreover, because of their 
geographical location, these countries do not deal with large shares of very specific 
migration stemming from neighboring countries.  
In addition, the Low Countries have witnessed shifts in policies that are 
common to the European context. Whereas policies to combat irregular migration 
have traditionally been focused on guarding the external boundaries of the nation-
state, they have increasingly turned inwards over the last decades. In addition, these 
measures of internal control are changing as well. A paradigm shift is taking place in 
which policies of internal control aimed at exclusion are being replaced with policies 
targeting the identification and expulsion of irregular migrants.  
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 While Belgium and the Netherlands have stepped up their efforts to exclude, 
identify and expel irregular migrants, they have also had to ensure basic migrants' 
rights rooted in supra-national agreements. Furthermore, over the years both states 
have provided several ways for irregular migrants to legalize their status. It 
therefore appears that policies in the Low Countries both exclude and include 
irregular migrants, thereby creating distinct possibilities and constraints. The room 
for irregular migrants to maneuver created by these policies seems to be in constant 
flux as a result of the “arms race” between authorities and irregular migrants in 
which “actions provokes reaction” (Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1594), and 
because lawyers and human rights activists continuously battle with governments to 
create space as well.  
This constantly changing environment in which my respondents find 
themselves makes it difficult for me to determine if specific policy measures have 
certain effects, which is why I do not aim to do so. I have already discussed the main 
reasons in section 2.5.2, yet this chapter has provided even more ground for my 
reluctance to engage in comparative efforts. It appears that a gap exists between 
formal policies and their implementation in practice. One would therefore not only 
have to study formal policies, but also analyze how these are implemented. This is a 
complicated task given that implementation practices differ on a local level as well. 
Therefore not just two relevant policy implementation contexts can be discerned, but 
rather several. Examining the effects of policy practices within all these local 
contexts seems a difficult task that would probably require more than the 61 
interviews I conducted with organizations.  
Furthermore, even though the lives of my respondents are situated in 
different policy contexts, these contexts do not mechanically constrain or enforce 
their actions, but rather irregular migrants react to opportunities and constraints in 
different ways. The context in which my respondents’ aspirations take shape has 
been sketched in this chapter. In the following chapters the interaction between 
irregular migrants and the context in which they live will be analyzed in so far as it 
affects my respondents’ aspirations or their incorporation and transnational 
activities.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INVESTMENT, SETTLEMENT AND 
LEGALIZATION ASPIRATIONS 
This chapter examines what my respondents aspire to during their stay in the Low 
Countries. In other words, - as introduced in chapter 2 – an answer is sought to the 
question of what aspirations do irregular migrants have. From my analysis, it 
appears that three types of aspirations can be distinguished which are discussed in 
the next section. The subsequent sections zoom in on how these types of aspirations 
are shaped and on changes that may appear in aspirations during irregular 
migrants’ careers.  
5.1  THREE TYPES OF ASPIRATIONS 
The first type of aspirations concern working and making money in the country of 
destination with which to return to the country of origin. Respondents with this type 
of aspirations strive for future upward mobility in their country of origin. They are 
usually ‘target earners’: they save for very specific projects, ranging from starting 
their own business to financing a future wedding in the country of origin (Massey et 
al. 1987). Musa13 from Turkey for example says: “I am here with only one goal and 
that is to save money and return to get married and start my own business.” And 
Mbark says: “When I have earned enough money, I will go back to Morocco to start 
a business there.” During their stay in the Low Countries these migrants try to 
acquire the financial means for future investments in their home country. The 
following fragment illustrates how their stay serves a planned future in the country 
of origin: 
I have big plans in Bulgaria. For starters, I will marry my girlfriend 
when I return to Burgas. (...) Furthermore, I intend to start my own 
business. At the least, I do not want to deprive my children of the 
education that I did not have. (...) My only aim is to get back to Burgas 
as fast as I can. However, to be able to achieve this, I need a 
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considerable amount of euros. So that is what I try to achieve here in 
Ghent. (Dimitar, Bulgaria) 
These migrants mean to stay in the receiving society only on a temporary basis until 
their project has succeeded. They regard their stay as an intermediary period in 
which they work for their future upward social mobility in their countries of origin. 
Göksel for example says: “This is a step that I take in order to realize my dream. I 
earn enough money here to make the savings I need before I go back to Turkey.” 
Migrants with this type of aspirations aspire to make money with which to return 
and invest in a better future in their country of origin. I denote these aspirations 
investment aspirations. As irregular migrants with investment aspirations aim to stay 
on a temporary basis – often for a more or less pre-fixed amount of time – they do 
not aspire to settle down or to become legalized, as Ilian says: “My uncle will most 
probably get a residence permit at the end of this year, but I am not looking for a 
residence permit. I want to go back to Bulgaria in two years and start a family 
there.” When I asked Sofia from Bolivia if she was trying to get legalized, she 
replied: “No, I am not trying anything.” When I subsequently asked her why she 
was not trying she said: “You know I want to have papers but I don’t know….that is 
just to live you know and to not have this problem with fear for the police but it is 
not for staying here indefinitely, no that is my intention.” This illustrates that 
migrants with investment aspirations regard legalization as a mere convenience and 
not as a necessity. In other words, it is something that they would not refuse in case 
it was offered to them, but it is not something they currently strive for.  
Contrary to the temporary ambitions of migrants with investment 
aspirations, the second category of aspirations is oriented towards residing in the 
Low Countries on a long-term basis. Migrants with what I have termed settlement 
aspirations aim to start a new life in the receiving society and do not intend to return:  
The employment situation is bad in Morocco (…) Belgium and the rest 
of Western-Europe to the contrary has much more employment 
possibilities and more industry to offer people jobs. (…) That is why I, 
like many other illegals by the way, have come to Belgium to build a 
new life here. (Badr, Morocco) 
The respondent quoted above clearly states that he believes that having a job is very 
important in terms of the life he desires in Belgium. As in his case, the desire for a 
long-term stay is often inspired by economic prosperity migrants aspire to gain for 
themselves, as is very clearly expressed by Andrei:  
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In Holland so much work exists, not officially, but they need workers, 
not for twenty euros but for five. You need to start one month for five, 
later you work for seven, and in three months you work for ten. Later 
you have twelve or fifteen but believe me with fifteen euros, cash, ah 
fifteen euros, this is my price with what I have lived [during the] last 
three years. Masja, fifteen euros per hour is enough. Masja, hundred 
twenty, hundred fifty euros every day, is not enough for life? No taxes 
or other things. It is perfect, perfect life (Andrei, Moldova). 
For some migrants, their settlement aspirations do not derive from their personal 
economic desires, but stem from family needs that span national boundaries. Arda 
for example says: “I don’t have any choice. I stay here to send money to my family. I 
can work all year round here, in Turkey I only work a few months a year.” 
Furthermore, focusing on settling in the new society does not mean that migrants 
give up on the option of ever returning to their country of origin. Not only do 
migrants with settlement aspirations – if they can – regularly visit their home 
country; many plan on returning upon retirement as living costs are usually much 
lower there.  
For migrants with this type of aspiration, legalization of their stay can be 
pleasant, but they do not regard it a necessity: they are primarily occupied with 
living a life that they regard as better or that they hope will become better than the 
life they left behind. Jean for example responds, in answer to the question of whether 
he wants to legalize his stay, that he “does not feel like getting into that whole 
affair.” He indicates that he would be happy if he were legalized, but that he is not 
taking any action in that direction himself. He says: “in my own way, I have 
arranged for a pleasant stay in Belgium.” Jean believes that the life he is living in 
Belgium is much better than the life he would lead in Congo. Like Jean, migrants 
with settlement aspirations seem to be content with the idea of living without 
papers, because in their opinion they lead a better life now than they would in their 
home country. Valentina from Cuba for example says: “honestly with all I have here, 
I don’t have papers, but at least I work a little and with that I can buy things that I 
can’t buy in my country.” They are convinced they do not necessarily need papers to 
ensure a good life in the receiving society, like Chavdar from Bulgaria says: “I lead a 
better life than people with a residence permit. I even make more money than they 
do.”  
  Life Without Papers 
74 
Not always are settlement aspirations only about economic prosperity in the 
receiving society. Some people for example want to stay because through their right 
to urgent medical care, they receive medical assistance they would not be able to 
afford in their home country (cf. Rosenthal 2007). Kees, who is a social worker in 
Antwerp, explains: “There is this man, we have been talking about voluntary return 
for five months now but this man has the entire medical dictionary, he has all 
illnesses. It is much better for him to stay here. This man costs the OCMW14; I think 
it is their best customer in terms of costs. What he has here [in Belgium] he is never 
going to get there [South-America], and he won’t have the money either.” Medical 
expenses that can be provided for in the receiving society can thus constitute a 
reason why migrants aspire to settle down: 
My sister has a tumor in her head (…) my sister is undergoing hard 
treatment, and very long, it will practically be forever. And to this 
country we are so thankful because they help her so much. These 
examinations could not be done in my country. Firstly because they 
don’t have them there, they don’t know how to do them, and secondly 
because we economically could never have afforded it. (…) the 
beautiful thing about Belgium is (…) that when someone is illegal, 
there is medical assistance for this person…. regardless of…. if the 
medical problem that you have is this big, the government accepts the 
expenses and they help you. (Constanza, Bolivia) 
Even though irregular migrants only have limited rights in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the few rights they can claim are often reason for them to aspire to stay 
here, as they often do not have similar rights in many countries of origin.  
Similarly, the educational possibilities of respondents’ children can fuel 
settlement aspirations (cf. Fozdar and Torezani 2008). When I asked Antonia if she 
had the chance to do it all over, if she would again make the same decision to come 
to Belgium and settle down illegally, she replied: “yes because my children have 
learned Dutch, another language, they speak English, they speak French, and they 
know many things. They know many things that you don’t have there [in Ecuador], 
intellectual things everything. Here is the best future for them.” And when I asked 
Benjamin from Ecuador if he was satisfied with his life in Belgium, he said: “My 
children go to music school here, school of painting, of dancing, karate, so that is 
something very nice for them. We are satisfied because we are complying with our 
obligation as parents to give a good education to your children. We hope that they 
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will take advantage of it and have a better future later.” Mostly, it is not just one of 
these underlying factors that shapes settlement aspirations, but a combination of 
several factors, as Javiera explains: “We have grown away from our country so we 
feel better here because we are better here economically, and I can give my children 
the education that I would like to give them, and health too, and I can give that to 
my sister and my mother [who live in their house] as well. I wanted to do all that in 
Ecuador but I could not.”  
As most migrants with settlement aspirations point at several factors 
underlying their aspirations, they sometimes also mention reasons that would not 
shape these settlement aspirations independently. In combination with other factors, 
though, these do add to the total picture. In this connection, some for example 
emphasize the freedom from parental or community control they have come to 
enjoy.  
Settlement aspirations not only stem from economic conditions, but may be 
inspired by many other factors as well. What these different structural factors have 
in common is that they – sometimes in combination with each other – foster 
settlement aspirations. They are responsible for a category of aspirations to arise 
aimed at building a more or less permanent life in the receiving society that does not 
necessarily include legalization. This does not mean that some migrants with 
settlement aspirations would not seize the opportunity if legalization were offered to 
them, but in their everyday-life they do not pay attention to it.  
Contrastingly, irregular migrants who have legalization aspirations do aspire to 
acquire a legal residence status. For them, leading a better life is inextricably bound 
up with obtaining a legal status. They feel that they can only be comfortable by this 
means. Kamel for example says he can only start to live well if he acquires legal 
residence: 
You simply don’t have any rights if you don’t have your papers. (…) 
So my only hope is to get a legal status (…) only then can I start to feel 
good and try to actively participate in this society. (Kamel, Morocco) 
Mehdi from Morocco answers the question of why he chooses to remain in Belgium 
by saying: “because I plan to build a future here (…) I will do anything to get a 
residence permit. I know that it is going to take much effort; nevertheless, I will do 
anything to become a full citizen of Belgium.” Jamal says that he “[can’t] go back to 
Morocco without first having arranged for papers. All the effort and money would 
have been futile then.” For legalization migrants, obtaining legal residence 
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represents a start to a new beginning, unlike settlement migrants who can already 
start to build a new life without papers. Legalization migrants feel that only after 
obtaining papers can they make such a new start. Illiass from Morocco for example 
explains: “I hope I meet someone who I can marry so that I can reside legally, 
because only then I can start to work on my future.” Tolga from Turkey also 
emphasizes how legalization represents a new beginning: “My life here has yet to 
begin. I am going to marry my girlfriend and then I will start a restaurant with my 
brother in law.” For legalization migrants, their life seems to stand still while they 
live in illegality. Tarek from Algeria explains: “if I become legalized I can map out a 
route, make a plan, organize my life, and I cannot do that without papers. (…) It is 
very unfortunate that I am losing time like this.” Efunsegun from Nigeria also 
expresses how he feels time is ticking away: “it is because of my future that I stay 
here, I know that if I get the paper I know that my future will be much brighter as it 
is now. So that is why you know I want to have permission to live here, nothing else, 
because I know that if I ever decide to go back to Africa I have to start again from 
where I stopped. My age is counting on me.” 
 Legalization migrants consider legalization a precondition to be able to lead a 
good life. In many cases, they say that if they knew for certain that they would never 
get legalized, they would consider returning to their homeland or trying their luck 
somewhere else:  
There [in Africa], you know that you are in a shit situation, but here it 
is not a shit situation but it does not result into anything either. No, for 
me, without papers I go back. Without papers there is no reason to live 
here. I go back then. I didn’t go to Europe and stop here to do illegal 
work, that is no use. (Dnari, Sierra Leone) 
This respondent clearly explains that he did not come to Europe to do ‘illegal work’. 
Legalization migrants see their migration as some sort of project in which they strive 
for upward social mobility in terms of advancements in their life. They see 
legalization as a necessary stepping stone towards achieving that upward social 
mobility. That is why migrants like Illiass, Medhi and Efunsegun talk about how 
they need papers for their ‘future’. However, not all legalization migrants consider 
legalization to be only a stepping stone necessary for the advancement of their 
personal careers. For many, having papers represents even more than that:  
I just don’t want to earn 2,000 or 1,500 euros working in this and to 
only be with people who are also in this environment [illegal 
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employment]. I want to do other things as well and move around in 
freedom. I want to be in the environment in which I want to be. (…) if I 
know for sure that I have to be in this situation for two or three years 
or more, I think I will return then. (Fernando, Chile)  
Together with his wife, this respondent is making a monthly income that is likely to 
be enough to keep most settlement and investment migrants content, yet he clearly 
expresses that the benefits of making this amount of money do not suffice for him. 
As for many other legalization migrants, this has to do with his educational 
background. He answers my question of why he does not want to stay in Belgium 
without papers: “because I have graduated from university, I have a title and all 
that, and now I am here painting and doing work with my hands”. Several 
legalization migrants express the wish to take up their studies after legalization (cf. 
Menjivar 2008), or they hope that legalization enables them to be employed in a job 
in which they can use their educational knowledge.  
 It appears that my analysis has revealed three different types of aspirations of 
irregular migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands: investment, settlement, and 
legalization aspirations. Migrants with investment aspirations aspire to return and 
invest in a better future in their country of origin. Migrants with settlement 
aspirations aspire to build a new life in the receiving society, regardless of whether 
they will ever obtain a legal residence status or not, and migrants with legalization 
aspirations aspire to obtain legal residence. While other scholars have made similar 
distinctions based on two migration motives or two types of aspirations, the 
analytical distinction of these three categories is new. Leman for example (1997) 
distinguishes between those who primarily migrate to – usually temporarily – work 
and make money (employment illegality) and migrants who come to reside and 
legalize their status (residence illegality), and Chavez ([1992]1998) distinguishes 
between sojourners and settlers. Although my analysis broadly supports this 
distinction in individual aspirations, it reveals three categories of aspirations instead 
of two. Contrary to Leman’s findings, I found a group of irregular migrants who do 
not aspire to obtain legal residence, but who straightforwardly aspire to settle down. 
And contrary to the findings of Chavez I found a category of irregular migrants for 
whom settler aspirations necessarily involve legalization. I believe it is important to 
distinguish three categories and not just two, because these categories encompass 
very different definitions of success. Whereas settlement migrants describe their life 
in illegal employment as a ‘perfect life’, legalization migrants express they are not 
here ‘to do illegal work’ and that they are ‘losing time’ like this. This means that in 
  Life Without Papers 
78 
order to get what they aspire to, they need to employ very different strategies, and 
these different strategies are likely to require specific resources and are likely to 
shape specific patterns of incorporation. I therefore believe that distinguishing 
among investment, settlement and legalization aspirations provides more insight 
into the lives of irregular migrants than analytical distinctions with only two 
categories can offer.  
5.2 BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS 
As explained in the second chapter, aspirations are not only fed by wants and 
desires, but they are also influenced by structural factors. Some of these structural 
factors stem from characteristics of both the sending and the receiving countries, and 
others have to do with personal background characteristics or the personal social 
networks respondents are embedded in.  
In the previous chapter, I described the main characteristics of the two 
receiving societies. These different contexts are likely to create an overrepresentation 
of specific categories of aspirations in each country. For example, the possibilities of 
achieving individual regularization are perceived to be better in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands judging on the numbers of applications. This makes it likely that 
migrants with legalization aspirations are a relatively large category in Belgium. 
However, I cannot make proper statements about the distributions over the 
categories because of the qualitative nature of my study. All I can do is indicate that 
the aspirations described in the previous subsections have been shaped in these 
structural contexts, and that other structural contexts may shape different 
distributions and perhaps even additional aspirations. Furthermore, I can analyze 
how specific changes in the perceptions of my respondents of this structural context 
may foster changes of their aspirations or of their actions. In other words, I can 
indicate how irregular migrants react to the perceived policy context in which they 
find themselves: how they adjust their aspirations and actions to the structural 
context in which they are embedded. This means that I can report mechanisms that 
shape patterns. These mechanisms are discussed in the following chapters whenever 
they are relevant in the context of this thesis.  
In this section, I analyze how specific structural conditions in the different 
sending countries create an overrepresentation of migrants from certain countries 
within specific categories of aspirations. Furthermore, I discuss how certain personal 
background characteristics appear to underlie specific categories of aspirations. 
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Doing so, it becomes clear that the irregular migrants I interviewed developed a 
‘migratory disposition’ (Kalir 2005b) and how the conditions in their country of 
origin and their personal backgrounds shaped their specific aspirations.  
Migrants with investment aspirations usually come from countries where 
there is some investment potential. Tümer for example says that it makes sense to 
invest in Turkey: “Turkey’s economy is doing well now so I go back and start my 
own shop there.” For people from war-struck countries in Africa, it does not seem 
like a very wise decision to go back to make investments there. Oudry from Congo 
explains: “Everybody knows what the situation is my country is like. How can I 
return when it is like this? With all these mass-killings? (…) There is no future 
there.” Migrants with investment aspirations usually migrate without their partner 
and children to keep the costs down. Furthermore, they often originate from 
countries nearby, so that the costs of transport are relatively low in order to make 
the investment of their migration worthwhile. In addition to the proximity, the 
investment costs are a lot lower for migrants who do not need a visa than for those 
who do. Migrants with investment aspirations therefore often come from visa-free 
countries such as Bulgaria (cf. Düvell 2006c). 
  The literature on ‘regular’ migration usually stresses that migrants who settle 
down have often started out as temporary migrants (Piore 1979). In the same vein, 
only a few irregular migrants have traditionally been found to aim at settlement 
from the start (Massey et al. 1987). Although I have encountered migrants who 
initially had temporary aspirations that turned into settlement aspirations, I also 
found some who aspired to settle down from the beginning. Lucas from Chile for 
example answered my question of whether it had always been his intention to stay 
here with a firm “yes,” and he later added “we knew that we were not coming 
back.” Furthermore, recent research also points out that, as immigration control has 
increased for migrants who need a visa, these often stay as long as possible once 
they have successfully entered the country of destination (Düvell 2006c). This seems 
to indicate that migrants who have settlement aspirations from the outset of their 
stay are no longer exceptional. 
Even though initial settlement aspirations are becoming more common, many 
of my respondents with current settlement aspirations have initially come to Europe 
with the desire to make money and then return home. Mustafa, who initially came 
with the intention to save money for his wedding and return, for example, says: “I 
have work here, when I have saved enough money I go back to Bulgaria to get 
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married. After that, I come back here with my wife. I lead a better life here.” 
Sometimes these are success stories as in Mustafa’s case, but many investment 
migrants turn into settlement migrants because they fail to get together the amount 
of money they need to return. They often need more time than they initially planned 
to get the necessary savings together. When I for example asked Martina if it had 
always been her intention to settle down, she said: “No this was not my intention. It 
was covering what I owed, making a little money and going back to Bolivia. That 
was my original goal. My goal was to go back after a year. But after six months 
without work, and then after eight months of work I still did not have the same 
amount of money that I arrived with. So [I stayed] a year more, and then another 
year more.” It can be especially difficult to meet initial investment aspirations for 
migrants who had high travel expenses. In these cases, paying back these travel costs 
can constitute such a financial burden that migrants are unable to save any money 
for long periods of time which more or less forces them to settle down. Gzifa, who 
migrated from Ghana with the help of a migration broker, ran away from this broker 
once she realized that the wages in Belgium were not as he had promised them to be. 
While she initially planned to work for a few years to save money, she came to the 
conclusion that she could never save money with the enormous travel debt she had. 
Going back to Ghana was not an option because the migration broker’s people 
would easily find her there. She therefore decided to leave Brussels and settle in 
Antwerp, hoping he would not find her there, which he has not been able to in the 
past six years.  
Migrants with settlement aspirations usually come from countries where high 
levels of unemployment and corruption and economic problems are common, as in 
South America or in North Africa (cf. Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002). The economic 
crisis in Ecuador inspired Isidora to migrate to Belgium with her husband and her 
four children:  
So we had many problems in our country, a new government had 
come and all the business went down. (…) My husband and I had a 
pharmacy in Ecuador. (…) because of the change of government 
Colombian competitors came and they sold all the medicine very 
cheap and we could not compete with this (...) so we sold the 
pharmacy and we also had a car that we sold and for the little that we 
were lacking for the trip we took out credit. (…) So all the money that 
we got from selling the pharmacy we invested in the six airline tickets. 
(Isidora, Ecuador) 
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Migrants with settlement aspirations usually feel that the economic and political 
situation in their country creates few chances for future improvement in their 
situation. Moreover, they do not believe that this situation will change any time 
soon. That is why they migrate to Europe, where they hope to have a chance at some 
future upward social mobility, as is clearly expressed by Kamel and Younes: 
Morocco did not have and still does not have anything to offer me. In 
Morocco, being an uneducated boy, you don’t have a chance to build 
up a life like you can here in Europe. If you don’t have a job or you 
don’t know anyone who can help you get one, you will continue to 
live in the same poverty you always have lived in. So, economically 
speaking it makes no sense to stay in Morocco and to think that there 
will be better times because everything will remain the same. The rich 
are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer (Kamel, Morocco). 
 
Morocco is a corrupt country with huge differences between rich and 
poor. I do not believe that this will ever change or that there will be an 
end to corruption in Morocco. I was not living well in Morocco. It was 
not like we did not have anything to eat at my house, but there was 
never an improvement in our financial situation. It stayed like it 
always was and that had to change. That is why I have taken the step 
to go abroad like many young people my age do. I wanted to do 
something to make my life better economically speaking (Younes, 
Morocco).  
Countries that foster settlement aspirations often have hardly any social security 
system. Respondents often worked on the informal market there, and medical 
insurance or pension plans were usually out of their reach. This means that many of 
the conditions they face in their country of origin are the same as in the receiving 
society. But at least in the Low Countries they have partial access to medical care 
and good education for their children.  
Like migrants with settlement aspirations, migrants with legalization 
aspirations often escape poor and corrupt countries. In addition, countries that have 
been struck by war or where other serious political conflicts are part of daily life 
foster legalization aspirations. Many migrants with legalization aspirations have 
therefore applied for asylum. In this connection, it is important to realize that many 
of these migrants had not been well-informed in advance about conditions in the 
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country of destination. Many respondents complain about the false image that prior 
migrants have portrayed of Europe. After hearing the stories of seemingly endless 
economic opportunities and political freedoms, they think European streets are 
paved with gold (cf. Staring 1999), and that people can do whatever they want. As a 
consequence, many migrants leave without basic information or with a completely 
wrong image of what to expect. Some of my respondents for example thought that 
they could easily start working once they arrived and did not even know that papers 
are required in order to work or reside in Europe:  
You know that you need papers in order to leave Africa (…) but you 
do not know that people apply for asylum here. You don’t know that if 
you don’t have papers you have a problem. You don’t know that. 
(Albert, Congo) 
Many migrants with legalization aspirations have been smuggled into the country – 
sometimes without knowing which country they were taken to (cf. Black et al. 2005; 
Jordan and Düvell 2002) – without having the slightest clue of the conditions they 
will face. They were simply told by the smugglers to apply for asylum, which they 
did. Often they are provided with details on how to do this best (see also Van Wijk 
2007), but sometimes they are dropped off at the Aliens Office without further 
instructions:  
When I was there in 2000 there were a lot of people, from Kosovo, 
Chechnia, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo (…). And I asked: what is this 
place here? And they said this is where people ask for asylum. 
Asylum, what is that? Because I did not know, I knew nothing. 
Asylum what is that? It is asylum; asylum is like when you ask for an 
identity card. And that is here in Belgium. Oh ok, and I went to the 
office like that. (Tuyishime, Rwanda) 
Many migrants with legalization aspirations have consequently just rolled into 
asylum procedures. Many have fled their countries in search of protection without 
knowing anything about asylum laws; they just thought they could work in Europe. 
After each negative decision they file another appeal or try another procedure. As 
there is always another procedure to try or an appeal to file – especially in Belgium – 
the lawyers who assist migrants who strive for legalization continuously provide 
them with hope that the next procedure does have chances of success, especially 
since there are no strict criteria for these procedures. As a consequence there is 
always some hope of achieving legalization, and only the slightest glimmer of hope 
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can make some continue along this path for long periods of time. Furthermore, some 
social workers also tend to encourage them to file for regularization procedures, as 
they believe that the circumstances in the home country are too bad to go back to. 
When I interviewed social worker Debbie and the irregular migrant she was 
assisting (Dnari), they told me how Debbie encouraged Dnari not to go back to 
Sierra Leone:  
Debbie: “He wanted to return.” 
Dnari: “Yes that is the truth”  
Debbie: “So I said where do you want to go?” 
Dnari: “I said to Sierra Leone” 
Debbie: “What do you want to do there?” 
Dnari: “I don’t know” 
Debbie: “How are you going to? You can’t, I said. I said sorry but you 
are just not going to do that. Because you don’t know what will 
happen to you there. At least here you have…it is not easy…. but we 
are trying to find you a place to stay. So yes you don’t have a place to 
stay now but at least you do have some work and an income, and I am 
trying to arrange papers for you” 
Apart from the group of respondents who are have legalization aspirations because 
they come from countries with political problems and have been socialized into the 
world of legal procedures, there is a group for whom personal background 
characteristics underlie their legalization aspirations. The first type of characteristics 
has already been mentioned and has to do with their educational level. The second is 
about social status. Some migrants with legalization aspirations have a high social 
status in their country of origin. These respondents look down on illegal 
employment and often lie to their family and friends about the conditions they are 
facing in order to protect their social status. They can obviously not keep this up 
forever, so they need legal status so that they can start to live the life that they are 
expected to be living. A third characteristic is age. Irregular migrants with 
legalization aspirations are either relatively old or relatively young compared to 
those with settlement and investment aspirations. While the latter two categories are 
usually roughly between 25 and 45 – and hence at a good age to work and form a 
family, some legalization migrants are over 50 which makes them less suitable for 
heavy physical labor and consequently more likely to aspire to legalization. The 
younger migrants with legalization aspirations have often just left school and have 
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no job experience: they have come to the Low Countries in search of a better future. 
As they are at a good age to get married, this is usually what they are after. Their 
families have often sent them to Europe to live with other family members for a 
while. This especially applies to migrants from Turkey and Morocco whose family 
members are former labor migrants who acquired a legal status in the seventies or 
eighties. Finding the newly arrived family member a marriage partner becomes an 
issue for the whole family to deal with.  
It appears that specific social backgrounds or structural conditions in their 
home country make certain migrants more likely to have certain kinds of 
aspirations. Moreover, specific personal background characteristics underlie specific 
types of aspirations. Because categories of aspirations may overlap with countries of 
origin, people studying Poles and Albanians for example find that the former are 
mainly temporary migrants, while Albanians prefer to settle down permanently (see 
Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). Certain conditions in their home countries make 
them more likely to aspire to one thing than to another simply because it makes 
more sense in the context they live. However, there are always many exceptions. 
There are always Poles who do settle down or try to become legalized. We have 
already seen in chapter 2 that such nationality categories can be diverse in terms of 
aspirations. Moreover, people do not always have similar aspirations during their 
entire migrant career. If conditions in the country of origin change, aspirations may 
possibly change with these. A migrant who wanted to open a shop in his home 
country is for example likely to refrain from this idea once the economy in this 
country collapses. Moreover, irregular migrants can also change their aspirations 
due to certain events in the receiving society. These possible changes in aspirations 
are discussed in the next section in more detail.  
5.3 CHANGING ASPIRATIONS 
I take aspirations at different points in the lives of irregular migrants as a starting 
point for my analysis. For the respondents that were interviewed by research 
assistants in semi-structured interviews, I usually could assess only one point in 
their lives: the moment the interview took place. During my fieldwork I have 
however mostly been able to distinguish a sequence of aspirations throughout the 
migrant careers of my respondents.  
I choose to use the terms investment migrants, legalization migrants and 
settlement migrants from this point forward instead of the longer terms ‘migrants 
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with investment aspirations’, ‘migrants with settlement aspirations’ and ‘migrants 
with legalization aspirations’ that I have used so far. I have made this choice for 
reasons of readability, but the reader should bear in mind that my aim is to construct 
a typology of aspirations, not of migrants. In other words, my analysis is on the level 
of aspirations and not on the level of agents. The concepts investment, settlement 
and legalization migrants are hence used to refer to irregular migrants who have 
these specific aspirations at a certain point in time, but the core analytical categories 
are aspirations.  
According to Van Nieuwenhuyze (2007), a typical trajectory often takes place: 
the Senegambian irregular migrants she studied virtually all initially intended to 
return, but shifted their focus to obtaining a legal status after a while. However, 
research by Kosic and Triandafyllidou (2004) has indicated that not all irregular 
migrants are interested in the possibility of regularizing their work and stay. My 
own analysis also points in the latter direction: neither does there seem to be a 
hierarchy in aspirations, nor does a fixed trajectory exist. My respondents do not 
always find legalization important. Jean for example initially tried to legalize his 
situation, but purposely stopped all his attempts after he received a second rejection. 
Although I found that the typical trajectory from investment to settlement to 
legalization aspirations is surely not uncommon, I have encountered a variety of 
other trajectories. The only trajectories I did not come across were those in which 
settlement or legalization aspirations turned into investment aspirations. This does 
not mean, however, that these trajectories do not exist. But it is likely that migrants 
who have followed these have already returned and are consequently difficult to 
encounter in the destination country.  
The question arises as to what it is that makes irregular migrants change 
aspirations. As explained in chapter 2, aspirations mediate what an individual 
desires and what society can offer, which inextricably connects aspirations to 
assessments of available opportunities and possible constraints. However, they are 
not necessarily linked to real-life opportunities and constraints, but to perceptions of 
these. This means that aspirations may change as a result of changes in perceptions 
of the opportunity structure. These changes in perceptions can be the result of 
changes in the opportunity structure, but this does not necessarily have to be the 
case. Changes in aspirations can therefore be the result of an opportunity opening 
up or of increasing constraints, but they can also stem from false perceptions or from 
changes in desires and wants. Many things can therefore make migrants change 
aspirations. In other words, it is difficult to isolate the effects of specific possibilities 
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or constraints on aspirations. I can only analyze how irregular migrants adjust their 
aspirations to perceptions of these possibilities or constraints. I therefore have not 
systematically studied factors inspiring changes in aspirations themselves. In the 
following chapters I pay attention to contextual factors that I found to actually have 
inspired my respondents to change aspirations and that are relevant for answering 
my research questions. What is important to emphasize at this point in connection 
with changing aspirations is that if migrants switch to another category of 
aspirations, the required strategies for realizing their aspirations change (Van 
Nieuwenhuyze, 2009), and their incorporation and transnational activities are likely 
to change as well.  
5.4 ASPIRATIONS AND STRATEGIES 
In order to get what they aspire to, irregular migrants need to pursue strategies. 
Whereas the strategies pursued by investment migrants and settlement migrants 
show limited internal diversity, the strategies of legalization migrants can be divided 
into two distinct types. Investment migrants try to make as much money as they can 
in the shortest period of time possible. This means they try to work as much as 
possible while economizing on other things where they can. Contrastingly, 
settlement migrants aspire to build a life, and this requires more long-term stability 
than such short-term investment strategies can provide. They therefore try to find 
regular and steady jobs, and they put effort into building a social network of people 
around them who can supply them with information and assistance (Van Meeteren 
et al. 2007a; 2009).  
The two types of strategies that legalization migrants pursue correspond to 
the possibilities for legalization in the receiving societies. The first strategy is about 
trying to marry a native or a regular migrant with permanent residence rights. While 
some aim to find someone they love, others prefer to engage in a bogus marriage. In 
some cases the marriages are bought, and the partner consequently knows that it is a 
bogus marriage, yet I also encountered migrants who aimed to find a partner they 
could deceive and leave once they have obtained legal residence. The second type of 
strategy of legalization migrants revolves around legal procedures. Legalization 
migrants who employ this strategy aim to become legalized by means of all kinds of 
procedures, the most important of which being regularization. How exactly they 
pursue such strategies on a daily basis is discussed in the chapters dealing with 
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incorporation, transnational engagements and success. The same applies to the daily 
practices of investment and settlement migrants.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Whereas other scholars have made distinctions based on migration motives or 
aspirations using only two categories, my analysis has revealed three types of 
aspirations: investment, settlement and legalization. As these categories of 
aspirations are accompanied by distinct visions of what constitutes success, this 
distinction provides more insight than prevailing categorizations of two groups can 
offer. I have indicated that certain personal background characteristics as well as 
structural factors in the countries of origin underlie specific aspirations, and how 
changes in these characteristics are likely to inspire changing aspirations. 
Furthermore, I have described how migrants use certain strategies in order to realize 
their aspirations and how two specific types of strategies can be distinguished 
among legalization migrants. In the next chapters, I demonstrate how these types of 
aspirations underlie specific patterns of incorporation and transnational activities. 
The penultimate chapter focuses on how some irregular migrants manage to realize 
their aspirations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
LIVING DIFFERENT DREAMS (I): 
ASPIRATIONS AND FUNCTIONAL 
INCORPORATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The scholarly discussion on irregular migrants and their incorporation in receiving 
societies has been governed by the question of whether irregular migrants can 
achieve full incorporation. In line with the victim perspective, many scholars argue it 
is impossible for irregular migrants to achieve full incorporation due to their lack of 
legal status (see for example Chavez 1991; Engbersen 1999; Leman 1997; Van der 
Leun 2003b). In some conceptualizations of incorporation, participating in political 
life and having citizenship rights are regarded as important parameters for 
incorporation. In such views, lack of legal status is a direct impediment to achieving 
full incorporation. Other scholars use other conceptualizations and claim that 
irregular migrants are able to participate in many spheres in spite of their legal 
status. However, they do find that the lack of legal status has an indirect negative 
effect on incorporation. Massey et al. (1987) for example find that the illegal 
residence status acts as an important damper on the formation of social and 
economic connections. This dampening effect is especially pronounced in the early 
stages of the migrant career. At the same time, the authors find that this dampening 
effect does not change the basic process of incorporation (Massey et al. 1987). 
Although obtaining legal status is clearly an important event in the process of 
incorporation that greatly facilitates the formation of connections to the receiving 
society, “it is not synonymous with incorporation itself and it is not necessarily the 
most important step in the process.” (Massey et al. 1987:270)  
I do not aim to discuss the question of whether or not irregular migrants can 
achieve full incorporation. My focus is on the patterns of incorporation that can be 
distinguished among irregular migrants and how these can be understood. It is 
therefore much more relevant to look at the issues that are discussed under the 
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heading incorporation and to see how I can contribute to these implicit or explicit 
scholarly debates.  
In the next sections and in the following chapter, I discuss the elements of 
incorporation that have often come up in the literature on the incorporation of 
irregular migrants, such as work, housing, and social contacts and that I have 
something to contribute to. I found it helpful to categorize these issues under two 
dimensions: functional incorporation and social incorporation. Functional 
incorporation includes housing, work and other sources of income and thus refers to 
the way irregular migrants are able to sustain themselves. Social incorporation 
includes the way migrants spend their leisure time and their social contacts in the 
receiving society. Note that this conceptualization of incorporation is not all-
encompassing: I do not intend to make statements about the incorporation of 
irregular migrants or about full incorporation. Instead, I aim to contribute to the 
literature on the incorporation of irregular migrants, so I only discuss those elements 
of incorporation about which there is an implicit or explicit scholarly debate I can 
contribute to. In the context of this dissertation, incorporation should therefore not 
so much be considered an unambiguous theoretical concept forced upon the data, 
but rather as a heuristic device that provides structure to this chapter and the next 
and that links my findings to relevant literature. Whereas this chapter discusses 
functional incorporation, social incorporation is dealt with in the following chapter.  
6.2 HOUSING 
Many scholars write of the low quality of irregular migrants’ housing arrangements. 
Stories of cramped rooms, lack of heating and landlords unwilling to make essential 
repairs are frequently quoted (see for example Adam et al. 2002; P. Anderson 1999; 
Burgers 1999a; Mahler 1995). I also encountered dwellings in which I felt 
uncomfortable eating the meals that were generously offered to me because of the 
many cockroaches running around. Yet after reading all these horror stories, it came 
as a surprise to me to also encounter very nice and well-maintained apartments, in 
which everyone had their own bedroom.  
6.2.1 Type of accommodation 
There is a debate among scholars studying irregular migrants about the relation 
between income and the amount spent on accommodation. A correlation between 
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the two, as there generally exists in Belgium and the Netherlands, has not been 
found for irregular migrants (Leerkes et al. 2004; Van Meeteren et al. 2007b). Other 
research seems to point in the same direction. Paspalanova (2006) for example found 
that her respondents live in cheap housing of bad quality, even though some had 
average incomes. She claims that irregular migrants share the priority of ‘living as 
cheaply as possible’ (p. 119). In addition to this shared priority, scholars often 
assume that irregular migrants’ juridical status prevents them from being able to do 
anything to improve their housing situation. In other words, there is no correlation 
between income and money spent on accommodation, because most irregular 
migrants live in cheap houses of bad quality as their vulnerable situation just does 
not allow them to find anything better (Burgers 1999a). Unlike the scholars outlined 
above, Chavez ([1992]1998) does find a relation between income and money spent 
on accommodation. He claims that crowded conditions are tolerated by temporary 
migrants, but they are not normally part of life for irregular migrants who aim to 
settle down. The latter do move into better housing arrangements if they can. In 
addition, other scholars emphasize that housing arrangements partly reflect the 
length of stay: although most migrants share accommodation in the initial period, 
once a job is obtained, finding and moving to separate accommodation often 
becomes a major objective (Leerkes et al. 2004; Roer-Strier and Olshtain-Mann 1999). 
I found that this diversity in research outcomes can be explained by bringing 
aspirations into the analysis. Most irregular migrants manage to arrange some form 
of accommodation; only one of my respondents lived on the streets when I 
interviewed him. A few others told me that they had lived on the streets in the past, 
sleeping in parks and public shelters during their initial period in illegality. The 
diversity in housing arrangements I encountered partly reflected the length of stay 
of the irregular migrants in question. Those who had lived in the receiving society 
for some time often had been able to get a better deal than migrants who had just 
arrived. However, I found that this aim was not shared by all my respondents, but 
only by those with settlement aspirations. These migrants prefer the privacy of their 
own room or apartment and are willing to pay something extra for it. As a result, 
while some settlement migrants live in shared arrangements out of economic 
necessity during the initial period of settlement (see also Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994) – 
those who can afford it move into more spacious and more private accommodation:  
I lived with my brother for a while in the beginning but when I 
found work I wanted my own room. A family member read an add 
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indicating that there was a studio for rent. (…) I like it very much to 
have my own room so that I do not have to bother anyone. (Brahim) 
Investment migrants, on the contrary, do not usually wish to move to more private 
and consequently more expensive accommodation even if they can afford it. They 
prefer to continue to live in shared living arrangements in order to save money. 
Martina for example says: “we rented a studio with the four of us so we could share 
the costs, the rent, and the electricity.” In some cases, migrants live with family 
members or friends during their entire stay as they know from the outset that their 
stay will only last for a certain period. In these cases, this is usually something 
migrants and receivers have agreed upon before the migration took place. Other 
investment migrants share studios and (student) apartments where they either 
occupy one room per person or in which they share a room with multiple persons, 
usually also irregular migrants. In some cases it is not the rooms that are rented out 
but the beds (see also Leman 1997). These are often provided for by employers, as 
was the case with Musa, who says: “My employer arranged a bed for me in a 
pension for 150 euros per month.”  
Those who live in low-quality dwellings are thus not only those who cannot 
afford anything better or who have just arrived, but also investment migrants for 
whom this is part of their strategy: it helps them to realize their aspirations. 
Investment migrants want to economize on many things as this brings them closer to 
the realization of their aspirations. When Diego noted that I was impressed with the 
way he managed to save such a large share of his earnings he reacted: “Well we are 
a school of economics.” 
Legalization migrants are like investment migrants in the sense that they 
hope that the situation they are in is only temporary. They are therefore more 
willing to make concessions in their housing situation than settlement migrants are 
prepared to make. Those who try to find someone to marry usually prefer to spend 
money on going out rather than on accommodation. After all, it is by going out that 
the attainment of their aspirations comes into closer view, because they can meet 
potential wedding partners this way. In addition, they often live with family 
members who help them in their quest. Those who are involved in procedures often 
still live in the house that was assigned to them by the Aliens Office or that they 
found when they successfully passed through the first stages of the asylum 
procedure. In the past, asylum seekers in Belgium were allowed to live outside the 
asylum center after their first positive decision. In the case of my respondents, the 
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second decision turned out negative, which transformed them into irregular 
migrants, but they continued to live in the same place. In many cases, their landlords 
did not know that their tenants had become illegal. Because these landlords are 
usually not slumlords who are trying to take advantage of the vulnerable situation, 
these accommodations are often pretty decent. That is, the landlords take good care 
of maintenance and ask market prices. Furthermore, legalization migrants who 
move are often able to show some form of documentation to landlords: the forms of 
their application. As a result, they often manage to rent an apartment from a person 
who is not a slumlord. In these cases, the persons they rent from are not aware of 
their illegal residence status. They only know their tenants are in a precarious 
situation or that ‘they are arranging their papers’. In addition, organizations 
sometimes negotiate accommodation on their behalf. 
However, if legalization migrants have applied for regularization and have 
been denied, the police can come to their house to expel them. Some legalization 
migrants therefore move and cannot afford to be picky about where they move to. 
They have to settle for whatever they can get. Obviously, these are often dwellings 
in very bad condition offered by slumlords.  
To my surprise, I found quite a number of legalization migrants with 
procedures who lived with a Belgian or Dutch family. In exchange for the free room 
and board offered to them, these migrants engaged in light house work such as 
doing the laundry, cooking and cleaning. In all cases, the accounts the migrants give 
of their living situation are that they have been taken in by a loving family with a 
heart for immigrants and are surely not being exploited as a live-in maid. Obviously, 
people in the latter situation are probably more reluctant to talk to a researcher, and 
they are in a more difficult position to do so than the migrants I interviewed, so I do 
not want to make statements about the general conditions that accompany such 
arrangements.  
All in all, there does not seem to be a relationship between income and 
money spent on accommodation in general, but only for a specific category: 
settlement aspirations. In line with Chavez, I encountered migrants who were 
willing to spend more money on accommodation so that they could give their 
children a private bedroom or a room to study. Unlike Paspalanova (2006), I found 
that not all my respondents wanted to live as cheaply as possible; only investment 
migrants did. And contrary to Burgers (1999a) some settlement migrants did 
manage to find a nice apartment.  
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It is interesting to try and explain why other scholars came to different 
conclusions. Because Paspalanova (2006) interviewed Eastern Europeans, who often 
have investment aspirations, the explanation for her divergent results may lie in her 
specific sample. I probably found more diversity, because my sample contains more 
variety in aspirations. Mahler (1995: 207) claims that accommodation is so expensive 
for irregular migrants that “in almost every case a minimum of an extended family is 
required to rent and maintain an apartment or house.” She claims that the high costs 
of housing tend to keep housing arrangements in flux such that they do not 
resemble the settling phase of migration as it is described by Chavez ([1992]1998) or 
Piore (1979). Not only were most of her respondents economically worse off than 
elsewhere, they lived in Long Island, a white middleclass suburb. According to the 
accounts provided by Mahler there was too little work available there – which made 
most irregular migrants relatively poor – and accommodation was relatively 
expensive there. That is to say, it was much more expensive than in many European 
studies (Leerkes et al. 2007). This means, apart from irregular migrants’ aspirations, 
their length of stay and the economic opportunities they have, the structure of the 
local housing market partially explains the variety in irregular migrants housing 
situations. The next subsection therefore deals with the spatial distribution of 
irregular migrants.  
6.2.2 Spatial distribution 
Irregular migrants are mainly accommodated in large cities and in a number of 
border and rural areas (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2006; cf. Lianos 2001). 
Within cities, irregular migrants often live in the – often centrally located – poor 
immigrant districts (Leerkes et al. 2007). They end up in these neighborhoods 
because housing is cheap there and because these provide proximity to work 
(Engbersen et al. 2006; Leerkes et al. 2007; Leman 1997). In addition, there is a large 
presence of regular migrants there. This presence of regular migrants who are able 
to provide work, housing, care, healthcare, information, relevant documents and 
possible partners is believed to be very important for irregular migrants (Engbersen 
et al. 2006). According to Leerkes et al. (2007) it is not just that co-ethnics can help 
them; irregular migrants also prefer to live in ethnically diverse neighborhoods 
where many people speak their language. Moreover, the large presence of co-ethnics 
has the benefit of rendering irregular migrants inconspicuous (Leman 1997; Lianos 
2001). Furthermore, after some time, 'shadow institutions’ (Scott 1998) or ‘bastard 
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institutions’ (Hughes [1951]1994) that cater specifically to irregular migrants begin to 
develop in immigrant districts (Engbersen et al. 2006; Leerkes et al. 2007). The 
population of irregular migrants is thus selectively incorporated into the urban 
landscape and their spatial distribution is believed to reflect the preferences and 
interests of irregular migrants (Leerkes et al. 2007).  
My own results do not allow for statements about distributions to be made, 
but they do contribute to our understanding of where irregular migrants live and 
why. I found that many of my respondents with settlement or legalization 
aspirations live in the suburbs, because they preferred to live there instead of in an 
immigrant district. For many women this had to do with the proximity to work. 
Whereas the preference to live close to work leads many men to immigrant districts, 
women mostly do domestic work for middle class families in the suburbs which 
drives them in the latter direction. When I asked Fernanda why she lived in the 
suburbs, she responded: “Because I am close to my work and because I like this 
neighborhood…..the first time I lived in this area too, a bit more south, and this 
sector is very quiet. It is close to everything, the school of my children. So I like it for 
that.”  
The reasons my respondents provide for their presence in the suburbs all 
indicate that they live there because they prefer to live there. They for example point 
at the proximity to work, good schools for their children, and recreational 
possibilities. Many respondents were happy to live close to a park where they could 
go for a stroll on the weekends. Most importantly, they liked the tranquility of the 
suburban neighborhoods where they could escape the crowded conditions of the 
city center and the immigrant districts. Lucas for example comments on the 
neighborhood he recently moved to: “I like the area, I think it is peaceful, there is not 
so much noise, not too many people, not too many problems in the street, so it is 
good here….when we came to take a look at this apartment we immediately liked it 
because of its location….the school is close… and because the area is beautiful and 
the apartment is very spacious.”  
Furthermore, many preferred to live in suburban areas because they believed 
the immigrant districts to be dangerous, especially for children. They preferred not 
to associate with other groups of immigrants. Fernando from Chile for example says: 
“the majority of the foreigners, immigrants, Moroccans, Africans…many of those 
people are below the cultural level or they have bad customs…. Maybe I think a little 
like the Belgians as well. I think they are right when they say that the immigrants 
  Life Without Papers 
96 
give many problems ….I don’t know, they do things…they harass people and that is 
not good….they bother you….I am not all right with the Moroccans and with their 
cars and all the harassing that they do or bothering women….the clashing of 
cultures is difficult.” After Fernando’s wife was harassed by a Moroccan man in the 
immigrant district where they used to live, they decided to move to Wilrijk, a quiet 
middle class suburban area near Antwerp.  
I found that only investment migrants and those migrants whose ethnic 
background is heavily represented in immigrant districts – like Turks and 
Moroccans – want to live in those neighborhoods. For investment migrants, these 
neighborhoods provide an infrastructure for irregular migrants that caters to their 
needs. This is where contractors come in search of employees, it is where the buses 
leave to take migrants to the location of their jobs and it is where many landlords are 
willing to rent accommodation to irregular migrants. Those settlement and 
legalization migrants whose nationality is well presented benefit from the presence 
of ethnic shops and like that they are able to speak their own language in the 
neighborhood.  
It is very likely that Engbersen et al. (2006) and Leerkes et al. (2007) found a 
preference for immigrant districts because they only interviewed irregular migrants 
whose ethnic background was well represented in the neighborhoods they selected. 
Owing to the diversity in my sample, I found that the housing preferences of 
irregular migrants lead to much more divergent outcomes. While investment 
migrants wanted to live in immigrant districts because of the infrastructure catering 
to irregular migrants, the migrants I interviewed who had settlement or legalization 
aspirations and belonged to small communities preferred to live outside immigrant 
districts and in the suburbs. Not all of them were able to realize this ambition 
though; some indicated that they did not like to live in an immigrant district, but it 
was all they could afford. 
Leerkes et al. (2007) and Engbersen et al. (2006) have used police data to 
determine the spatial distribution of irregular migrants. It is well known that women 
are underrepresented in police statistics. The share of women among irregular 
migrants is believed to have increased considerably in recent years (Jandl 2007; 
Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Raijman et al. 2003). For some nationalities, more than 
half of the irregular migrant population consists of females nowadays (Glytsos 
2005). As settlement and legalization migrant women prefer to live in the suburbs, 
the underrepresentation of women in police data leads to an underestimation of the 
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number of irregular migrants who live in the suburban areas. In addition, it is likely 
that the police exercise more control in immigrant districts than in the suburbs, 
which makes a migrant who lives and possibly also works in the suburbs less likely 
to end up in the police statistics. As a result, Engbersen et al. (2006) and Leerkes et al. 
(2007) probably overestimate the share of irregular migrants in immigrant 
neighborhoods.  
6.2.3 Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands 
It appears that irregular migrants’ aspirations underlie different housing 
preferences. Aspirations therefore partly explain the patterns found in the types and 
location of their accommodation arrangements. The following diagram reflects 
irregular migrants’ different housing preferences.  
Figure 6.1 Housing patterns per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Housing     
Type 
Cheap and 
crowded 
Regular Diverse With family 
Location 
Immigrant 
district 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
 
The variety in housing situations that I encountered can be understood from the 
aspirations irregular migrants have, their (economic) opportunities, their length of 
stay, and the structure of the housing market in the area where they live. Bringing 
aspirations into the explanatory frame has cleared up a lot of confusion surrounding 
divergent research outcomes.  
The housing market is differently organized in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands. Belgium has a lot more private homeownership and many fewer social 
housing projects. Leerkes (2007) therefore hypothesizes that irregular migrants will 
be less evenly distributed across the urban landscape in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands. My data do not allow me to make any statements in this respect – I can 
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reflect upon what my respondents told me, but I cannot make systematic 
comparisons. In both countries, the migrants that were interviewed feel that it is 
difficult to find a decent place to live for an economic price. They indicated that 
there are always people willing to rent to irregular migrants, but they can be difficult 
to find. Furthermore, in both countries, migrants who do not belong to a large 
minority group prefer to live outside the immigrant districts. In addition, settlement 
migrants in both countries are willing to spend money on their accommodation and 
not search for the cheapest they can find. My impression of the housing situation as 
expressed by my respondents is that the differences between the countries are not 
that profound. I did find that the average price level seemed a bit lower in Belgium. 
The few respondents who had lived in both countries expressed the same view.  
6.3 EMPLOYMENT 
Many times, irregular migrants combine a number of different strategies to cater for 
their basic needs (Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). One of these strategies is 
employment which is discussed in this subsection. The other sources of income that 
irregular migrants generate are dealt with in section 6.4. Before I discuss how the 
hours irregular migrants work, the type of work that they do and the exploitation 
they experience are connected to individual aspirations, I will briefly explain how 
irregular migrants engage in employment. 
There are three ways in which irregular migrants can find work. First, they 
can be employed by an employer who pays them in black. Second, they can obtain 
fraudulent working papers. And third, they can be self-employed (Coutin 2002). 
Self-employment is quite rare among irregular migrants. This is not surprising as 
both Belgian and Dutch authorities demand substantial amounts of paperwork to 
open a shop, which is not easily done by migrants who do not have nationality or 
permanent residency rights. So when irregular migrants are self-employed, they 
usually start a business together with legal migrants (cf. Staring 2000). Apart from 
opening a shop as a form of self-employment, migrants come up with inventive 
forms of self-employment. Tuyishime from Rwanda for example occasionally uses 
his 3-room apartment as a hotel: “They come for one week or two weeks and they 
prefer me over the hotel (…) they sleep here and I cook for them. They stay here, 
quiet, they can go in and out whenever they want. For two weeks maybe they pay 
600 or 1,000 euros. That is good.” Furthermore, he also does other activities that can 
be characterized as self-employment; he says: “I went to a garage over there and 
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they said to me when you find Africans who have a problem with their car, send 
them here, if they pay well, you get 50. It is always like that. And here in Europe 
there are a lot of Africans who have problems with their car.”  
The activities such as those described by Tuyishime are never my 
respondents’ primary source of income, but always a means to supplement their 
income from employment. Whereas I do consider such activities self-employment, I 
do not consider migrants who work for private households doing occasional chores 
as self-employed, because they work in employer-employee type of relationships. 
Following this categorization, I did not find self-employment to be common among 
irregular migrants in the Low Countries. Instead, I found that they usually work in 
black or by means of fraudulent papers. In the past, it had been possible for irregular 
migrants to work legally on the formal labor market, but this only happens in very 
exceptional cases nowadays (Engbersen et al. 2002; Van der Leun and Kloosterman 
2006; Van Meeteren et al. 2007b), and I have not encountered any.  
6.3.1 Work hours 
Most American studies find that labor force participation levels of irregular migrants 
are high (Chavez [1992]1998; Hagan 1994; Mahler 1995; Powers et al. 1998). North 
European studies to the contrary indicate that large shares of irregular migrants are 
unemployed. Studies in the Netherlands for example find that one third of 
respondents have no job at all (Burgers 1998; Engbersen et al. 2002; Van der Leun 
and Kloosterman 1999). However, they report that when irregular migrants do 
work, they work a lot of hours, often more than the general 40 hour workweek 
(Ahmad 2008; Datta et al. 2007; Paspalanova 2006). I found that this was indeed the 
case with the investment migrants I interviewed. Work is crucial for them, as it 
allows them to realize their aspirations. They often work six or seven days per week 
for long hours during those days. As they aspire to gather the necessary financial 
means for future investments in their home country, they want to ensure a quick 
return. As a consequence, they try to work as much as possible during their stay in 
the destination country. Investment migrants like Diego and Constanza usually 
respond to the question how much they work by saying “Well, I work every day 
really” or “I take all the opportunities I can get.”  
Settlement migrants, on the contrary, do not want to work all the time as 
investment migrants do. They do not want to work six or seven days per week, and 
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they do not want to work these long hours per day, as they value free time. Ignacio 
for example says:  
They have offered me work as a cook. They called me a month ago for 
a job but I did not accept it (…) you earn money but I want to live [in 
English instead of Spanish]. Yes because it is very difficult to have 
some time for yourself because in a restaurant you work from Monday 
to Sunday practically so there is no time for anything. I have to live as 
well.  
I found that settlement migrants prefer to work at relatively stable, non-seasonal jobs 
(cf. Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). They choose to work in Monday-to-Friday type of 
arrangements so that they have the weekends off, and they preferably work during 
the day so that they can be at home in the evenings. For many settlement migrants, 
this has to do with the fact that they live with their families, which sometimes 
include children. They want to spend time with their family members and friends 
and prefer to lead a regular life. If they can afford it they prefer to be home rather 
than to take on extra work. As Martina, who works 30 hours per week, said: 
My bosses ask me all the time, how are you with your jobs and I say 
“good, good.” There was work for Friday, she said a friend of hers was 
looking for someone for Friday (…) And I said “no, I am good with my 
hours, I don’t want to work all the time you know, no, no.”  
Having a regular and continuous job is also considered a very important aspect of 
life for settlement migrants (cf. Psimmenos and Kassimati 2006). But sometimes they 
do not manage to find this type of employment, which means that they have to 
accept other jobs. What they often do in such cases is work intermittently. Dembah 
for example says:  
If I have some money I am not going to continue to work you know. 
The work is often very heavy, it kills you know. (…) Last time I 
worked for three months I think…but at last I just could not take it 
anymore. It is really heavy work you know. I have some money now 
you know, maybe it will last two months more.  
Contrastingly, legalization migrants aspire to become legalized, and working 
informally could prevent them from reaching this goal. Both in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands, if an irregular migrant is caught doing informal work, he or she 
receives notification to leave the country which severely reduces the chances of 
legalization and simultaneously increases the chances of being deported. Therefore, 
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legalization migrants try to work as little as possible, like Monana from Congo says: 
“I don’t look [for work], because by working in black I run the risk of getting 
caught.” Although both settlement migrants and legalization migrants want to stay 
in the receiving society, they have quite distinct job preferences that lead to different 
patterns of incorporation. I experienced how important the distinction between 
legalization and settlement aspirations is when it comes to work in a conversation I 
had with Lazzat from Uzbekistan. When we talked, he had just found out that his 
application for regularization had been denied, and he was contemplating his next 
steps. He said: “I am not sure what to do. I should either file a new application for 
asylum or regularization or I should start to look for a job.” 
Many legalization migrants work part-time in order to cover their basic needs 
and choose to spend the rest of their time searching a marriage partner and 
attending language courses. This does not mean that this choice is always easy. If 
they do not work they easily get bored and start to feel useless, as is expressed by 
Alexandre from Congo: “it is black work (…) I do not take such risks in this 
life….that is dangerous…every day. What if the police catch me? That is not good 
for my application. But do I still have a life like this? If I don’t work it is good for my 
application but it is not good for my health…for my life.”  
Many legalization migrants choose to refrain from work as much as possible 
because this could obstruct the fulfillment of their aspirations, even though they 
could find a job if they wanted to. Efunsegun explains why he does not want to 
work: 
I never worked since I came to Belgium. I have been working 
voluntary always [for a NGO]. (…) Many undocumented people they 
are working in this country (…) but I don’t want to associate myself to 
that system. (…) because people go to rent documents you know they 
use them to work, and by the time they get caught they end up in 
prison. Even when I was in Nigeria I have never been to prison you 
know. So I don’t want to associate myself with when I have to rent a 
paper to work…. when the control is there I am arrested and I end up 
my life in prison. And the worst thing that could happen to me is that 
they send me back to my country. You know, what is the use of my 
working? The best option that I have is to wait until I have my 
personal permission with my passport. Then I want to look for job. (…) 
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So these are the reasons why I don’t want to run that risk, not that 
there are no people who do it but I don’t want to do it.  
Although legalization migrants do not want to work, not all of them are in a position 
in which they can afford not to. Efunsegun lives with a Belgian family who support 
him. Not all legalization migrants are able to raise alternative sources of income 
though. If they do need to work to gather or supplement their income, they work the 
minimum that is necessary. It is not the case that they can afford not to work and 
then make up a story about striving for legal papers around it. When I asked 
Efunsegun what he would do if he did not have this family to support him, he 
replied: “No even if I was not with [this family] I never thought of doing it [informal 
work] you say to somebody that you want to work and make money, this is a 
question of one or two of my friends they will rent a pass for me, but I will never do 
it you know.” Not working is thus his top priority because of the legalization 
strategy he pursues. He is convinced he would find another way around working if 
he did not have the family to support him. It is likely that he would manage; after all 
he has also managed not to work for quite some time before he met the Belgian 
family. He could manage because he is prepared to live with little. This is a sacrifice 
that he is willing to make in order to realize his aspirations.  
This does not mean that none of the legalization migrants work, or that all 
unemployed irregular migrants have aspirations to become legalized. It only means 
that legalization migrants prefer not to and consequently do it as little as possible if 
they can. Moreover, I do not mean to say that no settlement migrants work more 
than 40 hours per week or that there are no investment migrants who work less than 
that. The point is that because of their aspirations they have certain preferences 
regarding work. Some of them manage to realize a work situation that they prefer 
and others do not. What is important at this point is that if one wants to understand 
the patterns of functional incorporation of irregular migrants, one has to consider 
their aspirations as these partially explain them. This applies not only to the hours 
they work, but also to the type of employment they engage in and the extent in 
which they feel exploited doing it. These issues are discussed in the next subsections.  
6.3.2 Type of work 
It is commonly held – both in Europe and the US – that irregular migrant men work 
in economic sectors like agriculture and horticulture, construction, garment 
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manufacturing, food processing, hotels and restaurants (Ambrosini 2001; P. 
Anderson 1999; Burgers 1998; Engbersen et al. 2002; Samers 2001), whereas women 
tend to work as housekeepers or private caretakers in private households (Leman 
1997; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). The latter is not generally regarded to be a 
matter of choice or preference. Rather, these are considered to be the only jobs 
available to irregular migrant women (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Raijman et 
al. 2003). Like other scholars, I found that women work almost exclusively in 
domestic work, cleaning or babysitting. They do not work in horticulture or 
construction as men do. However, it was not the case that they could not find other 
than domestic work; these women actually preferred to work in this sector. 
Furthermore, whereas others find that domestic work is the exclusive domain of 
females, I found that many men with settlement or legalization aspirations did and 
preferred to do domestic work as well.  
As said before, some legalization migrants have to work a certain amount of 
hours to be able to sustain themselves, even though they prefer not to engage in 
informal employment. In these cases they try to work in specific types of jobs, being 
those that have least chance of being controlled. Albert explains:  
If I work somewhere, if someone from the church calls. I can work 
there in the church or in the house, in somebody’s house. In someone’s 
house, not outside but inside. If I enter a house like I have entered 
yours, if someone invites me, like for example if you would have an 
acquaintance I could come there and I clean, then I am done and they 
give me twenty euros. And then I come back next week for example. 
Then there is nobody who sees me because it is inside the house. And 
if somebody comes by they can say that I am a friend. (…) I do not 
want to work in things like construction. I have my family here and 
moreover if they expel me today to Kinshasa I know that there will be 
people waiting for me at the airport. They will arrest me right there at 
the airport. So I try, even though I suffer, I try to respect the Belgian 
law a bit. (Albert, Congo) 
Private households are thus perceived a much safer place to work than for example 
construction sites (see also Cyrus and Vogel 2006). This does not imply that only 
legalization migrants want to work for private households. Migrants with other 
types of aspirations are also concerned with their safety. Andrei from Moldova – 
who has had settlement aspirations for quite some time – has always preferred to 
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work for private households. He says: “I have never worked for a company. I have 
avoided it all the time because at big companies all the time the process of control is 
much bigger than in case I work for private people.” Settlement and legalization 
migrants thus prefer to work for private households – as domestic workers, 
handymen, gardeners or babysitters.  
Settlement and legalization migrants usually fear expulsion more than 
investment migrants do. This is because they generally have more to lose by being 
expelled, because they have settled down. In addition, many former asylum seekers 
stress the fear of expulsion (cf. Koser 1998). This has to do with the situation in the 
countries they are from, but also with the fact that fingerprints of asylum seekers are 
registered in a database. This means that the police can easily determine their 
identity which makes expulsion easier than it is for other irregular migrants who can 
hide their identity (Broeders 2009).  
But these are not the only reasons why legalization and settlement migrants 
prefer to work for private households. Black (2003) for example points out that many 
irregular migrants try to stay clear of any form of illegal activity because illegal 
migration has already become criminalized (cf. Penninx 2006). Many migrants 
therefore prefer to do a job like informal domestic work, because they think this is 
more socially acceptable than an informal job in for example construction. 
Furthermore, I have already mentioned that the mere fact of being settled makes 
migrants fear expulsion, and this fear is usually even fiercer in case children are 
involved. In Albert’s case this probably weighs heavier than the risk he runs in 
Congo. Although he said he was afraid to be arrested in Congo, he later indicated 
that he would go back to Congo if he obtained papers to visit his family there. I often 
noted such inconsistencies in the stories of the risks people would run if they were to 
be expelled. The reasons for not wanting to go back are therefore not so easily 
singled out, and often a combination of factors is at play. But whatever the reasons 
may be, they make these migrants avoid work as much as possible, and they make 
low-risk jobs especially attractive.  
Furthermore, settlement and legalization migrants prefer to work for private 
households because this way, they usually work for several employers. As a result, if 
one employer does not treat them well or if an employer fires them, they do not lose 
their income altogether. And if they get a job offer, they can more easily take a 
chance and try it out as enough other jobs remain in case it does not work out well. 
They are therefore in a less vulnerable position than those who depend on one 
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employer. Moreover, work for private households provides legalization migrants 
the possibility of working part-time. Such opportunities are generally unavailable in 
horticulture, construction or restaurants.  
In addition, settlement and legalization migrants prefer to work for Belgian 
and Dutch private households, because they are reported to pay the best and to 
exploit irregular migrants least of all. Private Dutch or Belgian households are 
perceived to pay between seven and fifteen euros per hour. My respondents agree 
that it is best to work for Belgians or Dutch people and not for other immigrants, 
often including their own kind. Diego for example says: “honestly foreigners don’t 
pay well. To work for our own people always complicates things.” Constanza says:  
It is better to work for a Belgian. Because of the way they treat you. 
Those for who you really don’t want to work are Spanish and Italian 
people. (…) For example, sometimes we talk among friends, female 
and male, and we ask: ‘how is your boss, where is he or she from’, and 
normally Spanish and Italian people are people who are very, very 
difficult to deal with. Because they don’t think they have someone who 
helps them with the work, they think they have a slave who has to 
work for them. And it is not like that. They don’t respect the hours that 
you work, they don’t respect many things. But normally Belgians do, it 
is better to work for Belgians. Obviously, with them the problem is the 
language. But it is preferable to struggle with the language than to 
struggle with hours. 
Marouane says he preferred to work for Belgians because they pay 50 euros per day, 
while a Moroccan or a Turkish employer only pays him half. And Valentina says: “I 
only work for Belgians. (…) If this person is not Belgian, they don’t pay you and, 
well Belgians are the best, they are honest people and the majority shows much 
consideration. They treat the persons who work for them as a normal person you 
understand. The Belgians here do that.” 
These results run contrary to what is often assumed. Many scholars find that 
migrants who can turn to co-ethnics in search of a job are better off than those who 
cannot (Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Leerkes et al. 2004; Van der Leun 2003b). 
Engbersen et al. (2002) for example find that Turkish and Chinese migrants have the 
highest employment rates because they can work for co-ethnic businesses. They 
further write that as Somali migrants lack ethnic entrepreneurship, they have to go 
outside their own community to find work, which, according to the authors, leads to 
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many problems. Contrastingly, many of my respondents prefer not to work for co-
ethnics because they are believed to pay the least and do not always treat them right. 
They therefore consciously turn to employment possibilities outside of their own 
communities. It seems that, although the presence of co-ethnics may help irregular 
migrants in finding some kind of employment, working for Belgian or Dutch 
individual households guarantees the least exploitative conditions.  
While settlement and especially legalization migrants are particularly 
attracted to individual households for work, investment migrants usually do the 
jobs that natives reject. These are the low status jobs found in economic sectors such 
as agriculture, horticulture, restaurants and construction. After all, both in the 
Netherlands and Belgium, organizations in these sectors often require (seasonal) 
labor market flexibility and cheap labor due to competitive pressures (Kaizen and 
Nonneman 2007). Like most temporary migrants, investment migrants tend to 
accept jobs that other migrants or natives would refuse because of their exploitative 
character. While others generally refuse to work long hours, investment migrants are 
happy to do so. Moreover, the jobs are unstable, and often seasonal, but this 
insecurity does not bother investment migrants it does other people, as their 
engagement is only temporary anyway.  
Piore (1979) and Massey (1986) remark that work is purely a means to an end 
to temporary migrants and that they are consequently the closest thing in real life to 
the homo economicus of economic theory: they are target earners seeking to maximize 
short-term income before returning home. Recall Diego who said: “we are a school 
of economics.” Investment migrants usually take what they can get, and if the work 
ends, they try to find something new fast. The labor they perform is usually the kind 
that requires people to work very hard and for long hours, which is not what 
settlement or legalization migrants like to do, because they find it too hard to do for 
long and too disruptive of their lives. Moreover, the jobs in these sectors are often 
risky, as they are heavily controlled. This constitutes less of a problem for 
investment migrants, as they have usually not migrated from far away and can 
easily travel back and forth. Newspapers often report how the police expelled 
eastern Europeans and how they arrived back on the job the next week (Paspalanova 
2006).  
But these are not the only reasons why investment migrants tend to do the 
type of work that natives or other migrants reject. They are also more likely to accept 
the prevailing low wages (cf. Carter 2005). These wages are below the official 
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minimum and below what settlement and legalization migrants usually demand, 
but they are higher than what investment migrants are used to in their countries of 
origin. From their frame of reference they consequently feel that they are being paid 
well. Moreover, they value the wages in terms of what they can buy with it in their 
countries of origin, as their earnings will be spent there. Settlement or legalization 
migrants on the other hand, are not prepared to work for such low wages. Vincente 
explains why investment migrants work for low wages and why he is not willing to 
do so:  
Because for them in their country a euro is worth a lot, so they have 
the capacity to earn less and to go and invest that in their country so it 
is more convenient for them to be here and even though they earn less, 
the money multiplies there. We to the contrary do not have other 
possibilities. (…) what we earn here is what we invest here, in this 
place itself. And this is the difference because everything is very 
expensive here so we can’t say all right we are going to earn six euros 
per hour because I have to live from that and that is not possible with 
this amount. What happens is that they earn this because in their 
country this money is worth a lot, it is worth four times more than 
what it is here. So well, they charge less.  
All in all, investment migrants work in the sectors that are traditionally associated 
with the informal labor of irregular migrants: horticulture, construction, personal 
services, and restaurants. They usually do not have many problems with the 
working conditions there. Settlement and legalization migrants on the contrary 
prefer not to work under such conditions, which attracts them to private 
households. Sometimes they do not manage to find anything else, and so they are 
forced to work in sectors where mostly investment migrants work and in which they 
feel heavily exploited. They do normally manage to find work there as the demand 
for workers is high. Most respondents say that if you want to work it is not difficult 
to find, but it depends on the conditions under which you want to work and the pay 
you are willing to accept. Andrei explains: “People who say they can’t find work in 
Holland, [on the] first day I say, good you don’t have it, [on the] next day I give him 
advice. [On the] next day, [if] he says “I don’t have it”, I say “sorry you are an idiot, 
be gone. (…) I am thousand percent, not hundred but thousand percent sure that if a 
person really likes to have work in the Netherlands, he has it in maximum three 
days.” Ûsko says: “to find work I just go to an employment agency. Here in The 
Hague there are many employment agencies. There used to be a lot of them, now 
  Life Without Papers 
108 
there are fewer. Or you go to coffeehouses or to restaurants to ask for a job, to find 
work. It is not a problem, you can find work everywhere.” And Marouane says: “it is 
very easy [to find a job] but they don’t pay well. (….) [Brussels] is the easiest city in 
Europe, for finding a job”. The problem is thus not so much to find work, but to find 
a job that fits the aspirations of the migrant in question. And in this case, investment 
migrants have the advantage as they are less demanding.  
 
Recent changes 
Things appear to be changing which is why the issue of finding work may become 
more difficult. Employers have started to prefer to employ investment migrants and 
new legal migrants over the other two categories of irregular migrants. They have 
several reasons to do so. First, investment migrants are willing to work for lower 
wages. Second, many investment migrants have set up systems in which they take 
over each other’s jobs when they leave (see also Paspalanova 2006), which implies 
that employers are never short on workers and do not have recruitment problems as 
the migrants arrange for a constant supply of hard workers themselves. Settlement 
or legalization migrants on the contrary are much more demanding: they want 
holidays and time off to rest from the heavy work, and they are not so easily 
replaced. Third, the arrival of regular migrants from new EU countries makes 
irregular migrants less attractive as employees. Many respondents indicate that the 
competitive pressure from migrants from new EU countries makes it more difficult 
for them to find work. Dembah for example says: “Yeah I had an employer and 
actually I could always depend on him. If I needed money he would say ok come. In 
the past he really helped me out but now, when I say I need work because I really 
need money he says, yes at this moment I do not have anything for you because I 
have hired employees from Poland. I say what? Poland.” The Polish workers 
Dembah is referring to have several advantages over him. First, they are temporary 
workers, and therefore they are committed to work hard for a certain period. 
Second, as Poles are now also citizens of the European Union, they are allowed to 
work legally. In practice, many do not work legally, but under semi-formal 
arrangements. Many employers prefer such hybrid forms of informal employment, 
such as fulltime work declared as part-time work, because their workers appear to 
work legally in case they are controlled (Ruhs and Anderson 2009). Irregular 
migrants lose their competitive edge, because they cannot work under semi-formal 
arrangements (Iskander 2000). This means that Dembah is not that attractive 
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anymore for his employer. He demands more pay than investment migrants do. He 
can only work informally, and he only wants to work when he needs money. When 
he has enough, he quits and leaves it to the employer to find a replacement. The 
developments outlined here make clear that it is becoming more difficult for 
settlement and legalization migrants to work in jobs in which investment migrants 
generally work.  
Other scholars point to similar trends. According to Van der Leun and 
Kloosterman (2006), the arrival of new groups of immigrants in combination with 
recent policy changes has caused the labor of irregular migrants to go ‘further 
underground’ (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006: 59; cf. Djajic 1999). They for 
example claim that labor conditions have deteriorated, which is indicated by 
decreased wages and the increasing use of subcontractors. They also note a sectoral 
shift: migrants now more often work in restaurants and catering services and in the 
domain of personal services: “illegal labor appears to move to sectors or segments 
where undocumented workers can or will less easily be detected: autochthonous 
private households and ethnic businesses.” (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006: 
66) These findings are in line with the developments I signaled at earlier. However, 
Van der Leun and Kloosterman (2006) suggest that these developments are negative. 
Indeed, the increasing use of subcontractors is a development that weakens the 
employment position of irregular migrants. Furthermore, if informal work is 
increasingly taking place within ethnic businesses, then this is probably not a sign of 
improving conditions for irregular migrants either. Yet I am not so sure if the 
sectoral shift to ‘autochthonous private households’ should be interpreted so 
negatively. After all, my respondents with settlement and legalization aspirations 
actually preferred to work for private households. Furthermore, as indicated before, 
a shift to the sector of personal services usually means that they get multiple 
employers which means they become less dependent upon the whims of one 
employer. In addition, they are paid better and have better working conditions if 
they work for Belgian or Dutch households.  
A consequence of this sectoral shift to private households is that it is 
becoming more difficult for settlement and legalization migrant men to find work 
than for women. Although some men also do cleaning work for private households, 
this sector is still dominated by women. Moreover, this is likely to continue as 
domestic work is traditionally labeled as female labor. Men therefore usually work 
for Dutch or Belgian households as handymen, a job for which specific skills are 
often required (see chapter 9) and therefore not easily accessed. Many respondents 
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consequently indicate that it is easier for women to find work than for men. 
Marouane says: “The women they work a lot, it is very easy for them to find work in 
black…..I know a girl who is without papers, she works three jobs per day. Three 
jobs, yes. She earns 2,000 euros per month.” Women not only find a job more easily, 
the jobs they find are also those that are relatively well-paid and steady. When I 
asked Ignacio if he recommends that people in Chile migrate to Belgium he 
responded: “When it is a man I recommend he does not come, if it is a woman, then 
good, come, because women have more work than men. But for a man no.” If more 
migrants give a similar advice to potential migrants, female irregular migration 
flows are likely to continue to increase in the future. 
6.3.3 Exploitation 
This subsection discusses the question of whether irregular migrants experience 
exploitation in the work they do, and if so, what circumstances lead to such 
experiences. According to Samers (2001) both social scientists and the media tend to 
focus on sensationalist stories of irregular migrants and their unscrupulous 
employers. Indeed many scholars focus on the vulnerable situation irregular 
migrants find themselves in vis-à-vis their employers (see for example Adam et al. 
2002; B. Anderson 2001; P. Anderson 1999; Devillé 2008; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 
2004). Because of their lack of legal status it is assumed that irregular migrants work 
under difficult conditions for low salaries and that they are powerless to do anything 
about it. This is also what many of my respondents indicated: that their position is 
very vulnerable and that it is difficult to fight any injustice done to them. Yet at the 
same time, only a few of my respondents indicated they have been maltreated 
themselves. The cases in which this happened were sometimes very shocking and 
understandably food for sensationalist stories. Vincente for example explained how 
his own family members had taken advantage of him:  
When I came here, I started to work on the second day. But I had bad 
luck. (…) I worked for almost a year and I was never paid. With my 
own family. (…) it was my brother-in-law (…) it is a little difficult to 
explain but I lived in his house. And he said I will pay you for 
example 80 euros or 70 euros for a day of work, 10 for the food, 15 for 
the food, and the rest is for you. And because I was living in his house 
and everything, I said well, I am going to work hard and I believed 
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them, I believed that they would carry out their words, but they did 
not, in the end they never paid me anything.  
Like Vincente, persons who have been maltreated usually say that this was a 
onetime event in the beginning of their migrant career which taught them to be more 
cautious. Obviously, Vicente’s experience makes him extremely aware of his 
vulnerable situation. So is Dembah who could go on for hours about his precarious 
situation and how employers take advantage of his vulnerability, yet his personal 
experiences in this respect are limited: “those Arabs they profit from me because 
they know about my situation. Sometimes if you go work for them you really have 
to be [hits with his fist on the table] otherwise you won’t get your money. (…) for 
example I used to have some acquaintances with an employment agency who let me 
work for three weeks and then they did not pay me. (…) but when I said [hits with 
hand on the table] I want my money, he paid it straight away.” When I asked him 
how often this had happened to him he said “well just this one time with this Turk.” 
Usually I received an answer like the one Antonia gave me: “Thank God it never 
happened to me that they did not pay me. Because I have heard about people who 
don’t pay, it happens to many people when they come (…) I had bad experiences 
with one man but since I left him, everybody pays me and they are very nice.” Tarek 
said: “It has never happened that they did not pay me. They always give you your 
money. If you work you can even ask for an advance.” And Arshan told me that he 
once worked a whole night for only one euro per hour. He said that ever since this 
happened he makes sure he negotiates his salary before he starts the work and that 
he has not encountered such problems since.  
Although there are a lot of stories about maltreatment in the literature, most 
of my respondents indicated they did not suffer from it, and when they had it was 
only in the beginning of their stay. Most migrants find ways to guard themselves 
against misbehavior of employers. Constanza for example says: “only the new 
people [are abused] because the other people already know many things so they 
don’t let themselves be abused.” She further explained to me how irregular migrants 
talk amongst each other about the reputation of employers to make sure they do not 
work for abusive employers. In case of new employers there is obviously not such as 
system. Constanza explains how testing an employer works in such cases:  
 You have to try the first month and evaluate if it is a good person or if 
they are going to pay you well or if it is punctual. (…) the bosses make 
us go through a test, a trial to see if you know how to clean, how to 
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cook, how to iron, etcetera etcetera. After you have gone through all 
these tests you also have the right to ask them when they are going to 
pay you, the data, and how, and also to know your rights (…) you find 
this security to be able to talk like this, this freedom to really say ok I 
want you to pay me every first of the month, I want to have a holiday, 
I want to have a subscription for public transport, many details.  
 A problem with determining the extent to which irregular migrants are 
exploited is that exploitation is experienced differently. Other scholars have reported 
difficulties in determining exploitation and sometimes seem confused about their 
findings (see for example Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006). Likewise, Düvell and 
Jordan (2006: 61) found many differences in terms of perceptions of exploitation, 
without being able to explain them: “Some emphasized their success. Others would 
not even complain about low wages or obvious exploitation. (…) Others critically 
reflected on the humiliating conditions and their rank in the social hierarchy and 
admitted to themselves that they had moved downwards socially.” P. Anderson 
(1999: 49) remarked that some of his respondents “looked back on their employment, 
despite harshness of conditions, low pay and the attendant uncertainties more 
positively than one would expect.” He further writes: “The perception of a job as 
lowly or exploitative at the objective level may not be felt by an undocumented 
person in the same way subjectively.” (P. Anderson 1999: 44) One can therefore not 
compare subjective experiences and then make objective statements about them. 
What can be done is attempt to understand where these different perceptions come 
from by bringing aspirations into the analysis.  
I noticed that divergent perceptions of objectively similar circumstances have 
a lot to do with aspirations; e.g., investment migrants hardly ever experience 
exploitation, whereas legalization migrants usually immediately emphasize the 
exploitative conditions under which they work. Houssine for example aspires to 
become legalized and says: “I work two days a week in black and I earn fifty euros 
per day. Everybody profits from the people without papers. And you know why? 
Because he knows that if you give fifty euros to someone without papers he is happy 
with it. (…) Black work is not good. Why? Because with black work it is the boss 
who profits. He profits a lot. And why does he profit? Because you work without 
papers.” Houssine works in a restaurant where he has to work 8 hours for the 50 
euros he earns per day. Investment migrants usually work for much less than that 
without complaint. Furthermore, he indicates that he is always paid on time and that 
his employers treat him well. At the same time, he keeps stressing that his employer 
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profits from him. It seems to be the unequal relationship that bothers him and which 
makes him feel exploited, not so much the actual treatment he receives. In the same 
vein, settlement and legalization migrants who have to work in a job in which 
investment migrants typically work report high dissatisfaction and perceptions of 
exploitation. Legalization migrants especially complain of exploitation, as this is 
bound up with their aspirations. Recall legalization migrant Dnari from Sierra Leone 
who said: “I didn’t go to Europe and stop here to do illegal work, that is no use.” 
Whereas settlement migrants come to Europe to work informally, legalization 
migrants do not want to work informally. Settlement migrants can therefore be 
dissatisfied with their work, because it does not allow them to live a regular life or 
because it does not pay well, but for legalization migrants their rejection of informal 
labor is much more fundamental. Exactly the same job is thus experienced 
differently by migrants with different aspirations.  
6.3.4 Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands 
Reviewing the previous subsections, it appears that the types of jobs irregular 
migrants do can be explained by both irregular migrants’ aspirations as well as the 
opportunities they have. Whereas the aspirations of investment migrants make them 
prefer to work as much as they can, taking the sometimes exploitative conditions in 
the typical sectors associated with irregular migrants for granted, settlement and 
legalization migrants aspirations’ make them prefer to work for private households. 
Their opportunity structures are responsible for the fact that not all irregular 
migrants manage to get the jobs they want. Moreover, many investment migrants 
work for co-ethnics as a result of their opportunity structure, as these are often the 
only people they associate with. Other scholars often find that irregular migrant 
workers are specialized by nationality (Glytsos 2005). I found that this was also 
sometimes the case with my respondents. However, I found that although many 
irregular migrants work for co-ethnics, this does not stem from preference. When it 
comes to preferences, many actually choose not to work for co-ethnics. However, 
some just do not have the opportunities to work for people other than their own.  
The following figure summarizes the main findings regarding employment 
patterns and aspirations: 
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Figure 6.2 Employment patterns per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Employment     
Work hours 
As many as 
possible 
Regular 
As little as 
possible 
As little as 
possible 
Type of work 
‘Typical’ 
irregular migrant 
sectors 
In native private 
households 
In native private 
households 
In private 
households and 
ethnic businesses 
Perception of 
exploitation 
No perception of 
exploitation 
Certain types of 
work 
Fundamental Fundamental 
 
One may wonder if there are major differences between the employment patterns of 
irregular migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands. After all, the informal sector is 
relatively larger in Belgium than it is in the Netherlands. Obviously, my data do not 
allow for systematic comparisons. Yet what I can do is reflect upon what my 
respondents perceive. Even if these experiences do not reflect the objective situation, 
most irregular migrants do act upon these perceptions, and this means that these 
experiences do affect the employment patterns.  
Kamel for example moved to Belgium because of rumors. He says: “I [came 
to Belgium] because I heard from others that contrary to the Netherlands, there was 
work in Belgium. Rumors were spreading around that there was a lot more work in 
Belgium than in the Netherlands.” Brahim had a similar experience: “I lived in the 
Netherlands for almost nine years before I came to Belgium. (…) I heard that it was 
easier to find work in Belgium and that they are less strict with the illegals.” When 
Halil was still in Turkey he called several friends in Europe to inquire about the 
employment situation in the countries these friends lived in. He explains: “I called 
friends in Germany and the Netherlands. My friends there told me that it was 
difficult to find work. My friend in Belgium was the only one who said he surely 
had work for me.” Hassan, who has lived in the Netherlands in the past and now 
lives in Belgium says: “there is no work in the Netherlands. In Belgium it is all a bit 
easier.” And Nabil says: “I have lived in the Netherlands for twelve years. I left 
because it gradually became more difficult for me to find a job (…) In Belgium there 
was more work than in the Netherlands. I mostly worked in construction here.” 
Armine says: “I left the Netherlands because I was unemployed at a certain moment 
and I could not find a job anymore. (…) There is no black work there anymore. It has 
become less in Belgium as well but there is still more here than in the Netherlands.” 
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 The respondents quoted above lived in Belgium when they were interviewed, 
but they had lived in the Netherlands before. I did not encounter any migrants in the 
Netherlands who had previously lived in Belgium. Nevertheless, like the 
respondents in Belgium – my respondents in the Netherlands all believed that it is 
easier to find a job in Belgium than it is in the Netherlands. Andrei for example says: 
“in Belgium it is much easier [to find employment]. I have met so many people who 
stayed for example one year in Germany, two years in Belgium and one year here, 
who say Belgium is much easier.” Some irregular migrants appear to be quite mobile 
and move across the European borders in search of employment. According to 
Mohammed many irregular migrants have left the Netherlands: “there used to be a 
lot [of irregular migrants] here but many have gone to Spain. They get resident 
papers there, work; many people have gone … many Moroccan people I know have 
gone to Spain.” 
Although I cannot determine to what extent the statements made by my 
respondents reflect reality, it is clear that irregular migrants act upon rumors and the 
perceptions they have of the situation, and these perceptions all point in the same 
direction. I can therefore safely assume that Belgium is regarded as a country with 
more favorable conditions for work than the Netherlands. Irregular migrants who 
are in search of work – investment and settlement migrants – are therefore more 
likely to be found in Belgium than in the Netherlands.  
6.4 OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME OR ASSISTANCE 
Besides engaging in informal employment irregular migrants can obtain resources 
from the social networks in which they are embedded or by means of criminal 
activities (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 2006). Scholars in the Netherlands and 
Belgium have carefully studied the involvement of irregular migrants in crime (see 
for example De Boom et al. 2006; Engbersen and Van der Leun 2001; 1998; 1995; 
Engbersen et al. 2007; Leerkes 2009; 2007a; 2007b; 2004; Leerkes et al. 2004; Van der 
Leun 1999; 2003a; Van Meeteren et al. 2008). As the focus of my research is not on 
criminal activities, I have not gained insights that these studies have not already 
provided. I therefore choose not to elaborate on this topic. However, it is different 
when it comes to the resources irregular migrants derive from their social networks, 
in other words, from the gift and barter economy (Van der Leun and Kloosterman 
2006). I have offered a theoretical critique on the current research practice involving 
the study of social networks and the social capital embedded in these networks in 
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chapter 2. The subsequent subsection deals with some of the points mentioned there. 
It empirically demonstrates the downsides of the current research practice, as well as 
the insights gained by an approach that takes aspirations as a starting point.  
In addition to criminal activities and resources from the gift and barter 
economy, I found that some irregular migrants manage to receive resources from 
governmental organizations. This flies in the face of what is usually found in other 
research (Chavez et al. 1997; Mahler 1995; Massey et al. 1987; Paspalanova 2006; Van 
der Leun 2003b; Van der Leun and Kloosterman 1999; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). 
According to Van der Leun (2003b: 40) irregular migrants are unable to access the 
formal support (governmental) organizations provide; only the less-regulated 
informal support provided by organizations is within their reach. However, I found 
that in Belgium, state-sponsored support is substantial for some individuals. Because 
in practice it proved difficult to disentangle formal and informal support from 
organizations, I discuss both forms in one subsection, even though informal aid from 
organizations may technically belong to the gift and barter economy. The next 
subsection therefore deals with the gift and barter economy, which is followed by a 
subsection on support provided by organizations.  
6.4.1 The gift and barter economy 
Irregular migrants can mobilize support from the social networks in which they are 
embedded. This support is often referred to as social capital. However, not all social 
capital supplied by networks is support. Social networks can also supply other 
resources. Briggs (1998) conceptualizes two types of social capital available in social 
networks: social leverage and social support. Social leverage helps people to ‘get 
ahead,’ whereas social support helps people to ‘get by’ or cope (Briggs 1998: 178). 
This means that social leverage can help people to realize their aspirations, while 
social support ensures that migrant’s basic needs are met. I have conceptualized 
functional incorporation as relating to the way irregular migrants sustain 
themselves. This subsection therefore deals with the social support migrants derive 
from the social networks they are embedded in, leaving the role of social leverage in 
the realization of aspirations to be discussed in chapter 9.  
What is striking in the analysis of the support my respondents receive is that 
many investment and settlement migrants do not need much support to sustain 
themselves and receive little of it. These migrants generate most of their resources 
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from employment and only need support if they are temporarily unemployed or in 
case of unforeseen circumstances. Whereas they do rely on their social network for 
information about where they can receive healthcare and how to find jobs, they are 
largely self-sustaining, and they only occasionally need to supplement their income 
from labor. When I asked Martina who helps her if she does not have money or 
work, she replied: “I have always had work, and health. The first six months have 
been critical. (…) I had some reserves; I made sure I did not spend much.” As 
Martina indicates, investment and settlement migrants mostly need support when 
they arrive and do not yet have a job. Once they have obtained employment they 
only occasionally need additional sources of income.  
 Contrastingly, legalization migrants structurally need a lot of support 
because they wish to refrain from work as much as possible. In fact, they prefer to 
generate resources from support rather than through informal labor. Instead of 
searching for a job, they therefore look for monetary gifts with which they can pay 
the rent and buy food. Settlement and investment migrants on the other hand 
sometimes live on gifts during the initial period of their stay, but after a while their 
caregivers expect them to be able to sustain themselves independently. When they 
find jobs and move into independent accommodation, they do still occasionally 
receive material help, like furniture or clothes, but they usually do not receive 
substantial monetary gifts anymore. Partly this is because they do not need it, but 
caregivers also appear to refuse structurally to give investment and settlement 
migrants money. That is why they receive only small sums on the order of 10 euros 
(see also Staring 2001). In case of special circumstances , such as when an irregular 
migrant is very ill and in need of expensive treatment, he or she may receive larger 
sums especially for this purpose. If there are no special circumstances and settlement 
and investment migrants need larger sums of money to sustain themselves, they 
have to borrow. Legalization migrants are thus to a much larger extent dependent 
on support to sustain themselves than investment and settlement migrants because 
they prefer to work as little possible.  
 Having established that different types of irregular migrants have different 
needs, the question is how they get support, and from whom. Most scholars look 
within ethnic communities as a source of support. As pointed out in chapter 2, many 
scholars equate social networks with ethnic networks, or ethnic community 
networks, meaning that they mostly look for sources of assistance within the ethnic 
community of the migrant in question and overlook other possibilities. Their focus is 
often on community structures in specific localities. Whereas others consider the 
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ethnic community to be the most important source of support for irregular migrants, 
I found that this is certainly not the case for irregular migrants in general, but only 
for specific categories of migrants. My results indicate that migrants with different 
aspirations draw support from different sources. The most important sources are 
family relations, ‘ethnic community’ relations, relations with natives, and support 
from organizations. While the first three sources are discussed below, the latter is left 
to be discussed in the next subsection.  
 
Family support  
If respondents have family in the host country they receive help from them, 
regardless of what type of aspirations they have. As family often receives them, 
during the initial period they provide a roof over their heads, food, and sometimes 
pocket money until the newcomers are able to find a job and sustain themselves 
independently. Support from family is generally all-encompassing and 
unconditional in this initial period. However, family members do usually not want 
to provide encompassing support that is everlasting. After a while, migrants have to 
be able to settle down on their own, return with enough savings, or become 
legalized so that they can live independently. Once migrants live independently, 
they can always turn to their family in case of a temporary setback, but they cannot 
expect to be fully taken care of forever. Catalina for example says: “my family here 
helps me. They do the little that they can. They help me but they cannot sustain me, 
they also have their own obligations and they also don’t earn much. (…) But yes, if I 
have a problem I go to one of them and they help me. But it is like this that they can’t 
sustain me and my two sons, that they can’t do.” Of all three categories, legalization 
migrants who are involved in procedures receive the least family support. This is not 
because their family refuses to help them, but because they often do not have family 
residing in the country. When they do, these family members usually do try to 
support them until they receive papers.  
All in all, people who can generate support from family members are 
relatively well off because family relationships allow for all-encompassing support. 
The closer the family relation the more valuable and the more easily obtained the 
support tends to be. Tarek says: “help starts with the family. (…) support starts with 
those who are closest to you, if you have a brother or sister you start with them.” 
However, the support migrants receive from their family members should not be 
seen as support from the ethnic community. That they receive support from family 
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does not mean that they associate let, alone receive help, from their co-ethnics. 
Fernando for example tells: “We have cousins and aunts here. The aunts are married 
to Belgians, and they have children here and they are already Belgians. And from 
this family we get support. (…) Normally with the Latinos here in Belgium I don’t 
have a lot of contact.”  
 
Systems of social solidarity 
Those who do not have family support have to turn to others for help. For 
investment and settlement migrants these are usually friends or acquaintances, often 
with a similar ethnic background. In order to receive help from what others scholars 
denote ‘the ethnic community’, they need to invest in social relationships within 
these communities. For a tightly-knit community in which solidarity is exchanged to 
develop, migrants need to invest in the community and contribute to it. This way, 
they can create social security structures that serve as an insurance against 
temporary setbacks. Tarek explains how such social security systems work:  
100 euros is a lot of money. But it is not between us. We look at these 
things from a different perspective. Who needs the 100 euros most, 
you or me. The need is the priority. If somebody else has priority then 
you give it. That is how it works among us. (…) if I have 50 euros and I 
do not have anything else (…) and he asks 50 euros from me, then I ask 
him if 45 is all right because I prefer to leave a few euros for myself. 
And I do that because I know that I won’t gain anything bad with it. 
(…) because I know that if I give him 40 or 50 euros, then he will help 
others too if they need it. (…) he himself will act the same way, that is, 
how do you say it, the social financing, and the cooperation that is the 
social solidarity.  
These social solidarity systems are only open to people who contribute to them. As a 
result, legalization migrants, whose aspirations mean that they usually receive more 
than they contribute, have limited access to such systems. In addition, only people 
who are what my respondents call ‘serious’ have access. Marouane explains about 
such social solidarity systems: “when you are not serious he can’t give you, he will 
say he does not have anything, even though he has money. If you are not serious 
they won’t give you [anything]. If you are serious, you can have whatever you 
want.” Tuyishime: “Serious means if you are correct. (…) Masja, if you give me 50 
euros, I will give it back on Friday. When it is Friday I give it. That is correct.” When 
  Life Without Papers 
120 
I asked Marouane what serious means and how you can determine if someone is 
serious he said: “There is no measure for it, it is like this, if you search someone, you 
say to your friends that you need someone to live with you, but only if he is honest, 
so he will search someone that he knows who is honest so he can say, this person 
here is serious, I vouch for him. Like that. (….) me I am also serious but I can’t tell 
you that I am serious (…).” Marouane explains that other people have to vouch for a 
migrant's honesty to get access to social solidarity systems. These thus function 
based on trust. This means that in order to partake in social solidarity systems a 
migrant needs other participants who can vouch for him, and he needs to pay the 
money back as promised. Otherwise he will be excluded from the system, as he is 
not considered serious anymore.  
Furthermore, it is very important for irregular migrants who depend on 
social solidarity systems to continue to invest in them. If a migrant does not, and he 
needs help one day, he will be refused. This means that if an irregular migrant has 
money, and someone else needs help, he or she is obliged to lend or give the person 
in need money. If a migrant has money, but chooses to keep it to himself when 
someone else is in need, he will be refused support if he needs it himself one day. 
This is why it is unattractive for investment migrants to partake in such systems. 
After all, when they have money they do not want to invest it in a social solidarity 
system. Rather they want to save it as this brings them closer to the attainment of 
their aspirations. They are therefore more inclined to think about themselves than to 
help other people. Sofia, who is an investment migrant, says that the people around 
her are all “egoists who think only about themselves”. Piore (1979) also stresses the 
radical individualism of temporary migrants. Lending money to other people does 
not get them closer the realization of their aspirations, but it instead drives its 
attainment further away. So investment migrants who do not have enough income 
from work and no family to support them encounter difficulties in gathering social 
support. In cases like these, they fully depend on the commercial infrastructure that 
caters to irregular migrants. In this circuit, migrants do not last long as support is not 
unconditional. Some of the investment migrants who depend on it therefore turn 
into settlement migrants after a while.  
Irregular migrants who fail to invest in social solidarity systems do not get 
access to these when they need it and therefore run the risk of ending up in the 
streets. I met an irregular migrant who was denied access when he needed it because 
he previously kept all the money he earned to himself. I met him in a place where he 
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came every day to eat soup and to take a shower, where he explained to me how he 
ended up there: 
I have worked a lot, like I told you almost five years; I put it all in the 
casino. (…) if I had 1,000 euros, I played the whole day in the casino, 
try this, play that and then the money was gone. (…) all the illegal 
people I know who come here are addicted to gambling too. They have 
all worked here for years but have destroyed their lives because of 
gambling. (…) now people think that I am a junky (…) nobody trusts 
me to help me for money and all that.  
This trust that Adil talks about is very important. As a gambling addict, Adil was 
not ‘serious’ like the other migrants who partake in social solidarity systems. When 
he borrowed money he did not always pay it back as he promised, and he did not 
lend money to other people. Migrants who contribute to social solidarity systems 
have to trust that the people they give money will pay them back or that they will 
help others in need if they can. In other words, they have to know that they do not 
only take from the system but also occasionally give and that they hold true to their 
word. That is why there is a lot of talk and gossip about people who partake in such 
systems. It has to be clear who can be trusted and who has failed to live up to his 
promise.  
Who make up these social solidarity systems then? Tarek is from Algeria, but 
he says the system he partakes in is comprised not only of Algerians but also 
includes other North Africans like Moroccans, Tunisians and Egyptians. One might 
be inclined to put a ‘North African’ or ‘Arabic speaking’ label on it. But it is not as 
easy as that. Albert explains that although Africans help each other, you cannot 
speak of an African community: “for us Africans, those who are here (…) in Europe 
(…) there is solidarity among us, but it depends from person to person. Like you, 
you are European, but you would never say that all Europeans have solidarity. You 
would never say that among all Belgians or Dutch people there is solidarity. There 
are always people (…) that you do not want to help.” To Albert, an ethnic 
community of Africans does not exist. Not only are many ethnic groups too large in 
numbers to form one community, communities are not necessarily formed on the 
basis of shared ethnic background. They can be based on social boundaries like class 
as well (cf. Al-Ali 2002; Baumann 1996). Fernando for example does not want to have 
anything to do with the Chileans who migrated decades before he did, because they 
are culturally different:  
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I have more contacts with Belgians, or with people from outside 
[Chile] (…) during the time Pinochet ruled the country, many people 
left abroad and during this time all kinds of people arrived here, also 
people who were not very well prepared culturally, who had not 
studied, nothing. (...) It is a very big change for people who don’t have 
much education. So they arrived in a country where they did not know 
the language or the customs.  
Fernando has a university degree and does not want to associate with settled 
Chilean migrants because they are not well educated and because “they do not bring 
good things.” He does associate with some South Americans, but only with those 
who have a similar level of education. Moreover, these people only come from 
Argentina and Chile and not from other South American countries as, according to 
Fernando, these countries are less well developed economically and culturally. 
Likewise, Warsi, who has a bachelor's degree, has problems associating with other 
Bengali migrants as he feels they are of a lower class. He says:  
We have class. From top to bottom we have class and this is a big 
difference. (…) our characters are very different because of the 
difference in class. (…) the people who come [here] they are really not 
rich, they are in the middle class. (…) my positioning, I could be 
something in Bangladesh but a lot of them, they are here, they have 
nothing to do in Bangladesh. Even I can be a teacher there. (…) The 
people who did not go to college or university, what can they do? (…) 
They don’t have any chance there. I have a chance [there]. (…) So that 
is the difference. (…)You know that I don’t have any friends. I don’t 
honestly, not a Bengali here. (…)I don’t think the same way, I think 
differently. [Between our lives] there is a big difference.   
It is not only the migrants of a higher class who indicate that they have such 
problems. Tuyishime had problems with other migrants from Rwanda because he is 
low class: “in the beginning I lived together with other Rwandans. But there was a 
problem with us living together, their mentality was not the same as mine. In 
Rwanda, me I worked with my hands, while this man here had worked as an 
official, and it is not the same mentality, so [we could not] live together. “Hence, 
ethnic communities like ‘the African’, ‘the Latin American’ or ‘the Bengali’ 
‘community’ do not exist. While some irregular migrants do not feel they belong to a 
community at all, others have a sense of community based on social markers that are 
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meaningful to them and do not necessarily include ethnicity. Therefore, these 
communities of solidarity are not always only comprised of people with the same 
ethnic background, but they sometimes transcend ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, if 
an individual has a certain ethnic background, she or he does not necessarily belong 
to a social solidarity system.  
Many of these communities are made up of a mix of both regular and 
irregular migrants. However, regular migrants often stop participating after a while, 
as they know they put more into it than they get out. This is especially true for 
migrants whose ‘community’ consists of relatively few regular migrants. Many 
irregular migrants complain of their regular compatriots whose solidarity ends once 
they receive papers. Ignacio for example says: “those with papers don’t help us. (…) 
We ourselves, those without papers, we help ourselves. You have to give those who 
need it a helping hand. But the persons who have papers, no, they know what life 
without papers is like (…) because at one point they did not have papers either, but 
well, that is life. (…) when it is family yes there is help but when it is someone else 
no. (…) [They] change here once they have papers. (…) some change slowly and 
others change radically. But they all change.” 
It has become clear that migrants with a common ethnic background do not 
necessarily form a cohesive community from which irregular migrants can draw 
support. Communities that are meaningful to respondents and in which there is an 
exchange in solidarity do exist, but these may have different social boundaries than 
ethnicity, or they may have social markers in addition to ethnicity. Therefore, what 
or who makes up a community cannot be established by a researcher beforehand. At 
the same time, these systems of social solidarity can be very important additional 
sources of income for settlement migrants, while they are less of a resource for 
irregular migrants with investment or legalization aspirations.  
 
Native citizens 
In addition to support from family or from social solidarity systems, irregular 
migrants can draw resources from a third source located outside these communities. 
Many legalization migrants who are involved in procedures manage to receive 
support from native Dutch or Belgian citizens. This is not because they have no other 
choice or as some form of last resort, as is sometimes assumed by others (see for 
example Engbersen et al. 2002). Quite to the contrary, I found that many legalization 
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migrants prefer not to ask for help within their own community, but instead turn to 
others for support. Albert for example says: 
The problem with Africans is that they help you today, but tomorrow 
they will talk about it to other persons. (…) many of our friends do not 
know that we live with difficulties and that we do not get money from 
social services anymore (…) (…) I rather explain my suffering to 
people I do not know. This person can be white, that is better. (…) But 
if I speak to someone who knows me about my problem, and he is 
African, he can help me but I am afraid that he will talk about me. (…) 
And this old [Belgian] lady that I spoke to you about earlier, she helps 
me sometimes, but if she were African, oh, then I do not think that our 
relationship would continue. No.  
As explained before, social solidarity systems need a lot of talk and gossip 
circulating around in order to secure the necessary trust. Albert obviously does not 
like it, which is often the case with irregular migrants who belong to the higher 
classes in their country of origin. His social status in his country of origin makes him 
ashamed to have to turn to people of a lower social class for help, especially because 
he – as a legalization migrant – cannot contribute himself but only demand 
resources. He therefore chooses to turn to Belgians for support.  
Warsi has also reached out to people outside of his own community and has 
found a Belgian woman who agrees to support him. I found several legalization 
migrants like Warsi, who lived with Belgians or Dutch people and who were fully 
supported by them. Because I associated with these migrants for a few months, I met 
some of the persons they were living with. One of them was Marlies. She started 
helping irregular migrants 20 years ago. Some of the individuals she supported are 
now very successful regular migrants. She explained that she wants to help irregular 
migrants get through the period in which they do not have papers until they are 
legalized. She is able to provide substantial support during this period because she 
assumes that it is only temporary. However, when I met her she had already 
sheltered, fed and clothed Warsi for eight years. Many family members of irregular 
migrants do not even last that long in providing substantial support. 
Understandably she expresses doubts about her arrangements with Warsi:  
I am fed up with it. (…) he is too old. He will be spending the rest of 
his life washing dishes if he gets papers. Lately I think that he should 
go back. It seems that his girlfriend in Bangladesh is making good 
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money and also his brothers all have university degrees. But he says he 
does not want his family to support him, and this is what hurts, 
because he does not want to accept their support but he has no 
problem accepting mine. And this I don’t understand. (…) There are 
many things that I don’t understand. I have many doubts but I give 
him the benefit of the doubt. He is a good man in his heart and I made 
the promise to him that I would help him, and I am keeping that 
promise. 
Marlies’s support of Warsi enables him to refrain from work as he desires. For most 
legalization migrants, the support they get from people outside of their own 
community is not that all-encompassing as it is for Warsi and the others who live 
with Belgian or Dutch families. Other legalization migrants with procedures have to 
gather resources from multiple sources every day while they wait for the outcome of 
their procedures.  
In summary, while legalization migrants who have applied for legalization 
reach out to Dutch or Belgian natives for support, migrants of the other categories do 
not. Only a few settlement migrants very infrequently receive support from Belgians 
or Dutch people. In these cases, it is usually their employers who give them 
furniture or clothes. Monetary assistance is extremely rare. Investment and 
settlement migrants and legalization migrants who try to get married depend on 
family members for substantial support. If they do not have family members 
residing in the host country, settlement migrants usually manage to draw resources 
from social solidarity systems, whereas investment and legalization migrants have 
problems accessing these. The latter categories depend on the commercial 
infrastructure for irregular migrants in such cases. Next to these resources stemming 
from their personal networks, there is another source that irregular migrants can 
mobilize which is discussed below.  
6.4.2 Formal and informal support from organizations 
Research usually finds that irregular migrants receive limited to no resources from 
governmental organizations (Mahler 1995; Massey et al. 1987; Paspalanova 2006; 
Van der Leun 2003b; Van der Leun and Kloosterman 1999; Van Nieuwenhuyze 
2009). Only informal help provided by organizations is believed to be within their 
reach. Moreover, the informal support they receive is considered to be insignificant 
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compared to the resources irregular migrants generate from the informal economy. 
However, although the total amount of informal support provided by organizations 
is limited, I found that it can be of crucial importance to some specific migrants. 
Most irregular migrants do not receive support from organizations, but for those 
who do it is of vital importance. My analysis revealed that in order to understand 
variation in the amount and type of support irregular migrants receive, it is 
important to take aspirations into account.  
Investment migrants practically never receive support from organizations. 
They often do not even use the formal procedure for medical care but arrange for 
medical assistance on their own, either by consulting a doctor who specifically caters 
to irregular migrants or by simply paying for medical services they receive. Mehmet 
who works for a removal company for example says: “I have problems with my 
back. I have been to a physiotherapist, a Moroccan. He showed me how I should lift 
things from now on and he massaged my back. I paid him 50 euros for it.” When I 
asked Diego what he does if he falls ill, he responded: “Well it has not happened yet, 
well a couple of times but nothing heavy. (…) with this you have to be a little 
intelligent.” When I subsequently asked if he knew that he was entitled to urgent 
medical care he said: “yes that is what they say. Many people tell me to get this 
paper (…) I don’t do it because I have an aversion to it.” Paspalanova (2006) also 
found that temporary migrants do not use state support, and Leman (1997) has 
noted that temporary migrants do not expect that the destination state will come to 
their assistance in case of difficulties or illnesses. Migrants with this type of 
aspirations have come to make money and return and do not want to depend on 
state support.  
Contrastingly, legalization migrants who are involved in procedures receive 
a lot of support from organizations and often for a long period of time. In Belgium, 
refused asylum seekers who have filed a final appeal are entitled to government 
support. In practice, this often means that they are allowed to continue to live in the 
asylum center, receive full room and board and a limited amount of pocket money. 
Some of my respondents live in such a situation and can fully support themselves 
that way. In other cases refused asylum seekers who have filed an appeal continue 
to live in the house they lived in during their asylum procedure while they receive 
welfare benefits. Benjamin for example says: “When we just arrived [five years ago] 
we have asked for asylum, political asylum but the answer was immediately 
negative because our country [Ecuador] is considered a country without political 
refugees. So it was almost directly that our asylum was denied (…) until now they 
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have not cut off the help, we still have the help from the [social services] because we 
are now in the final stage with the [name of the court].” The benefits irregular 
migrants get are the equivalent Belgian citizens receive if they have no other means 
to sustain themselves. However, most respondents indicate that they prefer to 
supplement their welfare benefits, usually by means of material support like food 
and clothes. If irregular migrants receive welfare benefits, they usually perceive 
these to be too little to live on. At the same time, it is usually the most substantial 
support irregular migrants are able to generate.  
Apart from support that is provided to irregular migrants directly by 
government organizations, there are some semi-governmental initiatives which 
support irregular migrants. There are a few organizations that select irregular 
migrants to whom they supply accommodation and financial help that more or less 
equals the official welfare benefits. These organizations receive government funding 
that enables them to provide this assistance. This type of help is not open to every 
irregular migrant. Evelien, a woman who works at such an organization explains 
what criteria she uses to select irregular migrants for this type of support:  
We have a very strict selection procedure (…) we ask many details 
about their history with procedures, their health, their length of stay, 
all together (…) For example people with Belgian children, they have 
high chances of becoming regularized, very ill people, those have been 
so far in a very precarious legal position and can’t just end up in the 
streets, and then people with a long length of stay, those too, may be 
combined with health problems. Those three factors play a decisive 
role. (…) With very ill people I mean very serious applications like in 
case of children who have had cancer for the last three years and the 
father has cancer, people with AIDS in very advanced stages, a lot of 
cancer really and a lot of HIV. But with HIV we already have to select 
strictly, the length of stay decides who we choose then.  
It has become clear that the bulk of irregular migrants do not have access to this type 
of support. At the same time, like direct government support, it is the most 
substantial form of organizational support some irregular migrants are entitled to.  
Some organizations not only provide (semi)governmental support, but they 
also supply informal help to irregular migrants. For some, the informal support they 
receive from organizations is their most important resource. Alexandre for example 
says: “Without all these organizations I don’t think that life would be possible. My 
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life here without papers would not be possible.” Although for some migrants the 
informal support they receive from organizations is their most important source of 
income, only a very few irregular migrants receive enough support to fully sustain 
themselves with these means only.  
Furthermore, organizations adopt different criteria for the provision of 
different types of support, which renders distinct forms of support unequally 
accessible. For irregular migrants to be eligible for financial support, they usually 
need to have what social workers call ‘a perspective’. A migrant is considered to 
have a perspective if he or she is likely to become legalized, if he or she wants to 
return to the country of origin, or if he or she wants to go to some other country. 
Martijn, a social worker from an organization explains:  
We investigate if there is a perspective and if there is then we also 
investigate if we can help financially to realize this perspective. So we 
have a budget with which we can pay the rent for a number of families 
or the electricity bills. It never happens that we take all of their costs at 
our expense but we can pay the rent. And this way we can help a little 
while they wait for legalization. And this way we have helped some 
families who have received papers after two or three years.  
This means that only legalization migrants who are involved in procedures are able 
to generate this type of support. Most organizations do not want to help people lead 
a life as an irregular migrant. That is why settlement and investment migrants have 
problems receiving financial support from organizations:  
We do not want to help people to install themselves in illegality 
because we think we do not help people with that. (…) So if there is no 
perspective we will help people to for example get urgent medical 
care, but financial aid for us is connected to the perspective of people. 
If people choose to live here illegally, if they think that life here in 
illegality is better than a legal life in their own country than this is 
probably true, those people are better judges of that than we are (…) 
but we are not going to support them financially in that. (Martijn)  
Because most organizations use the perspective of migrants as a criterion for the 
provision of financial help, settlement and investment migrants do not get it. What 
they can occasionally get is material support from organizations. However, this is 
usually only provided in the beginning of their stay and surely not structurally. 
Isidora explains: “In the beginning when we did not have work we inscribed 
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ourselves in [an organization]. Every Tuesday we went there and they gave us food. 
They gave us food, they gave us clothes for the children, and also [another 
organization] gave social help. To one we went on Monday and Thursday and to the 
other on Tuesday, and they gave us food for the whole week, cornflakes, milk, 
chicken. Because of these organizations we had no problems in the beginning 
because we always had food to eat. But after a year they said that we were now here 
long enough to know how to depend on ourselves, and that there are many people 
who also have needs and who have just arrived.”  
Organizations do not usually want to provide material help to irregular 
migrants structurally, which is why settlement and investment migrants are only 
supported by them for periods, usually in the beginning of their stay. While 
organizations do not structurally provide material help to settlement and investment 
migrants, they do always provide them with advice, for example about how to get 
medical care. Kwami for example says:  
They can’t help me with these things, with money and things like that, 
they can’t help me with that. They can write letters for you or help you 
to investigate something, that’s all. (…) I was in the hospital the other 
day and they write letters for me, for the payments you know, because 
hospital bills are pretty heavy. 
Only a few ‘restaurants’ are open to investment and settlement migrants as a form of 
emergency care. Food packages are only handed out temporarily, usually to 
migrants who have just arrived.  
As indicated before, a share of respondents with aspirations to get legalized 
try to find someone to marry. While some of these may themselves think they have 
good perspectives of realizing this ambition, this is not considered to be a 
perspective by organizations on the basis of which they are willing to provide 
support. Organizations therefore mostly treat legalization migrants who are not 
involved in procedures as settlement or investment migrants. Vera, a woman who 
works for an organization, says: “If they want to stay here twenty years until they 
find a husband that is their decision. (…) but then they have to be able to manage on 
their own, and then they should not be here every day.  
Even though the informal support provided by organizations to legalization 
migrants with a perspective is limited, support accumulates because migrants tend 
to shop around. Most legalization migrants involved in procedures receive help for 
food, clothes and cheap shopping from multiple organizations. Rasja says: “I have a 
  Life Without Papers 
130 
card from [organization a], they help me a little (…) [organization b] they also give a 
package of food once every two weeks. (…) And with [organization a] I also have 
this card for clothes (…) and this shop [at organization c] is very good. (…)Now for 
example I have bought this schoolbag for ten cents, which is nothing. That is very 
good. (…) once per month [organization a] pays ten euros for us [to shop at 
organization c].  
According to Düvell (2006c), those who turn to organizations are irregular 
migrants who do not have social capital. However, I found that irregular migrants 
who turn to organizations do not necessarily go there because they have no social 
network from which they could potentially draw resources. Legalization migrants 
often combine support from various sources, as is illustrated best by Alexandre:  
[organization a] gives me something every now and then and through 
them I find some cleaning work in people’s home sometimes.(…) Once 
per month [this organization] gives me free food, and at [organization 
b] I can get free food twice per month. (…) [Organization b] also gives 
me clothes sometimes. (…) I have friends with whom I have worked, 
and they said all right, I pay every month for the subscription of your 
television. And another said, all right for the diapers of your baby I 
give you this much every month. And another said, all right, for the 
subscription of your phone I will pay every month. Friends. Moreover, 
there was another person that I knew and her brother said all right I 
will give you 15 euros every month. (…) And for the gas there is a 
Belgian lady who pays. But I pay the rent. [Organization a] sometimes 
pays it, once every few months but not every month. 
Nawang also combines support from organizations with help from his personal 
network of friends: “my friends pay for the rent, I just sleep. (…) But for the eating, 
you know you have [this organization], I went every week there, they give me food 
(…) they are helping me to buy food.” Like Alexandre, Nawang manages to secure 
his basic needs through his personal network and by means of support from an 
organization. In other words, he combines the social capital from his personal 
network with support he receives from an organization. In addition, Nawang has 
savings from his time as a settlement migrant, and he manages to live from this 
combination of resources. Although he lives a modest existence, he accepts it as he 
knows it is only a temporary sacrifice until he receives papers or returns to his 
country. He proudly said to me: “Before I was drinking, spending fifty, sixty euros 
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sometimes hundred euros per day, but now two hundred euros for a month and I 
don’t drink anything.” 
Finally, there is another type of support that organizations provide. Some of 
my respondents receive help from the organizations they work for voluntarily. As 
with formal, financial and material support these were usually legalization migrants 
involved in procedures. Efunsegun for example says: “My organization that I am 
doing voluntary work for sometimes they help me with money too, so yeah so, they 
are helping me as well.” In return for the work they do, migrants such as Efunsegun 
sometimes receive support. In addition, volunteer work provides irregular migrants 
with a temporary sense of purpose. 
All in all, it appears that only legalization migrants involved in procedures 
are able to access (semi)governmental support from organizations. Only this 
category of migrants receives significant financial or material help from informal 
support organizations. Organizations do help investment and settlement migrants 
with information and advice, but they are expected to be able to live independently 
after a while and therefore do not receive long-lasting material or financial support.  
The finding that aspirations are crucial in the ability to access organizations 
runs counter to the commonly held belief that as migrants accumulate time and 
experience, they become better acquainted with the host country’s institutions 
(Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). It may seem as if length of stay has something to do with 
it because many legalization migrants have a long length of stay, especially 
compared to investment migrants. However, the analysis revealed that it is not 
length of stay itself that shapes these patterns, but specific aspirations. For 
settlement migrants, their length of stay actually negatively influences their chances 
of accessing support from organizations. The findings of this subsection as well as 
the previous subsection can me summarized in the diagram 6.3: 
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Figure 6.3 Other sources of income per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Other sources of 
income 
    
Gift and barter 
economy 
Commercial 
networks 
Social solidarity 
systems 
Native citizens Family, friends 
Organizations None 
Occasional 
material support 
Intensive None 
 
One might wonder if there are major differences between Belgium and the 
Netherlands in the extent to which irregular migrants manage to access support 
from organizations. Apart from the formal support irregular migrants receive from 
the government or from semi-governmental initiatives, support seemed accessible in 
the same way in both Belgium and the Netherlands. In both countries, a migrant’s 
perspective is determinant for the provision of financial or long-term support. 
Emergency aid and incidental support are provided and accessed to about the same 
extent in both countries. The major difference is that in Belgium, organizations tend 
to provide this support more out in the open and are not afraid to talk about it, 
whereas organizations in the Netherlands tend to remain more secretive about it.  
6.5 CHANGING ASPIRATIONS 
I have argued and demonstrated that aspirations underlie specific patterns of 
functional incorporation. However, this relation is not necessarily always one-
directional. Although I did not systematically study what makes irregular migrants 
change aspirations, I have sometimes observed how events that changed the 
functional incorporation of irregular migrants resulted in changing aspirations.  
Employment for example constitutes an important instigator of change for 
investment migrants. Chavez ([1992]1998) claims that in some cases, having 
obtained a steady job becomes a major reason for temporary migrants to settle down 
instead of to go back. I found that it also works the other way around: investment 
migrants who fail to find a good job are forced to stay around longer then they 
intended and end up settling down. Recall Martina who said: “six months without 
work, and then after eight months of work I still did not have the same amount of 
money that I arrived with. So [I stayed] a year more, and then another year more.” 
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Not having employment or not being able to work can also inspire migrants 
to change their settlement aspirations into legalization aspirations. Andrei for 
example says:  
Look, I have been here for seven years. I have always worked but now 
I cannot work anymore because I am sick (…) my neck is broken this is 
the problem. And from the neck comes the problem with the arm and 
shoulder. (…) I make something between 1,000 and 1,500 every month. 
But because I don’t have insurance, I pay cash for my physiotherapist. 
This means I work to have money for the physiotherapist. I give him 
all my money, and the physiotherapist says you should not work 
otherwise you don’t solve your problem. So I am in a vicious circle you 
understand. 
For others, an unexpected event in their employment career more or less forced 
them into changing aspirations. As with Andrei, Nawang’s settlement aspirations 
transformed into legalization aspirations because he could not work anymore. I 
already knew him for a while before I interviewed him. When we first met he was 
working fulltime in a restaurant. However, circumstances forced him to stop 
working. He explained: “There was a really big control. There were more than 
twenty policemen there. (…) they arrested me and I was there for five hours with the 
police station. Only five hours, I was lucky.” I subsequently asked him if he had 
been able to find another job. He replied: “No I don’t want to work because already 
they arrested me this first time and at that time they said to me this is your first 
time.... that is why I let you go, if you do it a second time I send you back to your 
country if I find you doing illegal work. So I don’t want to work. I don’t want to go 
back to Nepal. (…) if I want to work I can find work, sure, because I know all the 
restaurant and the catering people. I can work, they said ok you come at night, you 
come in the morning, early in the morning you work, just make a sauce for us, they 
are telling me like that (…) I told them no, I am fighting for the paper now. Now my 
way is to get the paper now. (…) so my way is this, I go this way, so I don’t work 
black.”  
Nawang said he had savings that would last him about a year. If he does not 
receive papers within this year, he will reconsider his actions. Nawang’s story is a 
good illustration of how changes in the work situation can influence aspirations, and 
how in turn, aspirations affect the work situation. It thus shows how functional 
incorporation and aspirations mutually influence each other.  
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, some elements of the functional incorporation of irregular migrants 
in the Low Countries have been analyzed. Functional incorporation refers to the way 
irregular migrants are able to sustain themselves and includes housing, work and 
other sources of income. I have demonstrated how our understanding of specific 
patterns of functional incorporation can be improved by bringing aspirations into 
the analysis. Next to such issues as length of stay and the opportunity structure, 
aspirations underlie the patterns of incorporation of irregular migrants in receiving 
societies. Distinct aspirations shape specific patterns, as can be seen in figure 6.4:  
Figure 6.4 Functional incorporation per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Functional 
incorporation 
    
Housing     
Type 
Cheap and 
crowded 
Regular Diverse With family 
Location 
Immigrant 
district 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
Employment     
Work hours 
As many as 
possible 
Regular 
As little as 
possible 
As little as 
possible 
Type of work 
‘Typical’ 
irregular migrant 
sectors 
In native private 
households 
In native private 
households 
In private 
households or 
ethnic businesses 
Perception of 
exploitation 
No perception of 
exploitation 
Certain types of 
work 
Fundamental Fundamental 
Other sources of 
income     
Gift and barter 
economy 
Commercial 
networks 
Social solidarity 
systems 
Native citizens Family, friends 
Organizations None 
Occasional 
material support 
Intensive None 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the patterns of functional incorporation 
of irregular migrants and to provide understanding of how these patterns are 
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shaped. The findings should not be interpreted as a description and understanding 
of the functional incorporation of irregular migrants. I have only dealt with issues 
that are relevant in the light of the typology I have constructed and that can be 
linked to debates in the literature or divergent research outcomes. As a result, this 
chapter sheds light on some of the basic processes of functional incorporation of 
irregular migrants by contextualizing migrant experiences and does not provide 
answers to questions concerning the functional incorporation irregular migrants in 
general.  
The qualitative nature of my study does not allow me to say anything about 
the frequency of the patterns I found. However, the strength of my analysis does not 
lie in the description or quantification of the patterns of functional incorporation, but 
in the understanding that is provided for how these patterns are shaped. Doing so, 
new light has been shed on existing findings. Following the grounded theory 
approach this typology has been constructed “not to provide a perfect description of 
an area, but to develop a theory that accounts for much of the relevant behavior” 
(Glaser and Strauss [1967]2006: 30) The figure on the previous page therefore 
presents ideal-typical relations.  
 The results indicate how overemphasizing structure in the analysis obscures 
understanding of how migrants act differently under similar circumstances because 
they have different aspirations. Bringing aspirations into the analysis therefore 
increases our insight and provides clarity in important scholarly debates or 
divergent research outcomes. Whereas chapter 2 provided a theoretical critique of 
the current research practice, this chapter has empirically demonstrated its 
downsides as well the benefits that can be gained from an approach that focuses on 
structure and agency.  
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CHAPTER 7 
LIVING DIFFERENT DREAMS (II): 
ASPIRATIONS AND SOCIAL 
INCORPORATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A striking feature of studies on irregular migrants is that there is little to no attention 
paid to their social incorporation. Most studies do not deal with the theme at all, and 
others consider it to be of secondary importance. This lack of attention is probably 
inspired by the implicit assumption in much research that when migrants are busy 
‘surviving’ there is little time for recreational activities or maintaining social 
relations. Most studies which do deal with the social aspects of irregular migrants’ 
lives therefore portray images that are in line with this ‘survival perspective’ 
discussed in chapter two. They tell stories of migrants who avoid public spaces, stay 
inside their houses behind locked doors and closed curtains, either too afraid to 
venture outside or too tired from work to do so (see also Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). 
Psimmenos and Kassimati (2006: 153) for example write about respondents who live 
“in the shadows,” who are confined to their house and who are “afraid of the 
public.” Likewise, P. Anderson (1999: 67) asserts that for irregular migrants “free 
time is in short supply,” and “largely devoted to recovering one’s energies” at home. 
Iosifides et al. (2007: 1351) paint a similar picture by mentioning that their 
respondents speak of the “almost total unavailability of free time and recreation,” 
and how “the majority of interviewees equate recreation and free time with rest at 
home.” Another example stems from the work of Schuster (2005) who claims that 
irregular migrants do not visit shops, cafés or cinemas, but only visit markets to buy 
food every now and then. Likewise, Ahmad (2008: 311) writes that irregular 
migrants are “locked in an endless cycle of work that confines them to a physical 
space of a few square meters both at work (…) and at home.” In addition, Engbersen 
(1999a: 236) reports that irregular migrants live their lives in “geographically 
restricted areas,” show “immobile behavior” and that many are “chained to their 
home.” Likewise, Iosifides and King (1999: 226) report “high levels of socio-spatial 
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exclusion.” In addition, according to Diouck (2000: 57) “the life of an [irregular 
migrant] is characterized by a daily struggle to escape police controls.” 
Irregular migrants are not only believed to have few contacts, but also the 
contacts they have are thought to consist of a selected group of people. As irregular 
migrants are assumed to have little time for recreational activities and are afraid to 
venture in public places, they are portrayed as spending most of their time at home 
or calling at the houses of family or friends for a visit, the latter usually being other 
migrants. Chavez ([1992]1998) for example claims that irregular migrants’ social 
contacts primarily consist of other irregular or regular migrants. And Datta et al. 
(2007) and Hagan (1994) describe how their respondents primarily socialize with 
migrants with a similar ethnic background, preferably from the same town or 
region. It is not so surprising then that Iosifides et al. (2007) remark that for most of 
their respondents, social contacts to (native) local residents “are reduced to 
banalities such as saying simply ‘good morning’ or ‘good evening.’” Paspalanova 
(2006: 261) writes that her respondents displayed a lack of interest in “establishing 
social contacts, learning the languages, or to become familiar with Belgian customs 
or to follow local news” which fits the picture as well. Moreover, she found that their 
contacts with the local population were strictly work-related. Likewise, Grzymala-
Kazlowska (2005: 683) claims that although the migrants she interviewed “develop 
economic links with the Belgian society, in general they are poorly integrated in 
socio-cultural terms.” Apart from work, time “is usually spent with their own ethnic 
group.” (Ibid.)  
All in all, irregular migrants are generally believed to be locked up in 
immigrant neighborhoods where they primarily associate with co-ethnics and do not 
venture out on the streets. Mahler (1995: 106) therefore claims they are cut off from 
mainstream society and writes that irregular migrants live in a world that has 
evolved “parallel to the world of the larger society and there are few links between 
the two.” The image that irregular migrants are trapped inside some sort of 
“cocoon” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994: 173) separated from mainstream society is 
enhanced by the frequent use of metaphors as living “in the shadows” (Psimmenos 
and Kassimati 2006: 153) or “in a shadow” (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005: 680) when 
referring to the social lives of irregular migrants. Moreover, because irregular 
migrants are cut off from mainstream society, they are believed to lack a sense of 
belonging to the country or city they live in. Chavez ([1992]1998: 160) for example 
claims that irregular migrants feel that although their lives take place within a larger 
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social system, they are not fully part of that social system: “Their incorporation is 
incomplete.”  
At the same time there are a few scholars who claim that the “cocoon” 
metaphor is invalid. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 173) for example writes: 
The cocoon image is misleading because it suggests that 
undocumented immigrants, especially women, live in suspended 
isolation, in a domestic capsule void of community. I began my 
fieldwork with some of these preconceptions, but they were quickly 
dispelled. Instead of socially inactive lives, I witnessed a good amount 
of informal sociability, participation in formal groups and 
organizations, and contact with various institutions and agencies. 
Instead of anonymity, I observed and experienced an environment 
where the intensive scrutiny of personal life from kin, friends, and 
acquaintances at times reached stifling levels.  
The author further lists a host of recreational activities her respondents like to 
engage in. Likewise, Leman (1997: 35) witnessed how irregular migrants spend their 
free time visiting dances, parties and discos, and how Columbians in Brussels have 
their own soccer club, which is also visited by wives, children and friends whose 
presence turns “matches into small community events.” And Hagan (1994) too 
reported that irregular migrants engage in lively social interaction at soccer clubs 
and in churches.  
In summary, the little scholarly attention that is devoted to the social 
incorporation of irregular migrants paints a grim picture of social isolation and 
geographic immobility. Only a small group of researchers has objected to this image 
and devoted their attention towards describing the richness in the leisure activities 
their respondents undertake and the social contacts they maintain. The question that 
logically follows from this discussion is how these diverging pictures are shaped. 
Why do some researchers find active social lives, while most emphasize the 
migrants' inactivity? As in the previous chapter, I argue and demonstrate how 
aspirations play a major role in shaping these divergent outcomes.  
The next section discusses the way irregular migrants spend their free time, 
and the subsequent section deals with their social contacts. As in the previous 
chapter, the issues in each section are discussed by type of aspiration. Before the 
concluding section, the penultimate section deals with the role of the social realm in 
changing aspirations.  
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7.2 LEISURE TIME 
Because investment migrants are in the destination country to make money with 
which to return to their country of origin, they try to maximize work time and 
minimize free time. They do not strive for an active social life because this is not part 
of their aspirations, as Diego explains:  
I am not going to (…) I came here to work, of course I can go out and 
be with someone but I know my place you understand. I can’t go out 
for example all week to go dancing all night long. I have a certain 
place here and this behavior does not serve me nor my family.  
As their focus is on working as much as they can, investment migrants are not keen 
on free time or holidays. They believe that when they return home they may enjoy a 
holiday, but not during their stay in the destination country. When I asked Sofia 
about the way she spends her free time, she replied: “I don’t have free time (…) I 
have half a day on Saturday and half a day on Sunday, so I only go to church and I 
go on internet and I make some calls and then the time is up.” When I asked 
Constanza what she does if her employers go on a holiday she replied:  
When they go on a holiday I look for other work. That is why there is 
never a holiday. They give me holiday, they think that I rest but I 
don’t. (…) I don’t forget my priorities (…) if you go to the cinema a lot 
or if you make many costs your salary will never rise, it will not last. 
So I don’t have this, I can’t afford to give myself this so I don’t. To go 
to an ice-cream parlor, or to drink something in a bar, no I don’t do 
anything like that. I only go to the supermarket and the house and 
work and the church. 
Investment migrants regard their stay as an intermediary period in which they live 
for their future plan, which is why they are not very concerned with the lives they 
currently lead. When I asked Diego if he liked his life in Belgium he said: “It is living 
for living, I am here to get money together and that is it. Living is done in another 
way.”  
When investment migrants are not employed, they sit in tea houses or bars 
where subcontractors come to look for workers. This way they hope to find a new 
job as soon as possible. If investment migrants do have work, they also inevitably 
have some amount of free time on their hands. What is distinctive about investment 
migrants is that they try to minimize the amount of money they spend during this 
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leisure time. They therefore usually stay at home to play cards and talk with their 
flat mates, like Mehmet who says: “I live together with five other Turks. We get 
along very well. We cook together sometimes; we associate with each other in our 
free time. We play card games at night.”  
Contrary to investment migrants, settlement migrants highly value their 
spare time, and they like to spend it outside of their house. Settlement migrants may 
also associate with their flat mates, but in contrast to investment migrants they do 
not predominantly stay indoors. Gökdeniz says: “My flat mates who have been here 
in Belgium illegally for a longer period have introduced me to their circle of friends. 
We do all sorts of things together in the weekends, like playing sports or 
instruments.” As explained in the previous chapter, settlement migrants do not want 
to work all the time, because they like to have some leisure time as well. Recall 
Ignacio who was quoted explaining that he refused a job offer because if he took it, 
he would not have enough spare time. Since settlement migrants highly value time 
for recreational activities, I had many opportunities to spend their leisure time with 
them. I had drinks with some of them, I went swimming with others, and I have 
made hundreds of strolls around the park or through the city center in their 
company. While enjoying recreation they commented on how often they came there 
and how much they liked it. This enabled me not only to hear from them how they 
preferred to spend their leisure time, but also to see how they spent it in practice.  
Many migrants with settlement aspirations lead active social lives which for 
the younger generations include going out and sometimes experimenting with 
alcohol and drugs. Javier for example confessed over a Belgian beer that during the 
beginning of his stay he went out a lot to get high on cocaine. Just before it 
developed into a habit, his girlfriend became pregnant which made him calm down 
and choose a less restless path. Like Javier, other young migrants take the 
opportunity to experiment. Volkan for example says: “I smoke marihuana a lot. I 
have also tried other forms of drugs every now and then here in Belgium, but now I 
am sticking to marihuana.” Not all settlement migrants have the money or the wish 
to go out, let alone try drugs, though. Older people in particular do not want to go 
dancing, but they have other ways to socialize in their spare time, like visiting parks 
or the city center. Florencia for example says: “We go to all kinds of places. The only 
places we don’t go to is a place to dance.” When I asked Ignacio how he spends his 
free time he said: 
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I go for a walk around the center, and look at the shops, I don’t know I 
walk around and every now and then if I have money I buy 
something. Yes, I buy something. I am saving money now for a 
computer. That is not very expensive here, a small computer. I have 
one now on which I make songs for the church. (…) and I run to lose 
some weight and I play basketball with [a friend]. 
Migrants with legalization aspirations value their leisure time differently 
than do those in the other two categories. Because they usually do not work or do 
not work that much, they have a lot of spare time which makes leisure time less 
desirable than it is to settlement migrants. Dnari for example explains how he 
spends his leisure time: “Nothing special, every day the same thing. Yes. That is why 
you can’t say free time because free time is if for example you do something and 
then if you don’t do that, then you have free time but I always have free time, 
always, every day.” Legalization migrants tell stories of how they hang around at 
different places all day. As they usually do not have a lot of money, they have to be 
picky about the places they visit. Önder says: “I mostly spend my time in 
coffeehouses and bars. I also frequent [an organization] here in the neighborhood. I 
sit there all day and I get the possibility to watch television and drink tea for free.” 
This means that although legalization and settlement migrants may value leisure 
time more than investment migrants do because they want to live in the destination 
country, they appreciate it differently. Furthermore, the way they spend their free 
time in daily life is very distinct as well.  
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures spend a lot of their 
free time calling at organizations for a chat, social support, to do voluntary work or 
to take part in some of the activities they organize. Rasja for example says: 
I visit groups of women who do not have work. The women who go 
there do not have papers, and you can learn how to sew and babysit 
there. It is a very nice place. And now during the summer holiday we 
go on many trips. To the park, in two weeks we go to the hills with my 
daughter which is very good. It is all free if people do not have papers. 
And sometimes we go the coast, to the beach, that is much fun. I have 
many friends. Only we do not visit each other [at home] but we only 
see each other in [our children’s] school or somewhere else. 
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures hang around at organizations 
all day as these offer a wide range of social or recreational activities for free. 
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Furthermore, as became clear in the previous chapter, organizations also supply 
legalization migrants who are involved in procedures with social support. In 
exchange they often work there as volunteers. This keeps them busy, and it allows 
them to return a favor. 
 However, there is another reason why legalization migrants who are 
involved in procedures frequent organizations, take part in their activities and work 
there. Dakarai explains: “I work also for [an organization] because if I come here and 
I do nothing, it would not be good for my application [for regularization], and I 
would have nothing to do. If I don’t have work and don’t go to school, even if they 
don’t pay me a lot, or if they pay me nothing, I have something to do in my life. To 
do something, to have people, and maybe it is also good for my integration.” It 
becomes clear from Dakarai´s statement that apart from keeping themselves busy, 
legalization migrants who are involved in procedures do things with and for 
organizations because they think this helps their integration. This looks good on 
their application and therefore increases their odds of legalization.  
Contrastingly, legalization migrants who aim to get married do not hang 
around organizations all day. As became clear in the previous chapter, organizations 
do not welcome these irregular migrants since they do not have ‘a perspective’. But 
it is also not in the interest of this category of irregular migrants to go there, because 
this is not a good place to meet a partner to marry. They do not stay indoors like 
investment migrants, but go out a lot in order to meet potential partners. When I 
asked Maroune how he aims to find a woman to marry, he said: “you have to go out 
a lot, you have to meet people. You have to flirt with women. (…) Life for a person 
without papers is not only about working. You have to go out as well.” In fact, as we 
shall see in chapter 10, going out a lot is what makes a successful strategy for this 
category of aspirations. In case legalization migrants do not have the money to visit 
discos and bars, they stand on street corners and in front of bars and tea houses, 
flirting with women passing by. Before I started my fieldwork, I tended to ignore 
such approaches. During my fieldwork I developed the habit of responding to these 
attempts by engaging in small talk with these men. Without exception, it turned out 
that these were irregular migrants with aspirations to become legalized.  
Irregular migrants with different aspirations experience and spend their 
leisure time differently. Furthermore, aspirations underlie different patterns of 
geographic mobility. Many settlement migrants have visited other cities and have 
even crossed national borders. Much to my surprise, many of my respondents in 
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Belgium proudly proclaimed to have visited the Netherlands. Fernando tells about 
the places he has visited: “Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Breda, Roosendaal, Vlissingen, 
Den Bosch. (…) I know more in Holland than in Belgium. (…) In Belgium Leuven, 
Ardennen, Rouen (…) Brussels. (…) Brugge yes I also know that and Zeebrugge, the 
beach. On the Belgian coast I only know Zeebrugge and in Holland Vlissingen.” And 
Martina: “I got to know Antwerp. We went to Oostende, Ghent, Brugge. We also 
went to Paris.” Since settlement migrants want to stay permanently in the receiving 
society, they want to get to know the country they intend to spend their lives in. 
Furthermore, they are often very interested in western Europe and keen on visiting 
famous cities in the surrounding countries. As the internal borders of the European 
Union are not heavily controlled, they are not afraid to try. But there are obviously 
limitations to travel as expressed by Isidora:  
My daughter says, we are here in this beautiful cage, but we cannot 
leave the cage, and that is true because you can do many great things 
here but we are here in this cage. (…) My daughter is now in love with 
a boy from China and she could come with his family to China to get 
to know China, but she said I would like to but I can’t because I don’t 
have papers. (….) My daughter always says we are here in this 
beautiful cage but we cannot get out of this cage. 
These accounts stand in sharp contrast to the immobility of investment 
migrants who do not see the need to venture beyond the safety of their home and 
their job location. However, it is not out of fear of the police that they prefer to stay 
indoors, but they are immobile as a result of their aspirations. Constanza explains 
that she does not travel or go out because of the economic priorities she has: “I don’t 
know anything else apart from Brussels, I haven’t gone to another place (…) they say 
that in other places they have very beautiful parts but I don’t know them. (…) I don’t 
go to discotheques, I don’t go to public places, I don’t go to such places, and it is not 
because of fear of the police, I just don’t like to go there. If I make 50 euros after 
working for a day for eight hours, 50 euros and to go there would cost me minimum 
50 euros, for one night. So I don’t do that. (…) And that applies to many things [like 
travel].”  
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures may also travel if they 
have the money to do so, but they usually remain within the country as they are 
afraid to cross national borders. They are more anxious than the other types of 
migrants because getting caught in another country could endanger their procedure. 
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Nawang explains why he was afraid to cross the Belgian border into the 
Netherlands (which he did nevertheless): “Because here [in Belgium] I can show my 
regularization paper and there I did not have anything. I did not have anything 
there. I was totally illegal.” Nawang’s statement that he is “totally illegal” in the 
Netherlands expresses the thought that he must somehow feel partly legal and at 
ease in Belgium. His application for regularization provides him with some form of 
semi-formal identification that is only accepted in the country where he applied for 
it. He is not only afraid that crossing national borders could damage the outcome of 
his procedure, but also that he could be jailed and expelled. But these are not the 
only reasons why legalization migrants feel safer in one country than in the other. 
My respondents noted that they perceive police practices to be different in Belgium 
than in the Netherlands. Rakesh for example says: “sometimes here [in Belgium] the 
police they check you, they say you have no good paper, they say no problem (…) in 
Holland they do not do it like that, they send them directly to jail. (…) I know many 
people from Holland, sometimes they come (…) they come to my house. (...) I don’t 
go there (…) I am afraid.” These perceptions influence irregular migrants’ choices 
and consequently make legalization migrants limit their travels.  
Legalization migrants who aim to get married worry less about police 
controls as they can usually hide their identity. Unlike those involved in procedures 
they have not yet made themselves ‘legible’ (Scott 1998):  
If the police meet you in the street with proof that you are Moroccan 
with a passport, [they expel you] directly. But if they don’t have proof 
they leave you. (…) They asked for my identity card, I said I was 
illegal, they said to me, come with us to the police station, I was there 
for nearly two hours and then they let me go. Yes. (Marouane) 
 All in all, it has become clear that irregular migrants with different 
aspirations value and spend their leisure time differently, as is summarized in figure 
7.1: 
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Figure 7.1 Social incorporation per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Social 
incorporation 
    
Leisure time 
As little as 
possible 
Highly valued Nothing special Instrumental 
Ways of 
spending leisure 
time 
Indoors 
Recreational 
activities 
Organizations 
In the streets, 
going out 
Geographic 
mobility 
Immobile 
Mobile (across 
national borders) 
Mobile (within 
national borders) 
Immobile 
 
Whereas investment migrants do not value free time, settlement and legalization 
migrants do, but in different ways. Settlement migrants like to spend their free time 
in recreational activities, and legalization migrants who search for a marriage 
partner devote much of their free time to this quest. Legalization migrants who are 
involved in procedures are drawn to organizations where they spend their day 
working on their integration and engaging in recreational activities that are free of 
charge.  
Investment migrants are geographically immobile, as they like to stay close to 
their jobs. Settlement migrants like to travel and see different places. They even cross 
the national borders of the neighboring countries. As the internal borders of the 
European Union are not heavily controlled, they are not afraid to try. The next 
section discusses in whose company irregular migrants with different types of 
aspirations spend their leisure time.  
7.3 SOCIAL CONTACTS 
Investment migrants who have been received by friends or family usually spend 
their free time in the company of the latter. This type of social contact is easily 
facilitated as they often live in the same house. Investment migrants who have come 
on their own usually spend most of their spare time with their room- or flat mates, 
the latter usually being other temporary migrants. Investment migrants have a very 
small social circle, dominated by acquaintances. When I asked Diego about his 
friends in Belgium he said: “I have little….a few….one.” Like Diego, investment 
migrants usually have a small number of acquaintances, but very few intimate 
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friends in the destination country. Diego indicates that although he has one person 
that he calls a friend, he still does not know him very well. Due to their temporary 
engagements and their lack of free time, it is obviously difficult for investment 
migrants to build and maintain friendships. Some investment migrants therefore 
indicate that they feel lonely, especially those who live alone.  
Contrastingly, settlement migrants have a much larger social circle, and they 
are willing to spend time investing in the maintenance of social contacts. They have 
many acquaintances and often also some good friends. They frequent all kinds of 
social gatherings in their leisure time. They for example regularly go to church or to 
the mosque, they visit or participate in sports events and they undertake many 
recreational activities with groups of friends and acquaintances. When I went to a 
lake for a swim with a group of women and children, they all brought food that they 
shared, some brought an instrument, and they all sang and danced to the music that 
was played. This group of women went there every Sunday weather permitting. The 
women all attached much value to social gatherings such as these because they 
strengthen social bonds and allow for new arrivals to get to know people.  
Settlement migrants tend to take part in all kinds of activities and 
celebrations. These are usually initiated by a small group of friends, but they can 
also have a more formal character. Many settlement migrants visit the activities 
organized by formal or informal socio-cultural organizations. Antonia says: “There 
are many cultural activities here organized by a group of Ecuadorians. (…) I have 
many contacts because I was working with my sisters in this Ecuadorian 
organization before. (…) we left but right now we still collaborate and we see if there 
is some activity. And I know many people from there.” Migrant women with 
settlement aspirations play a vital role in the development of these culturally distinct 
immigrant communities through the activities they organize (cf. Hondagneu-Sotelo 
1994). Reproducing cultural symbols associated with the home culture enhances 
solidarity among such groups (see also Hagan 1994). Moreover, the cultural 
activities provide a means to teach their children about their cultural background. 
Because of these social gatherings, settlement migrants meet many people which is 
why they usually have large social networks.  
The social circles of legalization migrants who are involved in procedures are 
much smaller than those of settlement migrants, because legalization migrants have 
less opportunity to meet people as they do not work (much) and do not go out or 
participate in recreational activities much outside of the scope of organizations. 
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Unlike settlement migrants, who constantly meet new people though the activities 
organized by socio-cultural organizations, friends or family in their leisure time, 
legalization migrants who are involved in procedures move in the same social circle 
of other irregular migrants who visit the same organizations each day. Legalization 
migrants who aim to get married usually have a larger social circle, because it is 
usually through other people that a potential future spouse is located.  
Investment migrants have a very small social circle, and this small circle is 
usually also very homogeneous in makeup, consisting primarily of other investment 
migrants. Next to their temporary engagements and their lack of time, they face a 
language barrier that makes it difficult to make contact with local residents. As 
Massey et al. (1987) remarked, temporary migrants do not learn to speak the native 
language, but only acquire enough familiarity with the language to deal with routine 
situations. I found that the same was true for investment migrants. They are not 
interested in learning the local language, because this does not bring the attainment 
of their aspirations any closer. Diego responded to my question as to why he is not 
in school to learn the language: “No because I do not have the time. (…) because I 
came for two years and it was not my intention to stay here (…) many people here 
are studying the language obviously because they want to stay here. In my case, I 
came here to get enough money together to build a house [in Chile].” It is clear that 
investment migrants have priorities other than learning the local language.  
As investment migrants usually do not speak the local language, they have a 
barrier to engaging in social contacts with local residents. However, even if there 
were no language barrier, investment migrants would probably still not be 
interested in associating with local residents. When I asked Sofia how she thought 
she could make her life in Belgium better, she responded: “To make my life better, 
economically or what?” I said: “What you think a good life is,” and she responded: 
“The only way in which I can make my life here better, is in economical terms 
because; you see I came here [for economic reasons]. But like socially, no.” So 
because of their aspirations, investing in social contacts does not take priority for 
investment migrants, contacts with local residents least of all. The only investment 
migrants who have contacts with native Belgian or Dutch people are those who have 
to deal with them because of their work. Servet for example replied to the question 
of whether he had contact with Belgians by saying: “It depends on the question if we 
have Belgian customers or not. If we do, I have daily contact with Belgians during 
my working hours.” The same applies to contacts with migrants of other 
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nationalities. Investment migrants may live or work with them, but investing in 
social relations is not a priority for these migrants: making money is.  
For settlement migrants, Belgians or Dutch people rarely belong to their 
smaller circle of intimate friends. Unlike investment migrants, settlement migrants 
do want to have some contact with local residents. Most settlement migrants 
therefore have some amount of contact with locals, but they usually know only a 
few persons. Ignacio for example says: “I have many friends without papers, the 
majority yes. And let’s see, I have one friend who is Belgian.” The Belgians or Dutch 
people they have contact with are usually persons with whom they can 
communicate in their own language, as with Antonia who says: “I have Belgian 
friends as well. One I haven’t spoken to for almost four months now but the other I 
see regularly. She helps me a lot with small things and she speaks Spanish perfectly. 
And now many Ecuadorians are married to Belgians as well (…) so I also associate 
with them, I talk to them, to the husbands of the Ecuadorian women.” Obviously 
these men speak Spanish as well, which makes communication much easier. There 
thus seems to be a language barrier that makes it difficult for settlement migrants to 
associate with local residents.  
Settlement migrants usually do very much want to learn the local language, 
because this enables them to function in the society where they want to build their 
future. Those with children for example often mentioned that learning the local 
language allows them to speak with their children’s teachers. In spite of their firm 
wish to speak the language, in practice they do not always manage to take language 
classes. Although these usually do not cost anything, migrants find it hard to 
negotiate time for it in their work schedules. Matias for example says:  
We have to work during the day on one day and then on the other day 
we work during the night. If it is on the same day as the [language] 
school, you skip school because well, I for example prefer to go to 
work because I need the payment to be able to pay the rent to pay the 
electricity, the gas. If I don’t work….And sometimes there are things, if 
you don’t appreciate a job at one occasion, then you don’t have to 
come back the next day. And you don’t have to call because they say if 
you don’t want to work why are you calling? So you have to think 
about that, you have to prefer to work and not study. And so you lose 
the studying because you are not constantly involved in it, you lose the 
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style of learning. Because if you miss two days of school, the teacher is 
not going to repeat things for only one person.  
However, language is probably not the only barrier to social contact with natives for 
settlement migrants. Emilia who lives in Brussels and speaks French well says: “it is 
not very difficult to have friendships, except for friendship with Belgians. (…) I have 
many many friends, but Belgians? No. Practically none.” In the absence of a 
language barrier, the precise reasons for this lack of contact are unclear. From the 
accounts irregular migrants give in this respect, I suspect they might have something 
to do with cultural differences and settlement migrants’ fear of being denounced.  
Settlement migrants lack contacts with Belgians and Dutch people, and they 
also seem to lack contact with other migrant groups. Some settlement migrants 
associate with migrants of other origins, but most are wary of contacting other 
migrant groups (cf. Datta et al. 2007). Moroccans are perceived badly by practically 
all my respondents with settlement aspirations. Moroccans are often portrayed 
negatively in public discourse in the Low Countries, and it seems that irregular 
migrants copy this kind of talk. Catalina for example says: “One time a friend of the 
church gave a bike to my son as a present (…) but they stole it. He parked it in front 
of the church one day and they took it away (…) Sometimes the Moroccans, or I 
don’t know who did it but you feel it.”  
According to Mahler (1995: 230) migrants are hostile to and stereotype other 
migrant groups especially the more established migrant groups she calls 
‘minorities’. She writes that the migrants she interviewed “view minorities as a 
stagnant, parasitic population.” They view established migrants “as architects of 
their own demise because even as citizens, with all their rights and advantages, they 
have not pulled themselves up by their bootstraps.” Camila expresses a similar kind 
of disrespect she feels towards established migrant groups: “I think that they behave 
badly sometimes, they make problems. Like the Moroccans, they make problems; 
they make problems and only that. I think that we are more reserved, maybe 
because we are in a different positions where they can arrest us at any time and 
deport us. We prefer to stay quiet. (…) we don’t make that many scandals I think, 
that much noise.”  
Many settlement migrants wish for migration policies to be much stricter. 
They often express their understanding for the ethno-centrist attitude of a part of the 
native population. Valentina for example says: “I can understand, it is logical that 
there are some racists but they are so with reasons, you know, how many people 
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from other countries have not murdered, robbed or sold drugs? Yes. It is logic if they 
say they have to send them back, but the Moroccans who do that get only one year.” 
Settlement migrants often feel that although they lead quiet and hardworking lives, 
their reputation as migrants is damaged by the bad behavior of other migrant 
groups. They feel that due to the misconduct of other migrants, they are denied the 
opportunity to prove themselves. They therefore rarely associate with migrants from 
a different background.  
In comparison to settlement migrants, the social circle of legalization 
migrants who are involved in procedures is more diverse. In fact, their social circles 
are more heterogeneous than those of the other categories of migrants, because they 
get into contact with migrants of other origins through the organizations they 
frequent. Because of these inter-ethnic contacts, these legalization migrants generally 
have a more open attitude than settlement migrants towards other cultures, as is 
expressed by Lazzat: “I respect the culture of the Belgian people but also others. In 
Antwerp there are many different [cultures] it is a multicultural city. There are 
different people, different cultures and that is pleasant and interesting. This way I 
get to know other cultures.” Although the educational level of this category of 
migrants is often relatively high and might be partly responsible for their tolerance 
towards other cultures as well, their visits to organizations are likely to be the most 
important reason for their open attitude and heterogeneous social networks.  
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures not only have more 
contacts with other migrant groups, they also more frequently associate with 
Belgians and Dutch people. It is obviously easier for legalization migrants to learn 
the local language as they do not work much and have time to go to school. 
Moreover, migrants who have an asylum background have usually already had 
some kind of language training during their asylum procedure. Furthermore, they 
do not have the fear of being denounced that settlement migrants expressed, as they 
are already known by the authorities through their involvement in procedures. 
However, it is not just that they have fewer obstacles than the other categories to 
reach out to natives; it is also their firmly expressed wish to do so. Tarek for example 
says:  
For me it is not interesting to know other people without papers. I 
have tried to make contact with Belgians to know what is happening. 
So I have tried to make contact with the people here. With the Flemish, 
with the Belgians, even with Dutch people. And I have subsequently 
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integrated myself in the organizations to see what the opportunities 
[for legalization] are. And I have tried to learn Dutch then. That is, I 
had to learn it so that they could get to know me you see. 
Like Tarek, Albert expresses a desire to have contacts with Belgians:  
I also like to have relations with people from other countries. I don’t 
like to invite only Congolese people to my home. I also like to have 
contact with Kamerounese. But most of all I like to have contact with 
white people. That is my primary occupation. I like to have contact 
with white people often. (…) I have contacts with Africans but I prefer 
to have contacts with white people. I want to have something that we 
Africans do not have. Yes. (…) so I like to have contact with white 
people to take something. (…) So I associate with white people a lot 
because they have things that aid me in the future of my life. They 
have things that I copy, that can help me to integrate above all.  
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures want to have contact with 
local residents, as they hope that these contacts will help them to realize their 
aspirations. They reach out to locals so that they can ‘copy’ things as Albert says, but 
they also often ask for written testimonies that they can add to their application. 
Including records in their file of local people saying they are friends and expressing 
how well they think the irregular migrant in question is integrated is believed to 
increase the chances of regularization considerably and hence worth the effort.  
Legalization migrants who try to find someone to marry show diverging 
patterns, depending on the marriage markets they are active in. If they look for a 
spouse with the same ethnic background, they invest a lot of time and effort in 
maintaining good relations with family, friends and acquaintances with the same 
ethnic background, and they do not learn the language and reach out to other local 
residents. The same usually applies to those who are looking for a bogus marriage. 
However, if they also try to find a Belgian or Dutch person to marry, they usually 
learn the language and have contacts with other local residents. These legalization 
migrants can go to great lengths in their efforts to get acquainted with locals. I was 
for example very surprised to find Marouane, who is fluent in French, taking Dutch 
language courses while he lived in largely French-speaking Brussels. When I asked 
him what the reason for this odd choice was, he said that it was much easier to find 
Flemish women to marry through the internet than French speaking women in the 
streets. But even though these legalization migrants sometimes make great efforts in 
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order to meet a Belgian or Dutch spouse, their closest circle of friends usually 
consists of people with the same background making the same kind of efforts in 
locating a potential partner for marriage.  
All in all, the social circles of irregular migrants with different types of 
aspirations are quite distinct, as can be seen in the figure 7.2: 
Figure 7.2 Social incorporation per type of aspiration 
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Whereas investment migrants primarily associate with a small group, other 
temporary migrants, settlement migrants have large social circles that mainly consist 
of migrants of the same ethnic background, both regular and irregular. The social 
circles of legalization migrants who aim to get married are dependent on the 
marriage markets they are active in. The social networks of legalization migrants 
who are involved in procedures largely consist of other irregular migrants who 
frequent the same organizations. Furthermore, they usually also know some 
Belgians and Dutch people they have consciously sought so that they can improve 
their integration and hence increase their chances of legalization. It shows that the 
social worlds in which irregular migrants are enmeshed are neither accidental nor 
predetermined by the ethnic group they belong to, but instead that they depend on 
the aspirations the irregular migrants in question have.  
7.4 SHIFTS IN ASPIRATIONS 
Aspirations can shift over time. What is important to consider is that if aspirations 
change, the way migrants spend their leisure time and the company they seek 
change as well. Nawang for example explained to me how his social life changed 
after he switched aspirations. As a young unmarried man, he explained that he took 
advantage of being away from the social control of his family by going out a lot as a 
  Life Without Papers 
154 
settlement migrant. Before he changed aspirations he spent quite a lot of money in 
his free time: “I was drinking, spending fifty, sixty euros sometimes hundred euros 
per day.” However, since he developed legalization aspirations, he spends his time 
and money differently: “now [I spend] two hundred euros for a month and I don’t 
drink anything.” (…) “Two times a week I go to [language] school. And the rest of 
the time well you know (…) I go to [an organization], go to the Nepalese café, go to a 
demonstration, and internet, most of my time I spend my time on the internet. 
Nowadays it is free at [an organization] so I stay there three hours, even four hours 
sometimes. So that is my day.”  
This relationship between aspirations and social incorporation is not 
necessarily one-directional: aspirations not only underlie patterns of social 
incorporation, but also changes in irregular migrants’ social surroundings have an 
impact on their aspirations. Such changes can therefore inspire shifts in aspirations. 
Although I have not been able to systematically study changing aspirations, I have 
made some observations about the role of changes in irregular migrants’ social life in 
inspiring shifting aspirations. Furthermore, many other scholars have scrutinized 
the reasons why some temporary migrants end up settling down.  
As has been noted by other research, the social dimension is a very important 
instigator of aspiration shifts for temporary migrants. While irregular migrants are 
able to live a spartan lifestyle devoid of intimate social contact for a short period, 
they cannot maintain such a lifestyle for very long (cf. Massey et al., 1987). 
According to Piore, the way temporary migrants live “is essentially not a human 
condition” and can therefore not be endured for long. The same is true for the 
lifestyle investment migrants lead. Diego has for example lived as an investment 
migrant in Belgium for more than two years now and feels increasingly 
uncomfortable with his social life: 
I leave the house like you do, I take the tram and I enter another house 
[to work], it is like I live in a cave. The tram arrives at your house and 
at this [other] house and like this is the system of life. And for example 
the little I have here I have to share with another person. I can’t call 
somebody and say hey come to my house I am alone here we can talk. 
That is very difficult you understand.  
Unable to keep up his ascetic lifestyle for much longer, he greatly misses his family 
and thinks about bringing them over, but at the same time he is afraid to bring his 
wife and child into what he perceives as a very hostile and dangerous situation. 
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Diego’s accounts show that although investment migrants may have clear plans, it 
can be very difficult to realize them when it involves living an investment migrant 
life for very long. As migrants spend more time in the destination country, they 
enter what Massey (1986: 671) calls a “transition phase” during which the distinction 
between temporary stay and settlement becomes increasingly problematic. People 
begin to anticipate their inability to maintain the ascetic existence they had originally 
planned, and they begin to bring their wives, and occasionally their children (Piore 
1979).  
 But it is not only that their inability to keep up spartan lifestyles inspires 
some to bring over their families and settle down, the few social contacts investment 
migrants have can affect their decisions in the same direction. By playing cards at 
night with their roommates, they may eventually develop friendships. Because they 
spend their evenings and weekends together, more intimate bonds can arise. Some 
investment migrants may begin to sacrifice overtime work for companionship. 
Investment migrants consequently start to earn less and spend more, which drives 
the attainment of their aspirations further away, and this means that they have to 
stay longer (see also Piore 1979). And the longer they stay the greater the chances are 
of them eventually settling down (Chavez 1991). This means that investment 
migrants who are unable to keep up this lifestyle will eventually seek to increase 
their free time and their social contacts, either by bringing over friends or relatives or 
by getting closer to the contacts they already have. It is thus the social life that is 
attached to the aspirations of investment migrants that instigates change in the long 
run.  
 Apart from this social dimension, I found that developments in the cultural 
realm could inspire change in the same direction. Upon arrival in the destination 
country, irregular migrants usually encounter cultures that are different from what 
they are used to. As migrants encounter new cultural beliefs and experiences, some 
of their own cultural ideals and guidelines for appropriate behavior may change as a 
result of their migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). A few studies describe how 
migrants react to and negotiate these cultural differences, especially with regard to 
changing gender roles (Dannecker 2005; Hagan 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; 
Menjivar 1999). The encounter with new cultures affects migrants differently 
(Parrado and Flippen 2005) and may foster discord within families, making some 
family members long to return to the country of origin, whereas others prefer to stay 
(Chavez 1991). I also noted how cultural encounters foster different reactions and 
preferences towards settlement. Whereas one of Isadora’s daughters desperately 
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wants to go back to Ecuador because she feels unable to fit in, her three other 
children like Belgium very much, feel adapted and never want to go back.  
In addition, Khoo et al. (2008) have demonstrated that one of the most 
popular reasons for temporary regular migrants becoming settlers is a liking of the 
local lifestyle. Furthermore, women are more likely to want to stay, because they 
mostly have more to gain in this new cultural environment. According to 
Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 146), “changing gender relations in the family help to 
explain women’s and men’s divergent preferences toward settlement.” While men 
lose authority and the monopoly over family resources, women gain greater 
personal autonomy and independence. Their “gendered orientations toward 
settlement [therefore] reflect the losses and gains.” (Ibid.) In short, how irregular 
migrants react to the new cultural environment depends on many aspects, like 
gender and cultural background. Moreover, the cultural encounters may make some 
change their original aspirations.  
Although I did come across respondents who were in a transition phase 
between settlement and legalization aspirations, or who had recently made the 
transition from legalization to settlement aspirations, I did not find a clear link with 
developments in their social surroundings.  
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The little literature there is on the social incorporation of irregular migrants is 
dichotomized around two positions. The dominant view is that irregular migrants 
are busy surviving and do not have time or opportunity to engage in recreational 
activities or to invest in social relations. Moreover, the social contacts they have are 
usually other migrants. Challenged by this grim picture of social isolation, a few 
scholars oppose this image and describe the richness in the social activities and the 
contacts their respondents engage in. So far it remained unclear how these different 
outcomes are shaped. However, this chapter has demonstrated that an approach that 
takes aspirations as the central focus of analysis is able to provide such 
understanding.  
 Investment migrants, who intend to stay in the receiving society only 
temporarily, do not engage in recreational activities and prefer to stay at home, 
possibly in the company of their family or their flat mates. Moreover, they have a 
very small network of social contacts. Their lives seem a lot like the social lives of 
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irregular migrants portrayed by the dominant stream in research. However, they 
usually stay indoors because they choose to and not because they are afraid to 
venture out in public. Settlement migrants, with their fondness of leisure time and 
their large social circles, appear to have much in common with the picture portrayed 
by scholars holding the second position. Furthermore, my analysis revealed more 
diversity in outcomes than the two positions described in the literature. Legalization 
migrants who are involved in procedures spend their abundance of free time with 
organizations and have small but very heterogeneous networks consisting of 
migrants with other backgrounds as well as Dutch or Belgian people. Furthermore, 
legalization migrants who aim to get married show diverging outcomes depending 
on the marriage market(s) they are active in.  
All in all, the divergent patterns of social incorporation of different types of 
irregular migrants in the Low Countries are explained in this chapter by bringing 
aspirations into the analysis. The following figure summarizes the main findings of 
this chapter: 
Figure 7.3 Social incorporation per type of aspiration 
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Obviously, the figure presented above does not do justice to the diversity in 
outcomes, but represents a simplified ideal-typical picture. As the aspirations of 
irregular migrants may shift over time, respondents sometimes found themselves in 
between the positions outlined above. Furthermore, personal circumstances may 
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have led migrants to divert from the typical path. Nevertheless, it has become clear 
in this chapter that the typology increases our understanding of how patterns of 
social incorporation are shaped and provides insight into a debate in the literature in 
which seemingly opposing positions are held. They indicate that there is not one 
“parallel world” or “cocoon” for irregular migrants, but that there are several 
“cages”, depending on irregular migrants’ aspirations. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ASPIRATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTIVITIES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters dealt with patterns of functional and social incorporation 
in the receiving societies. However, irregular migrants also maintain ties to their 
country of origin. To understand the way irregular migrants live in the receiving 
societies it is therefore important to also take their transnational engagements into 
account. Transnationalism has originally been defined by Basch and others (1994: 6) 
as “the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and 
sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together 
their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational 
social fields that cross national borders”.  
From the outset of this emerging field of research, it has been argued that 
transnationalism is not new. After all, migrants have always engaged in cross-border 
activities. So instead of a new phenomenon, transnationalism is regarded as 
representing a novel perspective (Portes 2003: 874). This new perspective is relevant 
for the study of migration, because it offers a means to study “an alternative 
adaptation path” (Portes et al. 1999: 228). In other words, a transnational perspective 
is relevant because migrants’ cross border activities are intertwined with the way 
they live in the receiving societies. This implies that the way irregular migrants live 
in receiving societies cannot be properly understood without taking their 
transnational engagements into account. In this chapter I therefore study the 
transnational activities of irregular migrants.  
At first, studies on transnationalism tended to include all kinds of cross-
border activities, thereby exaggerating the scope of transnationalism. Researchers 
also purposefully looked for transnational phenomena by selecting case studies in 
which these were abundant. In other words, many studies sampled on the 
dependent variable, for example by conducting qualitative studies of organizations 
active in the transnational field (Portes 2001). This exaggeration of the significance of 
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transnationalism has made some authors seek to delimit its scope (see Portes et al. 
1999). 
 The attempts to limit the scope of the perspective have resulted in 
transnationalism having been conceptualized in terms of “regular and sustained 
cross-border activities of individuals,” making “freedom of movement the point of 
departure,” thereby implicitly excluding irregular migrants (Waldinger and 
Fitzgerald 2004: 1178). It seems as if studies of transnationalism have overlooked 
irregular migration in their attempt to arrive at a clear conceptualization. In the 
literature on transnational social fields (see e.g. Levitt and Schiller 2004), irregular 
migrants are also recognized as community participants, but their experiences are 
not systematically compared to the transnationalism of regular migrants, because 
the emphasis in such studies is on the level of the community as a whole. 
Consequently, the questions of if and how irregular migrants specifically experience 
and engage in transnationalism are not asked.  
In spite of the lack of specific attention for irregular migrants, a dominant 
view can be derived from the literature on which one can base expectations about 
the transnational involvement of irregular migrants. Irregular migrants are not 
expected to be very active because of the obstacles they face. Portes (2001: 189) for 
example finds that “immigrants’ transnationalism is associated with a more secure 
economic and legal status in the host country.” Likewise, Mazzucato (2008: 213) 
claims that as irregular migrants face difficulties in their incorporation, these also 
“hamper migrants’ possibilities of investing in their home country.” Hence, because 
irregular migrants are less able to create a stable position for themselves in the 
receiving society, they are considered less equipped to engage in transnational 
activities. In addition, Bloch (2008: 298) found that migrants who had legal access to 
the labor market were “more than six times” as likely to send economic remittances 
as other migrants. According to the author this means that “structural exclusions 
based on immigration status” adversely affect transnational capabilities (Bloch 2008: 
302). According to this set of authors, transnational activities are consistently 
associated with higher human capital resources, such as education, immigration 
experience, occupational status and legal status (Bloch 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Portes 
2003: 886; Waldinger 2008). Portes (2003: 887) shows “unambiguously that the 
migrants most involved in cross border initiatives are not the most exploited or 
marginalized.” Following this line of reasoning, it is likely that irregular migrants do 
not engage much in transnational activities.  
  Aspirations and Transnational Activities 
161 
As the literature on transnationalism so far mostly provides tentative 
indications of the activities irregular migrants undertake, one would expect the 
literature on irregular migration to supply better answers. However, studies of 
irregular migrants devote little attention to the transnational activities their research 
subjects engage in. Although it has often been mentioned that irregular migrants 
have a transnational outlook and are oriented towards their country of origin 
(Chavez [1992]1998, Mahler 1995, Piore 1979), remittances are the only cross-border 
activities to which attention is commonly devoted. Neglecting the broader scope of 
the literature on transnationalism, studies of irregular migrants have not extended 
their view to include social and political transnational activities as well. 
Furthermore, the focus of research on irregular migrants’ transnational activities is 
on their transnational economic obligations and how these pose limitations for their 
incorporation into the receiving society and their chances of achieving upward social 
mobility (Mahler 1995: 6-7). Following the ‘survival perspective’ (see chapter 2), 
researchers probably assume that irregular migrants do not have the possibility of 
engaging in transnational activities: they only have transnational obligations which 
they struggle to fulfill.  
All in all, studies on irregular migrants are focused on incorporation within 
the receiving societies and neglect their transnational engagements. If these do pay 
attention to transnationalism, they only take economic obligations into account and 
analyze how these affect outcomes in terms of mobility. This narrow focus is 
unfortunate, because we have learned from studies of regular migrants that there is 
a lot to gain from adopting a broader transnational perspective. This chapter 
therefore attempts to contribute to the scholarly debate on transnationalism, as well 
as to the literature on irregular migrants, by bringing a transnational perspective 
into the study of irregular migration.  
Now that it is clear that transnationalism should be studied among irregular 
migrants as well, the question is how to do it. What exactly is meant by adopting a 
transnational perspective is not always clear (Levitt et al. 2003), yet there is plenty of 
empirical research that calls itself transnational (Smith 2006). Although transnational 
migration studies form an emerging field that is still very much fragmented, a 
distinction is generally made among economic, social and political activities (e.g. 
Portes et al. 1999; Snel et al. 2006; Bloch 2008). I will therefore analyze the 
transnational activities of my respondents along these same dimensions.  
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Because of the nature of my study I focus on transnationalism of individual 
migrants and not of groups (see chapter 2). Although researchers distinguish 
between transnational activities and transnational identifications (Snel et al. 2006), 
my focus is only on the activities. This choice stems from practical considerations: 
the semi-structured interviews did not contain questions pertaining to transnational 
identifications but only to economic, social and political activities. The transnational 
activities my respondents engage in are discussed in the following sections. As in the 
previous chapters, the role of their aspirations is central to this analysis.  
8.2 ECONOMIC TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
As investment migrants have come to the destination country to earn money that 
they want to invest in their home country, they usually remit large shares of their 
incomes. In practice, the sums of money they send home roughly amount to 2,000 to 
5,000 euros per year. Investment migrants differ in the frequency with which they 
send their remittances: whereas some send small sums of money each month, others 
save larger amounts that they send every few months. Mehmet makes sure he sends 
money each month: “I have a house in Karaman. [My wife] lives there with my 3 
sons and 2 daughters. I take care of them financially. (…) [I send] around 350 euros 
each month.” However, some investment migrants do not remit at all. Although 
these save large shares of their income, they choose to guard the money themselves 
instead of sending it to their home country. The migrants who save instead of remit 
are often without a partner and children. They save for their own business projects 
or in order to finance a future wedding. Whether investment migrants send money 
to the country of origin or save it, in the end all this money is invested there. This 
means that either way, investment migrants are very much engaged in economic 
transnational activities.  
 Settlement migrants normally prioritize their own financial situation and 
remit much smaller shares of their incomes than investment migrants do. As they 
want to build their lives in the destination country, they need money to do so. 
Moreover, because settlement migrants have often brought their closest relatives 
over, they are usually not financially responsible for family members back home. As 
they only have their parents or extended family in the origin country, they usually 
hold no financial responsibilities for them and only have to support them 
occasionally or in case of special needs. When I asked Isidora if she sends money 
home, she responded: “A little. They [my parents] are old so I send a little bit of 
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money. And my father is ill so I send a little money for that. (…) It is impossible to 
send more money because I have four children who make expenses. And we have to 
pay the rent and now that the children are studying they need internet so I have to 
pay the rent and the internet, the electricity, so the costs are high.” It is clear that 
Isidora does not work to support family in Ecuador, but to support her family life in 
Belgium. This does not mean that she does not remit at all, but she remits a much 
smaller share of her income than investment migrants do.  
Although some do not remit at all, most settlement migrants send small sums 
of money on an irregular basis; usually in case of special needs that come up in the 
country of origin. The amounts they send normally remain under 1,000 euros per 
year. However, a few of my respondents with settlement aspirations have such 
financial obligations in their country of origin that they remit much more than that. 
These settlement migrants are normally on their own in the destination country and 
work to provide for their family in the origin country. In fact, they are settlement 
migrants, because they are able to support their families through their stay in the 
receiving society. Recall Arda who was quoted in chapter 5 saying: “I don’t have any 
choice. I stay here to send money to my family. I can work all year round here, in 
Turkey I only work a few months a year.” These are the migrants who have settled 
down in the Low Countries so that they can provide for their families back home. 
They remit smaller shares of their income than investment migrants do because the 
length of their stay does not allow for spartan lifestyles to be endured. Nevertheless, 
they remit a lot more than the other settlement migrants do: between 2,000 and 4,000 
euros annually.  
Contrastingly, legalization migrants hardly send any money to their 
countries of origin. As they do not work much they have little money to remit. 
Efunsegun for example responded to my question of whether he sends money to 
Nigeria with: “No! I am not working, what money do I have to send?” Likewise, 
Fasila responded: “this is not possible now because I do not have any income.” 
Although their relatives in the origin country may have a strong need for additional 
income, legalization migrants feel that they have to get their legalization in order 
before they are in the capacity to help their family. René for example says: “Actually 
I am responsible for my family but I do not have the financial means to support 
them.” Legalization migrants worry about their own needs first. Alexandre for 
example says: “Money, I don’t have any money. It costs 1,200 euros to bring [my 
son] here nowadays. But even if someone would give me 1,000 euros now, I choose 
to pay the rent two months ahead you know.” The incomes of legalization migrants 
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are too low in relation to their costs to allow them to send surplus income to the 
country of origin.  
However, the fact that they do not work and consequently have little money 
to send home is not the only reason why legalization migrants normally do not 
remit. Legalization migrants often do not have any financial responsibility towards 
people in the home country. Mehdi for example says: “No [I don’t remit] because 
there aren’t any family members that I am financially responsible for, neither here 
nor in Morocco.” Likewise, Kiril says: “The only family I have left in Bulgaria is my 
mother and she lives from her old age pension. I don’t send any money to Bulgaria, I 
just take care of my family here.” And Rakesh responded: “[money] is no problem. I 
have good land, crops and everything, with a big house, no problem.” Since the 
migration of legalization migrants has often not been economically inspired, they do 
not have financial obligations, as investment migrants or settlement migrants can 
have. Their migration is often the result of political conflict. In other cases, it 
involves young men who were unemployed in their home country who migrated to 
find a better future for themselves and not because family incomes needed to be 
supplemented. They are busy trying to find someone to marry and devote their 
limited resources towards achieving this aim.  
In a few cases, money even flows in the opposite direction. Some legalization 
migrants come from rich families and therefore do not send money to the country of 
origin; instead their family members there send money to them. This financial 
support enables them to pay their expenses, while they wait for the outcomes of 
their procedures. However, as procedures may take very long and the Low 
Countries are expensive countries to live in, their families cannot supply financial 
aid for long. Rasja for example says: “Before my family used to send money to me. 
But in my country [Syria], look things are really expensive here, 1,000 euros is 
nothing here, 1,000 euros is the rent for less than three months but in my country a 
thousand euros is a lot of money. Way too much you understand that is why [they 
can’t continue to send money].” Only a few of my respondents have occasionally 
been supported by their families back home and are thus responsible for a small and 
temporary inverted financial flow. Others indicated that although they could ask 
their family for financial support, they are too ashamed to do so.  
All in all, the extent to which irregular migrants engage in economic 
transnational activities and the way in which they do it partly depend on their 
aspirations. Whereas investment migrants save large shares of their incomes to 
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either remit or to guard themselves, settlement migrants usually send smaller sums 
of money home, except for those whose partner and children (still) live in the home 
country. Of all three categories, legalization migrants remit the least. In the next 
section we will see how aspirations and irregular migrants’ social transnational 
activities are related.  
8.3 SOCIAL TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
Because investment migrants want to return they are socially oriented towards their 
country of origin, and they invest time and energy in maintaining the social relations 
with their relatives and friends back home. They feel that their lives take place there 
instead of in the receiving society. They therefore make efforts to keep up to date 
and to keep in touch when they can. When asked how often they contact family or 
friends in their country of origin, investment migrants respond with answers like: “I 
call and sms my wife every day” (Sercan) or “[I call my family] every weekend and 
normally I call friends as well” (Sofia). Most investment migrants call their friends 
and family members at least a few times per week and keep a minimum frequency 
of once a week. 
Because investment migrants do not have a vivid social life in the receiving 
society and because they cannot actively take part in social life back home, many 
investment migrants mention how much they miss their friends and families. Tümer 
for example says: “I don’t have any difficulties, I just miss my family. As soon as I 
have enough money saved I go back.” And Elin says: “I miss my wife and children 
very much. Last month my granddaughter was born and I haven’t been able to see 
her yet. As soon as my savings are in order I go back.” The contacts they have with 
their spouse, children and other loved ones make them want to come home even 
faster, and this inspires them to work harder towards that goal.  
Contrastingly, ‘home’ for settlement migrants is the receiving society. They 
call their relatives a lot less than investment migrants do: only once or twice a 
month. Antonia tells how she calls her parents less often now that she has settled 
down and brought her children over and now that her sisters all reside in Belgium 
as well: “Before I always called my mother and father every week but now I don’t do 
that anymore.” Settlement migrants want to build their futures in the Low 
Countries. They therefore do not feel the need to be in touch with the home country 
as often as investment migrants do.  
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While most settlement migrants keep a habit of contacting their family and 
friends at least once a month, a few respondents with settlement aspirations do not 
have any contact with the home country at all. Over the course of their stay in the 
Low Countries, they have broken all ties to family or friends in the country of origin. 
Adil for example says: “I haven’t called in almost four years. Four years yes. I didn’t 
feel like it. If you don’t have money or work, no future. And if I call now my family 
will say ‘why haven’t you called?’ Normally I called every week or every month but 
now I haven’t called in almost four years.” Adil has not contacted his relatives 
because he is ashamed to say that he does not have work and that he lives in the 
streets. 
Whereas some settlement migrants lose contact with their relatives back 
home over the course of their stay, legalization migrants sometimes do not have 
transnational social contacts from the outset. Because legalization migrants have 
often sought security from political persecution or war, keeping in touch with 
friends and family in countries that have been severely disrupted by war can be a 
difficult thing. Dnari says: “I do not have contact with anyone. Seven years. I do still 
have a brother but I don’t know where he is. I don’t know if he is alive or not. I don’t 
have any idea. I try to build a life here now for myself, we forget about the past.” 
Likewise, Kalusha says: “I don’t know where my family is staying. I am trying to get 
contact with friends who have helped me but it is not working.” The difficulties 
some legalization migrants experience in contacting friends and family also help to 
explain why many legalization migrants do not remit.  
 Even if they do know how to locate their family members, some legalization 
migrants are afraid that contacting their relatives might bring them into danger, as is 
expressed by Lazzat: “It is very dangerous [to call relatives in Uzbekistan]. If they 
would know that I am here then they might get problems and not me, and I don’t 
want that you know. (…) I have three sisters (…) I have contact with one now 
because she lives in Russia. (…) Russia is safe, she works in Moscow.” Clearly, for 
some legalization migrants, the political situation in their country of origin 
complicates the maintenance of social contacts.  
Whereas it can be practically impossible for some legalization migrants to 
keep in touch, those for whom it is possible to reach people in the origin country 
often face other barriers to maintaining transnational social contacts, which are 
connected to their aspirations. Relatives back home often do not understand the 
hardships irregular migrants go through in their efforts to become legalized. Tarek 
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for example says: “Yeah I call my mother sometimes so that she doesn’t worry. I 
would like to have contact more often but then they say ‘oh you don’t have papers 
yet, you are not trying hard enough, or what are you doing there.’ It is difficult to 
talk and to explain the situation.” Families have sometimes invested money into the 
migration plans of their relatives and do not like to see these fail. Furthermore, they 
either do not know about the requirement of papers, or they do not accurately assess 
the chances migrants have of becoming legalized. Their family members wonder 
why they do not receive any remittances, and in case legalization migrants try to 
explain that it is not so easy in Europe they are sometimes accused of lying because 
migrants before them have been successful. These misunderstandings can lead to 
arguments as Tarek explained, and in case family members do understand, the 
stakes are often so high that they encourage legalization migrants to keep on 
fighting. Enfunsegun for example says: “I call them sometimes, maybe once or twice 
in a month. Sometimes they call me, but normally I call them. I always tell them 
about my feelings in Europe. (…) they encourage me, they say that I am the eldest 
son of the family, that I have to continue struggling, and one of these days God will 
see me through.” Instead of providing emotional support, the telephone calls home 
lead to increased stress which makes these migrants call home less than they would 
like. In addition, these contacts strengthen their aspirations to become legalized.  
Next to the social contacts migrants maintain with the country of origin, 
another issue that is frequently brought up in connection with social transnational 
activities is the extent to which migrants keep up to date on things that happen in 
their home country. Therefore, respondents were also asked if they watch television, 
read news papers, look on the internet or if they have other ways of following what 
happens in their home country. Investment migrants have little time to follow the 
news or to read newspapers. Moreover, they are often unwilling to invest in 
expensive satellite TV installations. After all, they are only in the Low Countries on a 
temporary basis, and such subscriptions cost a lot of money. When they are 
unemployed they watch TV or read newspapers in teahouses where they wait for 
new jobs. Investment migrants do very much want to keep updated on the latest 
developments in their home country, but they mostly only keep up to date through 
their conversations with friends and relatives over the phone as they find other 
means too expensive.  
While investment migrants are keen to keep up to date with the situation in 
their country of origin, settlement migrants care a lot less. Lucas for example says: 
“No we don’t have news from Chile. Despite of the fact that there is news on the 
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internet and in newspapers, I don’t do it a lot.” Lucas finds it too much trouble to go 
to an internet cafe in another neighborhood which indicates that he does not have 
the urge to be updated on the latest news from his origin country. While settlement 
migrants are interested in the lives of their relatives and friends and developments 
in the local communities where these live, they do not make much effort to follow 
the latest news concerning their country of origin in general. Instead, they look for a 
sense of home in the receiving society by visiting the activities organized by socio-
cultural organizations and other social gatherings.  
 In contrast to settlement migrants, legalization migrants are usually very 
keen on keeping up to date on the latest developments. Lazzat for example says: 
“Ever since I fled I follow what happens in Uzbekistan every day, and the situation 
keeps getting worse and worse. (…) [I follow it] through the internet. Everything via 
the internet. On television here in Europe you see little, practically nothing.” 
Although legalization migrants have little money because they do not work much, 
they often do have satellite television and they find ways to surf the internet. Rasja 
who was several months overdue with the rent and about to be evicted by her 
landlord proudly said to me: “Yes of course, we have satellite television, we watch 
Al Jazeera.”. This urge to keep up to date is obviously related to the fact that they 
have fled their country when it was in a bad situation, and they want to know if it 
improves. After all, they often have relatives and friends there whose lives might be 
in danger. Furthermore, while they seek legalization in the Low Countries because 
of the bad situation in their country of origin, some hope that they might be able to 
return one day in case the situation improves there. Kalusha for example says”: “as 
soon as there is peace again in Congo I want to go back. My family is there and I 
want to be with them and I lived well there.” 
 Apart from social contacts and the extent to which migrants keep up to date 
on developments in their country of origin, research normally considers visits to the 
country of origin an indicator for social transnational activities (Smith 2006). 
Obviously, visiting their home country involves crossing national borders, and this 
is complicated for many irregular migrants. However, for investment migrants this 
is not a criterion because they clearly do not want to pay visits to their home 
countries, without regard to the difficulties involved. Mehmet for example answers 
the question of whether he visits his country of origin with: “No because I will only 
go back once I have earned enough money.” And Illian answers: “No because I 
haven’t saved enough money yet.” Clearly, they want to work and make money to 
go back for good and preferably not to come back again.  
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Contrastingly, most settlement migrants very much like to visit their home 
countries, and those who are able to also do this. They occasionally pay family visits 
and go back to attend important family weddings. For Eastern Europeans it is 
relatively easy to travel back and forth since border authorities do not usually stamp 
passports, and the costs of travel are relatively low. For those whose journey 
involves flying it is generally more difficult and more expensive to pay family visits. 
Those who do not have visa restrictions have to buy a new stamp-free passport 
during their visit. Because of the high costs attached to flying and buying a new 
passport, only few of my respondents have done so. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that they have not seen their family and friends since they left their 
country of origin. The lack of visa restrictions makes it possible for their friends and 
family to come to the Low Countries. A few of my respondents with settlement 
aspirations told me how their relatives have come to the Low Countries on a holiday 
to pay them a visit.  
Settlement migrants who do face visa restrictions have to buy false papers or 
find and pay smugglers that can take them across the borders. This is a cost and a 
risk that none of my respondents has been willing to take. Although these settlement 
migrants sometimes want to visit their home country, they have too many obstacles 
to do so in practice. For some of them, their urge to see family and friends becomes 
so great that is develops into a reason to shift to legalization aspirations after a 
while. After all, only through legalization can they possibly visit their family and 
come back to the Low Countries again.  
Although most settlement migrants would like to visit their home country, 
there are also a few who do not feel any urge to go there. But their reasons for not 
wanting to visit the home country are very different from the reasons of investment 
migrants. Tellingly, the answer of settlement migrant Mustafa to the question of 
whether he visits his home country is different from the answers of investment 
migrants quoted earlier: “No because I live in Belgium now. I have nothing to go 
back to except for my father.” While the investment migrants stressed they only 
wanted to return once they have earned enough money, Mustafa focuses on his 
choice for settlement in Belgium in explaining why he does not want to visit his 
home country.  
In contrast to settlement migrants who sometimes visit their country of 
origin, none of my respondents with legalization aspirations has paid their country 
of origin a visit. After all, not only do they face the same barriers to travel the other 
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irregular migrants face, their desire to become legalized is often connected to their 
fear of going back because of safety issues. In addition, those who come from safer 
countries are afraid that temporarily leaving the country in which they have a 
running application might do damage to the outcome of this application.  
All in all, it has become clear that aspirations play a role in shaping different 
kinds of social transnational activities. The frame of reference of investment 
migrants is in the home country which is why they call, sms or internet with their 
loved ones almost on a daily basis. For settlement migrants, ‘home’ is the receiving 
society which is why they are focused on their social lives there. They mostly only 
maintain personal contacts to the country of origin; they do not normally follow the 
latest news. Legalization migrants on the other hand do follow the news, but have 
not managed or only moderately manage to maintain many social contacts in their 
country of origin. When their personal contacts to the country of origin have not 
been complicated because of political conditions, contacts are often frustrated 
because people back home do not understand the struggles they go through in their 
attempts to become legalized. Settlement migrants are the only irregular migrants to 
visit the country of origin in the event obstacles are not too high.  
8.4 POLITICAL TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
None of my respondents with investment aspirations is engaged in political 
transnational activities. More specifically, they indicated that they did not take part 
in demonstrations concerning their home country and that they did not participate 
in politically inspired activities. Sometimes they even admitted that they did not 
follow what was going on in politics in their home country at all. Diego for example 
says: “Look, if I am honest, I am outside of all, of politics.” Diego is here to work, 
and he does not want to spend his time on other things than work if they do not 
bring the attainment of his aspirations any closer. Furthermore, as indicated in 
chapter 5, investment migrants usually come from countries where there is some 
investment potential. These are therefore normally not countries that are afflicted by 
war or political strife, and irregular migrants may not feel the need to have up to 
date knowledge.  
Settlement migrants are also not very politically active. When I talked about 
their political engagement with Fernanda and Camilla, Fernanda for example said: 
“when my brothers call me they inform me but not like, I ask very little about 
politics personally.” And then Camilla said: “I don’t even know who the president 
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of Ecuador is, I don’t know.” These two migrants are focused on their lives in 
Belgium. Furthermore, they care about their family and friends back home, but not 
about the political situation in their country. This lack of political interest is reflected 
in the activities the organizations of settlement migrants organize. These activities 
focus on transferring their cultural heritage to their children and on increasing social 
solidarity in the receiving society, rather than discussing the political situation of the 
home country. Although political issues may come up in private conversations, 
settlement migrants generally do not participate in political activities concerning 
their country of origin.  
In contrast to investment and settlement migrants, legalization migrants are 
often engaged in political transnational activities. Maboula for example responded 
in reaction to the question of whether he engages in political activities that concern 
his country of origin: “Yes, when people ask me to demonstrate in the streets against 
certain things that concern my country yes I do that.” Likewise, Kiyiaki says: “Yes I 
am very active, I participate in every demonstration.” In the same line, Lazzat 
explains how politically engaged he is:  
Ever since I came here I have been very active with the Uyghur people, 
I have been very active for the future of the Uyghurs. We want our 
country to be independent, we want our country back. (...) We do 
political activities like for example each year we do a demonstration at 
the Chinese embassy in remembrance of the uprising that took place in 
a Uyghur city in 1997.  
Some legalization migrants have even indicated that they are (still) members of 
political parties in their country of origin.  
In fact, many legalization migrants have these specific aspirations to become 
legalized because of the political problems in their country of origin. Bloch (2008: 
301) similarly noted that the participation in political activities of his respondents 
(both regular and irregular migrants) is “related to the main motivation for 
migration: those who left Zimbabwe for political reasons were most likely to engage 
in diasporic political activities.”(Bloch 2008: 301) The political issues in their country 
often formed the reasons for their flight, and, more importantly, they make 
legalization migrants afraid to go back. As they believe they cannot go back, they 
aspire to start a new life elsewhere and hence aspire to legalization. They want to 
become legalized because they feel they have no other place to go. Lazzat explains 
that he is engaged in political transnational activities because he feels he does not 
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have a home country anymore. After he has been refused by both Uzbekistan and 
Belgium, he feels landless and wants to try his chances not only in Belgium, but also 
in his native Uyghur land: 
I don’t have anything to do with politics but to live like this and not be 
welcome anywhere, I am fed up with this. I just fight my own battle 
for independence of our own country. Even though there is little 
chance that we will get it there is hope. Maybe it will work. Maybe 
such a large country will fall apart like the Soviet regime has. Maybe 
this will happen in China as well. And then we can have our own 
country, and Tibet as well. Then we will go back and build our 
country. 
The political activities legalization migrants engage in are usually coordinated 
through migrant organizations. The organizations not only devote attention to 
improving the political situation in the origin country, but they also look out for the 
well-being of those who live in the destination country. Albert explains the twofold 
mission of the organization he belongs to:  
Here in Belgium I am a member of…there are Congolese who have 
started an organization like [name of NGO] which is called the 
Congolese liga. It is like [names of two organizations] and I am a 
member there. They do manifestations, organize debates, they invite 
people to talk, like for example about the way people without papers 
live here in Belgium, and for example we have invited someone who 
comes to talk about Congo, about the time of Mubutu, the time of 
Kabila.”  
While settlement migrants create and become members of organizations that focus 
on social solidarity and culture, legalization migrants seek out the organizations that 
are active in the political arena. These organizations can focus on political 
transnational activities concerning the country of origin, but they can also be about 
problems the migrants in question face in the destination country. Some of these 
organizations for example try to improve the situation of irregular migrants, and 
they inform all migrants about their rights and obligations.  
Mascini et al. (2009) have indicated that transnationalism is by no means self-
evident among migrants who have sought to escape conflict. Likewise, I found that 
whereas many legalization migrants who are involved in procedures are engaged in 
political transnational activities, there are also some who choose not to be. They have 
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often completely closed the door on ever returning to their country of origin, or the 
problems in their origin countries are not considered that urgent (anymore). They 
find their own day-to-day problems already too big of a worry to exert themselves 
for yet another cause. As Tarek says: “I like politics but I have never been a member 
of a political party. (…) you know, you can’t be a member of an organization if you 
have a problem that is more important than that.” 
It has been suggested that irregular migrants’ membership and participation 
in political activities of organizations are instrumentally motivated (Pasura 2008). By 
bringing the problems in their home country to the forefront, they hope that the 
chances of legalization increase. Their instrumental motivation is also indicated by 
the finding that irregular migrants participate actively, but once they become 
legalized they often cease all these activities. Although my findings do point in the 
same direction, they also remain suggestions. This suggestion of an instrumental 
motivation for political transnational activities does help to understand why 
legalization migrants involved in procedures tend to engage in political 
transnational activities and why legalization migrants who aim to get married 
usually do not.  
8.5 SHIFTS IN ASPIRATIONS 
Above I have demonstrated that the transnational activities irregular migrants 
engage in can be understood from their aspirations. Obviously, the results presented 
here represent a simplified ideal-typical picture and do not do justice to all empirical 
diversity. Furthermore, as the aspirations of irregular migrants may change over 
time respondents sometimes found themselves in between ideal-typical positions. 
What is important here is that if irregular migrants’ aspirations change, their 
transnational activities are likely to change with them.  
Antonia for example explained how her remittance behavior changed once 
she brought her two sons over and decided to settle down: “Before I sent a lot, [I 
sent] all I had. I was very generous. But right now I don’t do that anymore. (…) 
before I sent money to keep it there but now I think it is better to keep it here. 
Because always if something happened I had to say give me this. (…) I think it is 
better to keep the little money I have saved here and not in Ecuador.” Antonia’s 
account indicates that she wants to be in control of her own money. In case sudden 
needs arise for her or her family in Belgium, they have to be taken care of. She sends 
a little money to her parents, and she lets her brothers keep the rent that she gets for 
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her house in Ecuador. When she had investment aspirations she remitted all that she 
could, but because her aspirations changed she now keeps her savings for herself 
and for her future. That migrants are inclined to remit less if they change aspirations 
and decide to settle down has been noted in other research as well. Massey et al. 
(1987: 207) for example observe that “a sure sign that a settlement process in under 
way occurs when migrants send fewer earnings back home and spend more in the 
United States.”  
If aspirations change the social transnational activities irregular migrants 
engage in change as well. Recall Antonia who not only explained that she remits less 
now that she has settled down, but who also said she does not call her parents every 
week anymore. The same applies to political activities. Lazzat for example explained 
to me that he was contemplating whether to file another asylum or regularization 
case or whether he should start to look for a job and forget about his political 
engagements.  
8.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that the types of transnationalism irregular 
migrants engage in and the extent to which they are active can be understood from 
the aspirations they have. The figure below indicates which types of transnational 
activities irregular migrants with different types of aspirations engage in: 
Figure 8.1 Transnational activities per type of aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Transnational 
activities 
    
Economic Very active Occasionally Little to none Little to none 
Social 
Many personal 
contacts 
Some personal 
contacts and 
receiving society 
High 
involvement, TV, 
papers, internet 
Personal contacts 
and receiving 
society 
Political No activities No activities Some activities No activities 
 
Investment migrants engage a lot in economic transnational activities, whereas 
settlement migrants spend a greater share of their incomes in the receiving society 
and send fewer remittances home. The frame of reference of investment migrants is 
in the home country which is why they call, sms or internet with their loved ones 
  Aspirations and Transnational Activities 
175 
almost on a daily basis. They keep up to date on what happens in the country of 
origin through these contacts. Settlement migrants on the contrary are focused on 
their social lives in the receiving society. They mostly just maintain personal contacts 
and do not normally follow the latest news from the country of origin. Legalization 
migrants appear to be the only category that engages in political transnational 
activities. Although not all legalization migrants engage in political activities, for 
those who do this seems to be closely connected to their aspirations.  
In the literature on immigrant transnationalism it is noted that transnational 
activities are not common. Portes (2003: 877) for example writes that “subsequent 
research has indicated that regular involvement in transnational activities 
characterizes only a minority of immigrants and that even occasional involvement is 
not a universal practice.” And Waldinger (2008: 24) finds that “transnationalism is a 
rare condition of being and transmigrants are an uncommon class of persons.” 
Furthermore, as indicated in the introduction of this chapter, irregular migrants are 
expected to engage in transnational activities least of all because of the obstacles they 
face (cf. Portes et al. 2007). Portes (2001: 189) for example found that “immigrant 
transnationalism is associated with a more secure economic and legal status in the 
host country.” Likewise Bloch (2008: 302) claims that “structural exclusions based on 
immigration status” adversely affect transnational capabilities. However, I have 
found that many of my respondents quite frequently engage in transnational 
activities. In addition, I found that in spite of the limitations they face, irregular 
migrants manage to find ways to engage in those types of activities that are 
important to them. In fact, investment migrants prioritize their economic 
transnational engagements over their own well-being in the receiving society. 
Hence, the aspirations irregular migrants have underlie the transnational activities 
they undertake.  
Furthermore, I found that in those cases in which my respondents were not 
transnationally active, this is not necessarily because of the limitations they 
experience, but rather often stems from choice. This flies in the face of the implicit 
assumption that underlies much research that as migrants earn more they will 
engage more in transnational activities (see for example Bloch 2008). In the case that 
settlement migrants earn more, they do not necessarily remit more. Instead, they 
mostly choose to spend their extra earnings on their own family in the receiving 
society. In addition, increasing income will most likely not make legalization 
migrants remit more but actually work less. Only investment migrants increase their 
economic transnational activities if they earn more.  
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Whereas there may seem to be a logical relationship between migrants´ 
economic positions and their propensity to engage in economic transnational 
activities, this is even less obvious for social and political transnationalism. Whereas 
it does cost money to make telephone calls and to participate in political activity, my 
respondents hardly mentioned these as reasons for their lack of or infrequent 
activity. Furthermore, an investment migrant from Turkey calls home more often 
than an investment migrant from Chile – because of the costs involved - but the 
latter makes calls more frequently than his co-nationals with settlement aspirations. 
Whereas factors such as cost may somewhat affect the frequency of specific 
activities, they do not match the impact of aspirations in shaping transnational 
activities.  
Scholars have been busy trying to find out if the general relationship between 
incorporation and transnationalism is of a positive or a negative nature. Some find 
that incorporation weakens transnational participation, and others find that it does 
not (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002). A huge step forward has been taken by 
recognizing that in order to make statements about this relationship, a 
differentiation needs to be made among economic, social and political activities, as 
the relationship works differently for distinct types of activities (Snel et al. 2006). Yet 
while researchers worry about the relationship between incorporation and 
transnationalism, they overlook the fact that both are rooted in aspirations. Studies 
have advanced by distinguishing between different types of transnational activity, 
but they also need to contextualize on the side of agency of the migrants to properly 
understand why migrants do or do not engage in certain types of transnational 
activities (cf. Al-Ali 2002). Future research on transnationalism can therefore 
significantly benefit from taking aspirations into account as well.  
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CHAPTER 9 
STRIVING FOR A BETTER POSITION: 
ASPIRATIONS AND THE ROLE OF 
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
As argued in chapter two, one should take care not to regard irregular migrants as 
mere ‘victims’. Although irregular migrants do obviously experience limitations, a 
‘victim perspective’ can obstruct our understanding of the ways they manage to 
improve their situation or realize their aspirations (see also Devillé 2006; 
Paspalanova 2006; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). In this chapter, an answer is sought to 
the third research question: What forms of capital do irregular migrants need to 
realize their aspirations? The realization of their aspirations is closely connected to 
the extent to which they are able to mobilize and enforce resources like social, 
cultural or economic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1986). Numerous studies have explored 
the significance of different forms of capital for irregular migrants. Their findings are 
worthwhile, yet ambiguous.  
Many studies find that social capital is of paramount importance to irregular 
migrants (Adam et al. 2002; Alguilera and Massey 2003; Chavez [1992]1998; 
Engbersen 1996; Engbersen 1999b; Engbersen 2001; Engbersen et al. 2006; Hagan 
1998; Iosifides et al. 2007; Jordan and Düvell 2002; Massey et al. 1994; Staring 2003; 
Van der Leun 2004). Other researchers tone down the significance of social capital 
(Collyer 2005; Cranford 2005; Kyle 2000; Mahler 1995; Paspalanova 2006) or argue 
that its importance has diminished in favor of cultural capital. The latter argument is 
put forward by Grzymala-Kazlowska (2005: 694), who asserts that “cultural capital 
(especially knowledge of foreign languages) has become a major factor determining 
the position of individuals and the entire group in the market, whereas social capital 
has lost its crucial significance.” A similar report emerges from the Italian literature 
on the bandante, the mostly Eastern European attendant of children and 
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grandparents. Those who master the Italian language and have familiarized 
themselves with customary Italian family rituals, benefit from these skills and are 
generally better off than those who lack such cultural proficiencies (Colombo 2007; 
Lyon, 2006). However, other studies indicate that cultural capital avails irregular 
migrants hardly at all, because their educational levels do not correspond to the 
work that they do (Engbersen 2001; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004; Van der Leun 
and Kloosterman 2006; Mahler 1995; Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009).  
Some of this ambiguity in research findings has to do with the fact that 
different researchers use distinct definitions of their main concepts. Whereas some 
scholars define cultural capital as knowledge of foreign languages, others take 
educational levels as a starting point. Moreover, different perspectives are applied 
with regard to irregular migrants’ aspirations: whereas one study deals with 
economic success (e.g. Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005), another emphasizes acquiring a 
legal status (e.g. Hagan 1998). This would be a minor problem were it not that 
scholars try to make statements about the significance of different forms of capital 
for irregular migrants in general. For example, whereas Engbersen et al. (2006: 223) 
write that social capital is “the most important currency for irregular migrants,” 
Grzymala-Kazlowska (2005) claims that cultural capital has become decisive.  
In this chapter, it is argued that a discussion of the significance of capital 
forms for irregular migrants in general does not lend itself to the development of 
theoretical insights. To shed light on the question of which forms of capital are 
beneficial to irregular migrants, we have to consider for what reasons these are 
deployed. After all, whether or not a form of capital is beneficial for migrants who 
strive for legalization is a different discussion than a debate on the significance of 
capital forms for migrants who try to realize economically inspired aspirations. 
Hence, instead of determining the most important form of capital for irregular 
migrants in general, it is more fruitful to analyze what makes one form of capital 
vital in one situation and a different form of capital decisive in another. As the 
deployment of capital is instrumental – that is, oriented toward the attainment of a 
certain goal (Portes 2000; 1998) – my analysis is focused on the relevance of different 
forms of capital for irregular migrants with different aspirations. The question that is 
central to this analysis is what forms of capital do irregular migrants need to realize 
their aspirations? In order to avoid the conceptual confusion mentioned above, I first 
elucidate the concepts used in this study before moving on to the analysis.  
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9.2 FORMS OF CAPITAL 
Over sixteen different forms of capital have been distinguished in academic 
literature, ranging from emotional to digital (Svendsen and Svendsen 2003). The 
focus of this literature is usually on one specific form of capital without reference to 
its connections to other forms of capital. This means that a consistent theoretical 
framework is often lacking. As Bourdieu’s understanding of forms of capital can be 
seen as an attempt to construct such a framework (cf. Anheier et al. 1995; Svendsen 
and Svendsen 2003), I take his analysis (Bourdieu 1986) as a starting point.  
One of the basic assumptions in his analysis is that capital is unequally 
distributed among individuals (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), thereby determining 
the chances of success of an individual’s actions (Svendsen and Svendsen 2003). The 
instrumental use of capital by individuals is central to Bourdieu’s work (Lebaron 
2003; Portes 2000). In his analysis, he distinguishes economic, cultural, and social 
capital.  
Economic capital “is immediately and directly convertible into money” 
(Bourdieu 1986: 243). Irregular migrants who possess economic capital could for 
instance benefit from it by using it to acquire false papers so that they can access the 
formal labor market, or they could deploy it in the arrangements for a (bogus) 
marriage in order to legalize their status.  
With regard to cultural capital, I aim to determine if ‘incorporated’ cultural 
capital – long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body – benefits irregular 
migrants. Therefore, respondents were asked about their educational level, 
profession, work experience, and language skills. These cultural competences derive 
scarcity value from their position in the distribution of cultural capital and are 
consequently likely to yield profits to my respondents (Bourdieu 1986). This 
definition of cultural capital consequently resembles what is sometimes labeled 
human capital (Becker 1964). However, for purposes of consistency, I refer to it only 
as cultural capital.  
Bourdieu (1986: 249) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” The 
amount of social capital possessed by an individual “depends on the size of the 
network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital 
possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.”  
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Research demonstrates how social networks not only include individuals, but 
implicitly exclude as well (Tilly 1990; Komter 2004). Furthermore, within social 
networks, rules of reciprocity apply. An individual who fails to return a favor can 
get excluded from social networks. Moreover, an internal hierarchy of power and 
social stratification characterizes social networks, which causes rivalry and forms of 
exploitation to arise (Cranford 2005; Mahler 1995). As a result, the way in which 
social capital operates is equivocal, rendering the size of an individual’s network or 
the strength of its ties irrelevant to the outcomes. Therefore, I have not studied the 
networks of irregular migrants, but the instances in which their social capital has 
actually been activated. For this purpose, respondents were asked in which cases 
and in what manner people in their personal networks have aided them.  
As indicated in chapter two, social capital can be subdivided into social 
leverage and social support (Briggs 1998; Domínguez and Watkins 2003; Kleinhans 
et al. 2007). Social support is a resource that is usually created in the strong social ties 
between family members, close friends and members of ethnic groups. These strong 
ties are a major source of emotional and material support, allowing individuals who 
can mobilize them to ‘get by’ and ‘cope’. Social leverage is normally mobilized from 
the weak social ties between individuals, such as friends of friends or indirect 
acquaintances. This form of social capital helps migrants to ‘get ahead’, to change 
their opportunity structure through access to resources in social circles other than 
their own. 
9.3 REQUIRED FORMS OF CAPITAL FOR REALIZATION OF 
ASPIRATIONS 
9.3.1 Investment aspirations 
For investment migrants, having arranged for work and lodging prior to their actual 
migration proves very helpful in realizing their aspirations. Hakan for example 
arranged his job in Belgium while he was still in Turkey. Hakan’s friend, who had 
worked in Europe before, said he was going to Belgium to work in construction for a 
man that he knew from a prior stay. This friend said the man needed an additional 
skilled employee and asked Hakan to come with him. Hakan accepted the offer, and 
his future employer arranged for him to be picked up from Istanbul and taken to 
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Ghent, where he now earns 1200 euros a month. Likewise, Servet benefitted from the 
contacts he had in the destination country and arranged for a job before he migrated: 
I contacted my uncle who lives in Antwerp. He told me about 
employment here in Belgium for construction painters who work for 
private households. It seemed like a fairytale to me. I told him that I 
was very interested in a trip to Belgium and asked him what the 
possibilities were. (...) After a while he contacted me and made sure I 
could come to Belgium.  
Like Hakan and Servet, successful investment migrants are often doing the same 
kind of work in the Low Countries as they did in their country of origin. Likewise, 
Musa is able to profit from his skills in the Low Countries: 
An acquaintance of mine is from Ghent and his son owns a 
hairdresser’s shop in Ghent and he was looking for an employee who 
knows his job. (…) He called his son, he agreed and they consequently 
arranged a visa for me to come to Belgium. (…) They know me well 
and they know that (…) I am good at my job. I needed them and they 
needed me.  
Because of their professional experience these successful investment migrants are 
able to make job arrangements before they migrate and therefore manage to find 
jobs that match their own capacities (cf. Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Staring 2001). 
These migrants therefore enjoy relatively good bargaining positions and are 
consequently relatively well paid. They are not easily exchangeable for other 
irregular migrants because their skills are needed. As Musa said: “I needed them 
and they needed me.” So some investment migrants who had for example been 
working as hairdressers, bakers or construction workers in their country of origin 
were doing the same type of work in the Low Countries, owing to their specific 
professional skills.  
Sometimes they were even invited to come to Belgium because of their skills, 
as was the case with Göksel. He was working as a singer in Turkey. In 2002, a good 
friend called him and asked if he would like to become the new singer with his band 
in Belgium. This friend said he had always been impressed with Göksel’s voice. He 
said he would earn considerably more money in Belgium than in Turkey and that he 
would fit in perfectly with the band. Because Göksel had always dreamt about 
publishing his own CD, and this could be a quick way of realizing that dream, he 
agreed. Until he has saved the required sum for the CD he will continue to sing in 
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Belgium at weddings, engagement parties, openings, and circumcision parties in the 
Turkish community. He is the only person in the band without legal residence, but 
his salary equals that of the other band members. Semih was also invited to come to 
Belgium and start a business together with his brother. He says: “My brother 
borrowed money from the bank to start a shop, which he had already done before I 
arrived. I have job experience, I know how to fit up a shop and how to run it. He 
does the administration and I am in the shop to sell things and maintain it.”  
Such investment migrants were able to arrange their jobs prior to their 
migration because of their job competencies. They were able to make use of a 
specific form of cultural capital because family, friends or acquaintances acted as 
mediators. These successful investment migrants have proved able to effectively use 
their cultural capital by means of their social capital. In other words, successful 
investment migrants are able to deploy a specific form of cultural capital – job 
competencies – because family, friends or acquaintances acted as mediators.  
Other successful investment migrants did not have any pre-migratory job-
arrangements, but managed to find work quickly through contractors or 
acquaintances from their own ethnic group. Chavdar explains: “Once I arrived in 
Ghent I went into a bar in which I encountered other Bulgarians. They told me 
where I could get shelter. And a few days later I had a job.” Many investment 
migrants find employment through contractors or through their well-organized 
ethnic networks. Inexperienced workers usually earn thirty euros per day, but 
Chavdar is a skilled construction worker who can do complex jobs that allow him to 
make fifty euros per day. He therefore benefits from his skills in two different ways: 
Chavdar’s job competencies not only enable him to find work, they also ensure he 
receives better pay than irregular migrants without relevant working experience.  
The work irregular migrants do is by no means necessarily of such a low-
skilled nature that employees are interchangeable: respondents with certain 
professional skills are better paid than respondents without qualifications. However, 
the value of cultural capital does not follow the same hierarchy as in the formal 
economy. Respondents who are highly educated are not able to use their 
qualifications in acquiring employment positions in the Low Countries. In this 
connection, Van der Leun and Kloosterman (1999) speak of a “legal ceiling”: 
qualifications above a certain level are hardly valuable on the informal market, 
whereas certain technical or manual skills can benefit irregular migrants because 
these skills can be marketed more easily in the informal economy (cf. Williams and 
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Windebank 1998). For investment migrants, cultural capital (job competencies below 
the legal ceiling) – which can be activated by social capital – prove decisive in 
determining the chances of success on the informal labor market in the Low 
Countries, and consequently in their aspiration attainment.  
As said before, Grzymala-Kazlowska (2005) asserts that the importance of 
cultural capital, in the sense of mastering languages, has increased in terms of the 
ability to ensure an employment position. This does not appear to be the case for 
investment migrants. None of the successful investment migrants indicated that 
mastering a Belgian language had benefited them, which is probably because they 
mostly work within their ethnic economy. Furthermore, investing in language is not 
worthwhile, because investment migrants do not mean to stay in the Low Countries. 
Economic capital also did not appear to play a major role. None of the 
investment migrants were working with false or borrowed papers; they were all 
immersed in the informal economy. However, this does not mean that economic 
capital is necessarily irrelevant. Many other scholars find that, especially on the 
heavily controlled Dutch labor market, it can be almost a necessity to have false 
papers to work with (Benseddik and Bijl 2004; Broeders 2009). Had I interviewed 
more investment migrants in the Netherlands, the relevance of economic capital 
might have increased.  
There are also investment migrants who said they remained unsuccessful in 
realizing their aspirations or who indicated they had been unsuccessful and 
therefore changed aspirations in the past. It appeared that they lacked specific work 
experience or competencies that they can assert in the Low Countries. For example, 
one of them had been selling vegetables and fruits on a cart, two of them had been 
unemployed, one had been working as a truck driver all his life, and another had 
always worked as a farmer. In the Low Countries, they depend heavily on seasonal 
labor in horticulture, cleaning work or the lowest jobs in construction. These jobs are 
usually very irregular, and remuneration does not surpass thirty euros a day for ten 
hours of work. Although my respondents were prepared to work these long hours, 
they indicated their earnings were not yet sufficient for attainment of their 
aspirations. 
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9.3.2 Settlement aspirations 
Some settlement migrants are able to build up the life they aspire to in the Low 
Countries in spite of their illegal residence status. Yilmaz for example, judges his 
illegal settlement in Belgium positively: “So far I haven’t experienced any real 
difficulties; I lead a better life than people with a residence permit. I even make more 
money than they do.” When I asked Antonia if was content with her decision to 
migrate to Belgium she responded:  
Yes I think so (…) because my children have learned Dutch, they speak 
English, they speak French, and they know many things. They know 
many things that you don’t have there [Ecuador]. Intellectual things 
everything. Here is the best future for them. (…) we have gained so 
much, many things that you can’t have there. A computer you can’t 
have it there, you can now, but if I had not come here I would not have 
gotten to know all these things. (…) the majority of the people that I 
know, the majority is doing well. They have work, they have money, 
they have mobile phones, they have cars, yes, there are many 
Ecuadorians here who don’t have papers but who have cars, and very 
nice cars too. They have it all. They have their things and people are 
very well.  
One is inclined to think that job competencies are of major importance to settlement 
migrants as these ensure a good income. However, few settlement migrants do the 
same kind of work in the Low Countries that they did in their country of origin. That 
does not mean that some have not acquired skills during their stay in the Low 
Countries that enable them to earn better wages. Vincente for example says: 
Someone who does not have experience, who does not know how to 
do the job well, earns very little. They pay a person like this very little, 
for example 20 euros per day or 30 for working the whole day and 
they do the heaviest work. I did it when I came here, because I did not 
know how to do the work here, I did the heaviest work, the hardest 
work, and I earned very little (…) you need to have experience, and if 
you don’t have it you can learn, see how others do it, buy literature so 
you can learn it.  
Whereas investment migrants do not normally have the time to acquire skills, this 
can be a good strategy for settlement migrants to gain more income. A few of my 
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respondents with settlement aspirations have managed to gain experience in 
construction work and now make good wages. However, high wages alone do not 
make settlement migrants realize their aspirations, as work with high pay cannot 
necessarily be performed on a regular basis. Moreover, settlement migrants attach 
more value to steady employment than to high hourly wages (see chapter 6, and see 
Chavez [19921998). The importance of stable work conditions is indicated by the fact 
that all successful settlement migrants have regular jobs or combine many jobs at 
once, thus guaranteeing a certain level of stability as well, even though these jobs 
bring in average pay. Successful settlement migrants do not do the lowest paying 
jobs that Vincente was referring to; neither do they get the highest salaries.  
Most of the jobs successful settlement migrants have do not require special 
skills or call for skills that can be easily acquired. For women, and sometimes for 
men as well, jobs usually involve cleaning, and for men, also painting or gardening 
work for private households or work in restaurants. These migrants have been able 
to get these jobs through acquaintances in their social network. Jobs do not usually 
come directly to settlement migrants. They have to know people who know that 
they are looking for work in order to get it. Lucas says: “Sometimes I get a call and 
someone asks me Lucas can you go to […] you want to work, do you have time? (…) 
and then I say ok I can come on Monday, I have three or four hours something like 
that then. (…) This telephone is very important. That is the first thing that you need 
to have.” 
One would be inclined to think that having a large network of acquaintances 
who can refer a migrant to a job is very important, but this is only partially true. The 
social capital available in these large networks also needs to be activated, and other 
research demonstrates that people do not just refer everyone they know to an 
employer (Cranford 2005). Having a good reputation is crucial. When I asked Diego 
if it ever happened to him that he did not refer someone to a job he knew was 
vacant, he replied: “Yes and it is not because I don’t want to, it is because, how can I 
explain, it is because I am the guarantee.” So irregular migrants do not just 
recommend each other to anyone, They have to know each other well because they 
have to bear consequences in case the worker they recommended does not live up to 
expectations: 
If I recommend someone I am certain that this person that I know 
works good and that he does not have problems. That he will not 
create problems for me or my boss, because in that case it is me who is 
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the colleague. (…) if he steals from the boss, and even if you tell this to 
the boss, then in this case even if I have done nothing, I have stolen 
nothing, he will say it is someone you know so for him you will have 
the same image as he, so it is very important that if you recommend 
someone that you know this person. Trust is very important. (Dakarai) 
In order to vouch for someone migrants have to know each other well. By vouching 
for other people irregular migrants are sometimes able to create a fairly large 
network in which they refer each other for work. When person B vouches for person 
A, and person C trusts person B, then person C is usually willing to recommend 
person A as well. This way the guarantee someone gives for another person can 
reach quite far: 
They put us in contact with another person and like that, they know us 
a little, they say well I know these people, I think they are serious and 
responsible and well, how you say it, I put my hand in fire for this 
person (…) And yes like that they help us. And this other person who 
you have just met, opens doors for you like he knows you already.  
It appears that for settlement migrants it is important to mobilize social leverage 
(Briggs 1998) from their ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973) in order to get the jobs they 
desire (cf. Yakubovich 2005). In order to be able to do so, migrants have to make sure 
they have a clean reputation. If they make a mistake the social capital that is 
potentially available in their social network will not be mobilized.  
Next to the relevance of securing stable working conditions, settlement 
migrants often point to the importance of nearby family members or close friends, 
who can support them in case of a temporary set-back. Even though their jobs can be 
regular for lengthy periods, the fact remains that they can be fired at any time. In 
times of financial stress, the proximity of friends or family members who can 
support them is what they need in order to feel secure. Most successful settlement 
migrants therefore have family in the Low Countries to whom they can turn in case 
of need. In case they do not have family, they have close friends with a residence 
permit, who are usually better able to assist than compatriots who are in an illegal 
situation as well. The assurance to be able to turn to relatives or close friends 
appears to be a necessity in order to secure independent settlement in the Low 
Countries: 
Being illegal you always depend on others, especially your family. You 
get nowhere without family, because you can’t expect to live with just 
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any person, free of charge, for a year. Being illegal you realize you 
cannot do without support. (Hassan) 
Families and close friends provide irregular migrants with social support so that 
they can ‘get by’ or cope (Briggs 1998: 178) during periods of unemployment or 
when they have little work available: 
I owe my family a lot (…) If you have work it is fine because you can 
take care of yourself then, but that is different if you don’t have money 
because you have to pay the rent and you have to eat. I have many 
relatives here who help me when I need help so I can always count on 
them. (Brahim) 
At the same time, they mobilize social leverage that helps them to acquire the steady 
employment they desire (Briggs 1998: 178). These two forms of social capital are thus 
complementary to one another; they need both to secure independent settlement. 
Social support provided by strong ties combined with social leverage acquired 
through ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973) proves decisive for settlement migrants’ 
realization of their aspirations. 
 Cultural capital in the sense of mastering the host country’s languages does 
not appear to play a major role for settlement migrants. For some jobs, such as 
babysitter or live-in maid it can be relevant. Martina for example explained to me the 
problems she had communicating with the family she worked for in Antwerp:  
So one day one of the children wanted to go out for the park. I 
explained to the eldest girl that I was taking the child to the park. I had 
understood from the mother that it was all right to take her to the park. 
So I was leaving and the girl arrived. And she said to me in French, 
you go to the park? And then the mother called me on the telephone 
saying are you leaving for the park, I told you not to do that. While I 
had understood that it was all right. (…) And then later she said I 
don’t want to have problems because you don’t understand anything. 
(…) so they said it would be better if I stopped working there.  
It appears that for a few jobs it is important to be able to communicate properly. 
However, for most jobs speaking a host country language is not that relevant. 
Therefore, cultural capital in terms of mastering languages is only moderately 
important and surely not a form of capital that is decisive for settlement migrants. 
Although some respondents do speak a little Dutch or French and some are taking 
language courses, only a few of them indicate that this has any influence on their 
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ability to find (better) work. Knowing a few words usually suffices. The decision to 
learn a language is probably related more to their choice to settle in the Low 
Countries than inspired by a quest for employment.  
Contrary to the accounts provided so far, many respondents with settlement 
aspirations do not manage to make a decent living in the Low Countries. A few 
respondents cannot mobilize either social leverage or social support, whereas most 
only manage to mobilize one of the two, instead of the combined social capital that is 
needed. Some for example lack social support: 
No work means no money. I don’t have any family here, so I have 
nobody who can support me. (…)When I am out of work, I have to 
find work as soon as possible, because you won’t survive otherwise. 
Your friends cannot support you. They are encountering hardship 
themselves. (Adel) 
Besides those who lack social support, there are unsuccessful settlement migrants 
who do not manage to find steady work. Necessity often compels them to reside 
with family. The social support provided by their strong ties enables them to cope 
and ‘get by’, but not to ‘get ahead’, and settle down independently. Because these 
unsuccessful settlement migrants do not manage to find steady employment, they 
remain dependent on social support: 
My family here in Belgium has sheltered me in their midst because I 
am their kin. I am very thankful for that. (...) Finding work is still a 
problem in Belgium. For an illegal, searching for a job means a lot of 
work. Regardless of the great efforts you make to find work, you often 
come home empty-handed. (...) I hope to find work so I don’t have to 
depend on my family all the time. That would also make me feel good 
personally. (Younes) 
In short, unsuccessful settlement migrants are usually only able to mobilize either 
social support or social leverage, while they need combined social capital in order to 
fulfill their aspirations. 
9.3.3 Legalization aspirations 
Successful legalization migrants have, one way or the other, legalization of their stay 
in prospect – usually because they are getting married. It is known from other 
research that marriage is the most successful legalization strategy in the Low 
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Countries (Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009; Staring 2001). Sometimes marriages are 
instrumental, but among my respondents these usually stem from a love 
relationship. It often concerns marriages within the same ethnic group, as in 
Abdeslam’s case: “I am about to get engaged to a Moroccan girl. She is born in 
Belgium and has a residence permit. My cousin introduced me to her.” Family 
members or close friends introduce migrants to their future spouses, or they meet 
while going out. Emre explains: “I have a Turkish girlfriend, I am about to get 
engaged to her. She is my sister’s friend, I met her when I was visiting my sister. My 
sister introduced us to each other.”  
At the same time, respondents indicate that it is not always easy for a migrant 
without a legal status to find a partner in their ethnic community. The parents of a 
potential candidate do not always agree with an intended marriage because they 
suspect that the candidate’s hidden intention is to obtain residency rights or because 
they feel that an irregular migrant lacks social status (cf. Engbersen 2001). Marouane 
explains: “if you don’t have papers, you are my friend, but if you demand my sister 
or even my girlfriend, it is like that, it is war, no. Because here, for women it is not 
good to marry someone without papers (…) they regard someone without papers as 
a handicapped person.” This is where the significance of social capital in the form of 
social support comes in: all respondents who are getting married within their ethnic 
community have family members residing in Belgium. Their presence allows for a 
relationship of trust to evolve between the two families and can compensate for the 
potential lack of social status and trust attached to the marriage candidate.  
Obviously, mastering a native language benefits these migrants hardly at all. 
However, if respondents aim to marry a Dutch or Belgian national, this does become 
salient. All successful legalization migrants who try their luck on the Belgian or 
Dutch marriage market are reasonably fluent in Dutch or French. Some of them have 
attended language courses, most likely because they realize that in order to meet 
someone, it is important to be able to communicate properly. Marouane, who was 
living in Brussels – where they mostly speak French – even attended Dutch language 
classes so that he could meet women on the internet.  
Finally there are respondents who pay money in order to enter a bogus 
marriage. In the Netherlands, the going rate for a bogus marriage is between 10,000 
and 15,000 euros (Mazzucato 2005: 10). Usually legalization migrants do not have 
the required amount of money themselves: they therefore mobilize economic capital 
by means of their social capital: 
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My boss told me he could arrange for me to get married to a Belgian 
student in Antwerp. He says he knows her. The amount that I would 
need to pay her, he could pay. I should then repay him afterwards. I 
haven’t seen the girl. If all goes well, we will head for Antwerp next 
month. (Nihat) 
As mentioned above, those who do not have family in Belgium often do not 
succeed in finding a marriage partner from their own ethnic group. Other 
unsuccessful legalization migrants try to find a Belgian or Dutch person to marry, 
but fail to do so because they run short of knowledge on Belgian or Dutch cultural 
conventions or because they have not yet sufficiently mastered the Dutch or French 
language. Furthermore, they do not have the financial means or the right contacts to 
get into a bogus marriage. For these legalization migrants, their lack of relevant 
capital for the right marriage market renders them unable to realize their aspirations.  
However, lack of capital that is required for specific marriage markets does 
not tell the complete story of unsuccessful legalization migrants, as not all of them 
try to find their luck on a marriage market. In fact, most legalization migrants try to 
become legalized through all kinds of legal procedures. They choose to remain in the 
Low Countries because they continue to cherish the dream of getting papers, 
although they seem to have little chance of success:  
I have come to Europe to check out my chances and to try and obtain a 
residence permit, in spite of all the difficulties associated with being 
illegal in Belgium. I still have hope, for I would not stay here 
otherwise. (Nadir) 
These respondents have either filed appeals in their asylum applications or they 
have applied for regularization. If they had not applied for legal residence they 
indicated that they were waiting for another regularization campaign. Even though 
their hopes were high, none of my respondents was convinced that she or he would 
get a positive result any time soon, which I thought at the time was likely to be a 
realistic assessment. But as indicated in chapter four, decisions made by the Belgian 
government have proved me wrong on this point: many of my respondents in 
Belgium have now been legalized as a result of the collective regularization in 2009. 
However, success achieved through a regularization campaign is not related to the 
theoretical focus of this chapter, which is on the relevance of different forms of 
capital. It is not the possession of a form of capital that leads to legalization, but a 
decision made by the government. I have therefore not included the regularization 
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campaign in this analysis, although it has unexpectedly made many legalization 
migrants realize their aspirations.15 In fact, because of the lack of transparency in the 
procedures legalization migrants apply for, employees of organizations complain 
that it is impossible to realistically assess the chances an irregular migrant has of 
achieving regularization (see also Van Meeteren et al. 2008). My analysis is therefore 
focused only on legalization migrants who aim to get married.  
As legalization migrants aspire to become legalized, they do not usually 
invest in work, because working informally could prevent them from getting papers. 
Although many legalization migrants do have job competencies which could help 
them, they choose to refrain from working as much as possible, because this could 
obstruct the fulfillment of their aspirations. Hence, unsuccessful legalization 
migrants do not necessarily lack capital altogether – although this happens as well – 
but they especially lack the right form of capital that allows them to realize their 
specific aspirations. As a result, some of them could be successful in realizing other 
type of aspirations, but for this moment, they choose to continue to focus on 
legalization instead. 
9.4 SHIFTS IN ASPIRATIONS 
What is important in the context of this chapter is the assumption that if a migrant 
switches to another category of aspirations, the required strategies change (cf. Van 
Nieuwenhuyze 2009), and consequently so do the forms of capital that are required. 
The question that arises next is what makes people change their aspirations. Do 
migrants change their minds if they realize they have the right configuration of 
capital for meeting another aim than the one they currently aspire to? No doubt that 
this could make a switch easier, but strategies here should not be understood as the 
“purposive and pre-planned pursuit of calculated goals”, but as “the active 
deployment of objectively oriented lines of action that obey regularities and form 
coherent and socially intelligible patterns”(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 25). 
Consequently, the strategies my respondents pursue are not necessarily a calculation 
of costs and benefits, although they can be (see also MacLeod 2009; Portes et al. 
1978). Irregular migrants’ aspirations are influenced by other things as well, such as 
morality. For example, to some people getting married for papers does not represent 
a moral option, even though they might have this possibility, given a certain capital 
configuration. Future research could benefit from investigating what makes 
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irregular migrants’ aspirations and accompanying strategies change and to what 
extent their capital configurations affect such decisions.  
9.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have tried to answer the question of what forms of capital irregular 
migrants need to realize their aspirations. The findings indicate that the extent to 
which irregular migrants manage to attain their aspirations depends on the extent to 
which they possess the right (combination of) capital. The finding that those who do 
not realize their aspirations do possess capital, but lack the correct form or the right 
combination of forms of capital required for that specific aspiration, validates this 
conclusion. Figure 9.1 summarizes the main findings:  
Figure 9.1. Aspirations and required forms of capital for attainment  
 
 
Investment Settlement Legalization 
Required 
capital for 
attainment 
Cultural capital: 
Job competencies 
Social capital: 
Ethnic (transnational) 
networks 
Combined social capital: 
Leverage and Social 
support 
Dependent on 
marriage market: 
Cultural, economic or 
social capital 
 
One should be careful in making generalizations based on these findings. My 
respondents are obviously not an accurate representation of the population of 
irregular migrants in the Low Countries or anywhere else in the world. Research 
conducted in another country and with different respondents could yield different 
results. The same would be true if this research had been done in a different time 
when immigration policies were different. However, whereas different or changing 
policy-contexts undoubtedly result in different distributions of irregular migrants 
over the three categories of aspirations, future research has to determine to what 
extent the configurations of capital required for the attainment of these aspirations 
remain the same under different conditions.  
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I have shown that different aspirations require distinct forms or combinations 
of capital. Thus, a contribution has been made to the theoretical debate on the 
significance of different forms of capital for irregular migrants. The importance of 
various forms of capital has been extensively discussed in previous research (see for 
example Chavez [1992]1998; Cranford 2005; Engbersen 2001; Grzymala-Kazlowska 
2005; Hagan 1998; Mahler 1995; Massey et al. 1994; Staring 2001), but it remained 
unclear in which situations which form or combination of capital is decisive because 
the discussion tended to focus on the question of what form of capital is important 
for irregular migrants in general. For example, whereas Engbersen et al. (2006: 223) 
write that social capital is “the most important currency for irregular migrants”, 
Grzymala-Kazlowska (2005: 694) claims that “cultural capital (especially knowledge 
of foreign languages) has become a major factor determining the position of 
individuals and the entire group on the market.” Clearly, dealing with the question 
of which form of capital is vital for irregular migrants in general does not facilitate 
the development of theoretical insights. After all, I have shown that the significance 
of various forms of capital depends on irregular migrants’ aspirations. These 
aspirations should therefore be the starting point of any analysis dealing with their 
success.  
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: ASSESSING A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE 
10.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
In this dissertation three interrelated research questions have been formulated:  
1. What patterns of incorporation can be distinguished among irregular 
migrants, and how can these be understood?  
2. Which types of transnational activities do irregular migrants engage in, and 
how can this be understood? 
3. What forms of capital do irregular migrants need to realize their 
aspirations?  
In order to answer these questions, I have developed a research approach that takes 
the individual aspirations of irregular migrants as a starting point. By doing so, a 
better understanding has been developed of how patterns of incorporation and 
transnational activities of irregular migrants are shaped. Whereas the literature on 
irregular migrants has traditionally overemphasized structure and neglected agency, 
I have sought to connect the two by bringing aspirations into the analysis, as these 
provide “a conceptual link between structure and agency in that they are rooted 
firmly in individual proclivity (agency) but also are acutely sensitive to perceived 
societal constraints (structure).” (MacLeod 2009: 139)  
My analysis revealed three types of aspirations. Investment migrants strive to 
acquire financial means for investments in their home country. They aspire to work 
and make money in the country of destination, and to return to their country of 
origin once they have acquired enough savings. These respondents strive for future 
upward mobility in their country of origin and are usually ‘target earners’ (Massey 
et al. 1987): they save for very specific projects, ranging from starting their own 
business to financing a wedding in the country of origin. Whereas investment 
migrants mean to stay in the receiving society only temporarily, settlement migrants 
aspire to start a new life in the receiving society and do not have the intention to 
return. Settlement migrants do not feel they necessarily require a legal status in 
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order to lead the better life they aspire to. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
aspirations of legalization migrants, for whom leading a better life is inextricably 
bound up with obtaining a legal status. For them, obtaining legal residence 
represents a start of a new life, unlike settlement migrants who feel that they can 
already start to build a new life without papers. Legalization migrants do not want 
to live as irregular migrants and therefore actively strive to obtain a legal status.  
As aspirations may change over time, it is important to emphasize that I have 
not constructed a typology of migrants, but a typology of aspirations. The concepts 
investment, settlement and legalization migrants have been used to refer to irregular 
migrants who have these specific aspirations at a certain point in time, but the core 
analytical categories are types of aspirations. In chapters 6, 7 and 8, I have 
demonstrated how these three types of aspirations underlie distinct patterns of 
incorporation and transnational activities. Chapter 9 has demonstrated how 
irregular migrants with different types of aspirations require different forms of 
capital to realize their aspirations. The main empirical findings of these chapters are 
discussed in the following subsections. As a means of achieving synthesis, they are 
not discussed by chapter, but by type of aspiration. The subsections are followed by 
a section on the implications of my research and a section containing suggestions for 
further research.  
10.1.1 Investment aspirations: preferring work over leisure 
and comfort while oriented towards ‘home’ 
Investment migrants try to work as much as possible during their stay in the 
destination country because this facilitates a quick return. They therefore often work 
six or seven days per week for long hours. Because they are in the destination 
country to work and make money, they do not positively value leisure time that 
much. They do not engage in recreational activities and prefer to stay at home, 
mostly in the company of their family or flat mates. Moreover, they have a very 
small network of social contacts. Because investment migrants do not want to stay in 
the receiving society, they are socially oriented towards their country of origin, and 
they invest time and energy in maintaining social relations with their relatives and 
friends there and do not put much effort in building social relations in the Low 
Countries. They therefore make efforts to keep up to date on the latest developments 
in their home country and try to keep in touch with their loved ones at least once a 
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week. However, most investment migrants call or sms on a daily basis, because they 
indicate they miss their loved ones very much. 
Investment migrants try to live as cheaply as possible in order to save money 
and ensure a quick return. They therefore live in cramped houses, often sharing 
rooms with multiple persons. They economize on virtually everything and spend 
very little money in the receiving society. Instead, they usually remit large shares of 
their incomes: approximately 2,000 to 5,000 euros per year. Others save similar 
amounts of money and guard it until they have acquired enough to return and 
invest it in their country of origin.  
Investment migrants often live in immigrant districts where they can profit 
from the infrastructure that caters to irregular migrants. In such areas contractors in 
search of employees visit tea houses and bars, and vans that drive irregular migrants 
to work usually leave from locations within immigrant districts. As work is a top 
priority for investment migrants, they often take exploitative conditions and low pay 
for granted. The low pay does not bother investment migrants that much because 
they aim to spend it in the country of origin where life is much cheaper and wages 
even lower. Moreover, exploitative conditions can be tolerated because they are only 
temporary. Investment migrants therefore often work in the sectors that are typically 
associated with informal migrant labor, such as horticulture, construction and 
restaurants: they do the type of work that natives typically reject. Investment 
migrants do not mind working there even though such sectors are often heavily 
controlled. In case they are caught doing informal labor and expelled, they can easily 
return because they often come from countries nearby.  
If investment migrants have specific job competencies that they are able to 
deploy in the Low Countries, they are relatively well paid. Furthermore, having 
arranged for work and lodging prior to their actual migration proves very helpful in 
realizing investment aspirations, because it allows them to find jobs in which they 
can use these competencies. For investment migrants, cultural capital (job 
competencies below the legal ceiling) – which can be activated by social capital – 
proves decisive in determining the chances of success on the informal labor market 
in the Low Countries, and consequently in their aspiration attainment.  
If investment migrants do not have job competencies, they earn low wages or 
do not find much employment. As a result they either have to stay longer than they 
envisioned, or they have to go back without having realized their aspirations. My 
respondents have obviously all chosen to stick around; otherwise I would not have 
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encountered them. These unsuccessful investment migrants indicated that they had 
to live off their savings or reach out to others for help until they found employment. 
Investment migrants who have family members in the receiving society can usually 
turn to them for help. In case they do not have family, they depend on the 
commercial infrastructure for additional sources of income or support. Investment 
migrants practically never receive support from organizations. Sometimes they are 
unaware of arrangements for irregular migrants, but many just do not expect that 
the state will come to their assistance in case of difficulties or illness. They have 
come to make money and return and do not want to depend on state support.  
10.1.2 Settlement aspirations: enjoying a better life in quiet 
suburban neighborhoods 
Unlike investment migrants, for settlement migrants ‘home’ is the receiving society. 
Their lives here are not all about working, but rather about leading a regular life that 
they regard as better than what they had in their country of origin. Settlement 
migrants prefer to work at relatively stable, non-seasonal, Monday-to-Friday type of 
arrangements, so that they have the weekends off, and they preferably work during 
the day, so that they can be at home in the evenings. For many settlement migrants, 
this has to do with the fact that they live with their families, which sometimes 
include children.  
Because settlement migrants aim to live a good life, they are willing to spend 
some money on a nice apartment. These migrants prefer the privacy of their own 
room and only live in shared arrangements out of economic necessity or during the 
initial period of settlement. Many settlement migrants opt for an apartment in the 
suburbs, because they prefer to live in a nice and quiet area with good schools for 
their children and recreational possibilities. Settlement migrants whose ethnic 
background is largely represented in immigrant districts – like Turks and Moroccans 
– form an exception: they want to live in immigrant districts because for them these 
neighborhoods have specific advantages.  
The suburban areas also provide proximity to settlement migrants’ preferred 
employment: in native private households. Settlement migrants prefer to work there 
because private households have the least chance of being controlled, while they 
generally have a lot to lose by being expelled as they have built their lives here. 
Furthermore, private households offer the possibility working for several employers, 
which allows them to spread the risk of exploitation and low pay. In addition, 
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settlement migrants are attracted to Belgian and Dutch private households, because 
these are reported to pay the best and treat irregular migrants well.  
In case they do not manage to find this type of employment, settlement 
migrants have to accept other jobs, usually the kind that investment migrants 
typically do. As settlement migrants cannot keep up the heavy conditions and work 
hours that accompany such employment for too long, they usually work at intervals. 
Settlement migrants who do jobs that investment migrants typically do are very 
dissatisfied with their working conditions, because these do not allow them to live a 
regular life. Moreover, they feel exploited because of the low wages they receive, 
which do not allow them to lead the good life in the Low Countries that they aspire 
to.  
Since settlement migrants want to stay permanently in the receiving society, 
they want to get to know the country they aim to spend their lives in. They therefore 
sometimes travel around and undertake various types of leisure activities. In 
addition, they frequent all kinds of social gatherings. Many settlement migrants visit 
the activities organized by formal or informal socio-cultural organizations. Because 
of these social gatherings, settlement migrants meet many people and create large 
social networks. Furthermore, through the activities organized by socio-cultural 
organizations cultural symbols associated with the country of origin are reproduced, 
which adds to a sense of ‘home’ in the receiving society (cf. Coutin 2005a). While 
settlement migrants do maintain personal contacts to their country of origin, they do 
not keep up to date on the latest developments there. Their frame of reference is the 
receiving society, and they probably have enough association with co-ethnics in the 
receiving society to fulfill their cultural needs. Because for settlement migrants 
´home´ is in the receiving society, they spend the largest share of their income there 
and only send small sums of money to their relatives back home. These sums are 
usually in the order of 1,000 euros per year or in case of special needs.  
In order to lead the good lives they desire, settlement migrants have to 
mobilize social leverage (Briggs 1998) from their weak ties to get the jobs they want. 
The social gatherings they visit are helpful, because they enlarge migrants’ social 
networks and provide access to a lot of information about jobs that circulates in 
these networks. In order to effectively mobilize the social leverage potentially 
available in these networks, settlement migrants have to make sure they have a good 
reputation. Next to the relevance of social leverage, settlement migrants require 
nearby family members or close friends who can support them in case of a 
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temporary set-back. Social leverage and social support are thus complementary to 
one another; settlement migrants need both to secure the life they aspire to.  
However, many settlement migrants do not manage to mobilize both social 
leverage and social support and consequently fail to secure the stable working 
conditions they need to fulfill their aspirations. Some for example do not have family 
to whom they can turn for unconditional support. These settlement migrants have to 
turn to informal social solidarity systems. However, such systems are not easily 
accessed as migrants need to invest in and contribute to them. Furthermore, these 
function based on trust. This means that in order to partake in social solidarity 
systems, a migrant needs other participants who can vouch for him, and he needs to 
pay borrowed money back as promised. The social gatherings settlement migrants 
frequent serve to enhance solidarity in such systems, because information on who is 
‘serious’ is exchanged there. 
In case settlement migrants do not have the resources to invest in such 
systems, they can turn to organizations for help. Most organizations help settlement 
migrants temporarily by providing them with material support. However, this is 
usually only provided in the beginning of their stay and surely not structurally. 
Organizations do not want to help irregular migrants install themselves in illegality 
by providing financial or material support for too long, and therefore information is 
the only type of assistance that is offered to settlement migrants on a structural basis.  
10.1.3 Legalization aspirations: sacrifices in the pursuit of a 
legal status 
Legalization migrants prefer to work as little as possible, because they perceive 
informal labor to be a risk that could obstruct the fulfillment of their aspirations. 
Getting caught while engaged in informal work severely reduces the chances of 
legalization and simultaneously increases the chances of being deported, which is 
why legalization migrants avoid it if they can. Many legalization migrants work 
part-time in order to cover their basic needs and choose to spend the rest of their 
time in search of a marriage partner or in pursuit of improving their ‘integration’. 
They believe that if they learn to speak the local language and associate with native 
citizens, they will increase their chances of legalization on the basis of their 
´integration´. Because legalization migrants work only the minimum that is needed 
to sustain themselves, they do not send money to the country of origin. Furthermore, 
they are picky about the jobs that they are willing to do. They consciously seek those 
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jobs that have least chance of being controlled: jobs in private households. Such 
employment is relatively risk-free, and it offers the possibility of working only a 
limited amount of hours.  
Because legalization migrants wish to refrain from work as much as possible, 
they need a lot of support to sustain themselves. In fact, they prefer to generate 
resources from support rather than through informal labor and therefore spend 
much time looking for monetary gifts with which they can pay the rent and buy 
food. As they prefer not to ask for help within their own community, they often turn 
to native Dutch or Belgian citizens instead, and some legalization migrants even live 
with native citizens. These legalization migrants usually receive free room and board 
in exchange for some light housework. In these arrangements they not only find 
support, but are also provided with additional means to integrate themselves, and 
these contacts with natives obviously look good on their applications. Legalization 
migrants who aim to get married also need support, but they usually turn to family 
members who likewise provide them with room and board until they manage to 
find a partner. If they do not have family members in the receiving society they 
depend on the commercial infrastructure, or they need to work more than they 
would like to.  
Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures also receive a lot of 
support from organizations, usually for a long period of time. As these have ‘a 
perspective’ in the eyes of organizations, they can get food packages and sometimes 
even long-term financial support. Even though the informal support provided by 
organizations is limited, support accumulates because legalization migrants tend to 
shop around and combine this type of support with assistance from their personal 
networks. Legalization migrants who aim to get married cannot turn to 
organizations for support, as they are not considered to have ‘a perspective’.  
Furthermore, it is not in the interest of this category of irregular migrants to 
hang around organizations, because this is not a good place to meet a partner to 
marry. Contrastingly, legalization migrants who are involved in procedures spend a 
lot of their free time calling at organizations for a chat, social support, doing 
voluntary work or taking part in some of the activities organized there. They hang 
around at organizations all day, as these offer a wide range of social or recreational 
activities for free. In the absence of fulltime work, they keep themselves busy this 
way, and they believe that visiting organizations is good for integration. Through 
their visits to these organizations these migrants develop rather heterogeneous 
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networks in terms of ethnic background. However, their social circles are quite 
small, because they primarily associate with other irregular migrants who visit the 
same organizations each day. Furthermore, they do not have much opportunity to 
meet people through work and do not participate in recreational activities much 
outside of the scope of organizations.  
Legalization migrants who aim to get married usually have a larger social 
circle, because it is usually through other people that a potential future spouse is 
located. They therefore put effort into building a large social network. They also 
maintain contacts with their relatives and friends back home, although this type of 
contact tends to become frustrated in case it takes the migrant in question long to 
become legalized. Many legalization migrants who are involved in procedures have 
lost contact with family and friend in the country of origin due to the political 
problems there. However, they do try to keep up to date with the situation there, 
especially regarding politics. The political issues in their country have often formed 
the reasons for their migration, and, more importantly, they make legalization 
migrants afraid to go back. They want to become legalized because they feel they 
have no other place to go to. The political activities legalization migrants engage in 
are usually coordinated through migrant organizations. The organizations not only 
devote attention to improving the political situation in the country of origin, but 
they also look out for the well-being of those who live in the destination country. 
It is difficult to determine what could make legalization migrants who are 
involved in procedures successful in their quest for legalization. Because of the lack 
of transparency in the procedures legalization migrants apply for, it is impossible to 
realistically assess the chances an irregular migrant has of achieving regularization. 
My analysis of the forms of capital that legalization migrants require to fulfill their 
aspirations has therefore focused on legalization migrants who aim to get married. 
Migrants who try to find a co-ethnic to marry need social capital from family 
members. The presence of family members in the receiving society allows for a 
relationship of trust to evolve between the two families and can compensate for the 
potential lack of social status and trust attached to the marriage candidate. 
Legalization migrants who try their luck on the Belgian or Dutch marriage market 
have to speak Dutch or French to be able to communicate with potential spouses. 
Moreover, those who pay money in order to enter a bogus marriage require 
economic capital which they often mobilize by means of their social capital. 
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10.1.4 Overview 
Aspirations partly reflect the dreams and wishes of irregular migrants but they 
should also be understood as responses to objective structures. These structural 
opportunities and constraints are located both in the country of origin and the 
receiving society, as well as in the personal social networks of irregular migrants. 
Throughout this dissertation, many examples have been presented of how 
aspirations reflect the structural conditions of irregular migrants. Patterns of 
incorporation and transnational activities of irregular migrants can therefore be 
understood from the agency individual migrants have, as well as from the structures 
they are embedded in. I have for example indicated how specific conditions in 
countries of origin shape specific aspirations. Furthermore, I have described the 
specific structural contexts in which the aspirations of my respondents have been 
shaped. In addition, throughout chapters 6 to 9 I have illustrated how perceptions of 
structural barriers like specific policy measures or chances of encounters with the 
police affected irregular migrants with different aspirations differently. 
Furthermore, I have indicated how migrants from the same ethnic group can be 
embedded in different social networks because of their aspirations. The approach 
outlined here therefore does not imply that structural barriers or embeddedness in 
social groups are not relevant for understanding how patterns of incorporation and 
transnational activities are shaped; instead, it implies that our understanding is 
improved by taking aspirations into account as well.  
Obviously the pictures portrayed in the previous subsections do not do 
justice to all empirical diversity, but they represent ideal-typical images of irregular 
migrants with different types of aspirations. Furthermore, as the aspirations of 
irregular migrants may shift over time, respondents sometimes found themselves in 
between the typical positions outlined above. When reading the main findings as 
summarized in the following figure, it is important to keep their ideal-typical nature 
in mind: 
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Figure 10.1 Main findings by aspiration 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Functional 
incorporation 
    
Housing     
Type Cheap and crowded Regular Diverse With family 
Location Immigrant district 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
If group is 
represented: 
immigrant 
district. 
Otherwise: 
suburb 
Employment     
Work hours As many as possible Regular 
As little as 
possible 
As little as 
possible 
Type of work 
‘Typical’ 
irregular 
migrant sectors 
In native private 
households 
In native private 
households 
In private 
households or 
ethnic 
businesses 
Perception of 
exploitation 
No perception 
of exploitation 
Certain types of 
work Fundamental Fundamental 
Other sources of 
income     
Gift and barter 
economy 
Commercial 
networks 
Social solidarity 
systems Native citizens Family, friends 
Organizations None 
Occasional 
material 
support 
Intensive None 
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Figure 10.1 Main findings by aspiration, continued 
 Investment Settlement Legalization Legalization 
   Procedures Marriage 
Social 
incorporation     
Leisure time As little as possible Highly valued Nothing special Instrumental 
Ways of 
spending leisure 
time 
Indoors Recreational activities Organizations 
In the streets, 
going out 
Geographic 
mobility Immobile 
Mobile (across 
national 
borders) 
Mobile (within 
national 
borders) 
Immobile 
Span of social 
contacts Limited Large circles Small circles Large circles 
Type of social 
contacts 
Other 
investment 
migrants 
Ethnic 
community 
Heterogeneous 
network 
Ethnic 
community or 
heterogeneous 
Transnational 
activities     
Economic Very active Occasionally Little to none Little to none 
Social Many personal contacts 
Some personal 
contacts and 
receiving society 
High 
involvement, 
TV, papers, 
internet 
Personal 
contacts and 
receiving society 
Political No activities No activities Some activities No activities 
Forms of capital     
Required capital 
for attainment 
Cultural capital: 
Job 
competencies 
Social capital: 
Ethnic 
(transnational) 
networks 
Combined social 
capital: 
Leverage and 
Social support 
Unable to 
determine 
Dependent on 
marriage 
market: Cultural, 
economic or social 
capital 
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10.1.5 Shifts in aspirations 
Although I have taken aspirations at different points in the lives of irregular 
migrants as a starting point of my analysis, I have mostly been able to distinguish a 
sequence of aspirations throughout the migrant careers of the people I interviewed 
during my fieldwork. However, for the respondents that were interviewed by 
research assistants in semi-structured interviews, I could usually assess merely one 
point in their lives. My analysis indicates that there does not seem to be a hierarchy 
in aspirations and that a fixed trajectory does not exist. Whereas Van Nieuwenhuyze 
(2007) found that a typical trajectory from investment, to settlement to legalization 
aspirations often takes place amojng the Senegambians she studies, the diversity in 
my sample allowed me to demonstrate that this trajectory is surely not uncommon, 
but that other variations occur as well. The only trajectories I did not come across 
were those in which settlement or legalization aspirations turned into investment 
aspirations. This does not mean, however, that these trajectories do not exist. But it is 
likely that migrants who have followed these have already returned and are 
consequently difficult to encounter in the destination country.  
I have demonstrated that if irregular migrants change aspirations, their 
functional and social incorporation and the transnational activities they engage in 
change as well. In addition, irregular migrants require different forms or 
combinations of capital if their aspirations shift. However, the relationships among 
incorporation, transnational activities and configurations of capital are not 
necessarily one-directional: changes in these domains may foster shifts in aspirations 
as well.  
Because aspirations mediate what an individual desires and what society can 
offer, they are inextricably connected with assessments of available opportunities 
and possible constraints. This means that aspirations may change as a result of 
changes in perceptions of the opportunity structure. Although I have not 
systematically studied factors inspiring changes in aspirations, I have demonstrated 
how aspirations on the one hand and functional and social incorporation, 
transnational activities and configurations of capital on the other are intertwined.  
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10.2 IMPLICATIONS 
The qualitative nature of my study does not allow me to draw quantitative 
conclusions about the patterns I found. However, the strength of my analysis does 
not lie in quantitative description, but in the understanding that is provided of how 
these patterns are shaped. In this way, new light has been shed on existing findings 
and scholarly debates about the ways in which irregular migrants live in western 
societies. Moreover, the results have implications for the way research on irregular 
migrants is conducted. These contributions to the literature are discussed in the next 
subsections.  
10.2.1 Beyond a ‘victim perspective’ 
In chapter 2 I have argued that studies of the way irregular migrants live in western 
societies have a ‘victim perspective’ in common. Scholars commonly perceive 
irregular migrants as passive recipients of structural forces who have little control 
over their lives. As they overemphasize structure, they neglect the agency irregular 
migrants have to act within structural boundaries and that sometimes enables them 
to overcome structural barriers. My analysis has demonstrated how a survival 
perspective does not do justice to the empirical reality. 
My results indicate that a perspective that includes more agency adds to our 
understanding by showing that irregular migrants act differently under similar 
circumstances. These diverging actions can be understood from the different 
aspirations they have. So instead of passive victims, I have shown how irregular 
migrants actively strive for specific goals. Furthermore, my findings demonstrate 
that not all irregular migrants are busy ‘surviving’, but that many irregular migrants 
do achieve some success: some even manage to realize their aspirations. In addition, 
even though not all irregular migrants realize their aspirations, a focus on 
aspirations helps to understand why irregular migrants prefer certain jobs or 
accommodation over others and therefore adds to our understanding of how 
outcomes are shaped.  
Since only the question of why some irregular migrants ‘survive’ better than 
others has been raised in previous studies, the dominant perspective has obstructed 
our understanding of the social mobility that some irregular migrants achieve. It is 
of crucial importance to distinguish between ‘survival’ and social mobility, and my 
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results clearly demonstrate that each requires different resources. Moreover, 
irregular migrants with different aspirations ‘survive’ differently as well. Future 
research should therefore surpass the victim perspective by taking aspirations into 
account. The subsections below discuss the main fields that can be advanced this 
way.  
10.2.2 Functional incorporation and ethnic community 
patterns 
My analysis has taken individual aspirations as a starting point and has offered 
insights into a number of implicit or explicit theoretical debates or diverging 
research outcomes pertaining to the functional incorporation of irregular migrants. 
These concerned issues such as the relationship between income and money spent 
on accommodation, the spatial distribution of irregular migrants and the hours they 
work and the type of work they do. These insights are discussed in detail in chapter 
6 and will not be repeated here. What these have in common is that they could be 
formed because my analysis has inductively focused on individual aspirations 
instead of on groups or on structural constraints.  
Researchers have traditionally investigated why some groups of irregular 
migrants have different outcomes than other groups. According to Piore (1979) 
migration and settlement must be understood as processes relating to communities 
rather than to individuals. Likewise, Engbersen et al. (1999; 2006) speak of ‘ethnic 
community patterns of incorporation’, and explain why ethnic groups display 
different outcomes in terms of income, labor, and housing conditions by referring to 
the dominant support patterns within these ethnic communities. My analysis reveals 
that it is problematic to explain outcomes by referring to the level of the community, 
and it demonstrates that an analysis that focuses on the group instead of the 
individual yields different results than an analysis that starts with individual 
aspirations.  
For example, it turned out that my Turkish respondents are more often 
employed and more often employed fulltime than my Moroccan respondents. On 
the basis of these results one could conclude that Turkish migrants manage to 
survive better than Moroccans, who only manage to acquire part-time employment. 
One could interpret these results by referring to the different characteristics of the 
two communities, the Turkish being a stronger, tighter community than the 
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Moroccan, with higher levels of ethnic entrepreneurship, consequently offering 
better employment opportunities to irregular migrants (see for example Engbersen 
1996; Engbersen et al. 2006). In addition, one could attribute these differences to 
levels of solidarity. After all, successful communities display more solidarity. 
Although such explanations are likely to be partially valid, they obscure the fact that 
many Moroccan irregular migrants are legalization migrants who choose not to 
work that much because this could endanger the possibility of acquiring legal 
papers. Hence, for these migrants, the fact that they work part-time is not primarily 
the result of lack of employment opportunities or solidarity in their ethnic 
community, but of the aspirations they have. This means that outcomes are not 
simply determined by structural conditions such as community characteristics; they 
should be understood by taking aspirations into account as well. 
Apart from issues such as housing and income, ethnic community patterns of 
incorporation are often discussed in relation to support irregular migrants generate 
from these communities. However, I found that not all irregular migrants belong to 
an ´ethnic community´. Some irregular migrants are assisted by family members 
who are obviously also co-ethnics, but which has nothing to do with their ethnic 
community in general. It appeared that some of my respondents were assisted by 
family members, while they did not have much contact with other co-ethnics. If 
strong family relations are frequent within a certain community, they shape a 
spurious ethnic community pattern. I believe for example that I could have easily 
misinterpreted the support my Turkish respondents receive as ‘community support’. 
Many Turkish investment migrants live with and are supported by family members. 
Moreover, many Turkish legalization migrants who aim to get married are 
supported by family members as well. Combined with the fact that there is a large 
presence of Turks who can construct social solidarity systems for Turkish settlement 
migrants, one might easily conclude that there is a lot of solidarity within the 
´Turkish community´. However, although many Turks are supported by other 
Turks, this does not have something to do with a dominant support pattern within 
the ‘Turkish community’, because different mechanisms are in play here.  
In addition, even though irregular migrants might have a specific ethnic 
background that could theoretically provide access to an ´ethnic community,´ this 
does not always happen in practice. I have explained in chapter 6 how informal 
systems of social solidarity operate: if migrants want to access these they have to 
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contribute as well. For settlement migrants who aim to spend their lives in the 
receiving society, this seems a wise investment, but this is less so for investment and 
legalization migrants. Because of their temporary engagements, investment migrants 
see no need to invest in such social systems and therefore cannot access them either. 
Because legalization migrants wish to refrain from work as much as possible, it is 
not possible for them to occasionally contribute any surplus income to help others in 
need. In addition, legalization migrants do not usually seek support from informal 
systems of social solidarity, but primarily derive social support from native citizens 
and organizations. In fact, they prefer to stay away from their own communities and 
consciously seek solidarity with native citizens. 
Moreover, even if migrants have access to support within social solidarity 
systems, this does not mean that every individual is able to mobilize it to the same 
extent. By looking at some sort of general level of solidarity or a dominant support 
pattern for the group as a whole, one fails to see that migrants are assisted in some 
situations and not in others. Irregular migrants need to contribute to these systems 
in order to get support, and they have to make sure that their reputation is solid. 
They need to be known as trustworthy employees or tenants and as people who will 
pay back money that was loaned to them. In other words, having a Turkish 
background does not guarantee access to social capital invested in social networks of 
the ‘Turkish community´. Whereas a lot of migration research takes social capital in 
social networks for granted (Ryan et al. 2008), I have indicated how it requires effort 
and the investment of time and resources to effectively mobilize social capital (cf. 
Portes and Landolt 2000). Furthermore, my analysis revealed that migrants with 
different aspirations vary in their willingness to make such investments.  
All in all, whereas many scholars explain outcomes by referring to ethnic 
communities, I have indicated that this is problematic. Although patterns of 
incorporation and solidarity may sometimes seem like ´ethnic community patterns 
of incorporation´, I have demonstrated that they are shaped by different mechanisms 
than dominant community support patterns. In other words, these ‘community 
patterns’ are often spurious relationships: they are shaped by other mechanisms 
pertaining to individual aspirations. This is obscured if the level of analysis is on the 
level of the group.  
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10.2.3 Social mobility: objective measures?  
My findings are also relevant for studies of social mobility of irregular migrants, 
since they indicate that it is difficult to ‘objectively measure’ success amongst 
irregular migrants. Because irregular migrants have different definitions of success, 
it is problematic to take a standard like a certain level of income or hours of work, as 
is sometimes done in other research (see for example Powers and Seltzer 1998; 
Tienda and Singer 1995). I have for example indicated how legalization migrants 
prefer to generate social support instead of income through employment and how 
settlement migrants prefer leisure time over work if they can. Not taking irregular 
migrants’ aspirations into consideration would lead us to prematurely label some of 
these migrants as ‘helpless victims,’ while they themselves regard their life in the 
receiving society a success.  
Since ‘success’ is defined differently by irregular migrants with different 
aspirations, we need different standards to measure their ‘success’. I have therefore 
reframed the question of social mobility into the question of how irregular migrants 
realize their aspirations. It turned out that different aspirations require distinct 
resources. Whereas irregular migrants require social support to ensure their basic 
needs in case they do not have enough income from employment, social leverage 
and other forms of capital can help them to realize their aspirations. I have 
demonstrated that irregular migrants with different aspirations require distinct 
forms or combinations of capital. The relevance of various forms of capital has been 
extensively debated in previous research (see for example Chavez [1992]1998; 
Cranford 2005; Engbersen 2001; Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005; Hagan 1998; Mahler 
1995; Massey et al. 1994; Staring 2001), but it remained unclear in which situations 
which form or combination of capital is decisive because the discussion tended to 
focus on the question of what form of capital is important for irregular migrants in 
general. Clearly, it is not instructive to debate about the role of different forms of 
capital for irregular migrants in general. After all, I have shown that the significance 
of various forms of capital depends on irregular migrants’ aspirations. These 
aspirations should therefore be the starting point of any analysis dealing with their 
success.  
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10.2.4 Social incorporation 
There has been little research that explicitly devotes attention to the social 
incorporation of irregular migrants, that is, to their leisure activities and to their 
social contacts beyond the scope of social capital. In other words, while much has 
been reported about the role of social networks in irregular migrants´ ability to 
´survive´, the social dimension of irregular migrants´ lives as a feature in itself has 
often been neglected. Not hampered by a victim perspective, in my research I 
perceived irregular migrants as active agents who may do things in their free time 
and who create social networks of friends and acquaintances around them, and I 
found that they do this in different ways, depending on their aspirations.  
The finding that irregular migrants with different types of aspirations live 
distinct social lives provides insight into the implicit debate on the social 
incorporation of irregular migrants, which seems to be dichotomized around two 
positions. The dominant position portrays images of the lives of irregular migrants 
that are in line with the ‘survival perspective’ (chapter 2) of migrants who stay 
inside their houses behind locked doors and closed curtains and who do not 
participate in recreational activities. They live their lives in “geographically 
restricted areas”, show “immobile behavior” and are “chained to their home” 
(Engbersen 1999a: 236). Furthermore, irregular migrants are believed to primarily 
associate with their own ethnic group, usually also other irregular migrants, as they 
are cut off from mainstream society and have few contacts with local citizens. The 
few scholars holding the other position argue that this ‘cocoon’ image is misleading 
and emphasize how their respondents spend their leisure time with all kinds of 
recreational activities in the company of co-ethnics.  
So far it has remained unclear how these different outcomes are shaped. In 
chapter 7 I have demonstrated how an approach that takes aspirations as the central 
focus of analysis is able to provide such understanding. Whereas the dominant 
viewpoint seems to reflect the social lives of investment migrants, the lives of my 
settlement migrants seem to correspond to the images portrayed by scholars holding 
the second viewpoint. Furthermore, the social lives of legalization migrants indicate 
that there is more diversity to be found than has been reported by the literature so 
far. Legalization migrants who are involved in procedures for example spend most 
of their abundant leisure time in the company of local citizens and by visiting 
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organizations. Hence, not all irregular migrants live in a ‘parallel world’ without 
contact with local citizens, and not all spend their leisure time participating in 
recreational activities with co-ethnics.  
My findings indicate that irregular migrants spend their leisure time 
differently and have different social networks depending on their aspirations. The 
analysis further demonstrates that the lives of irregular migrants are not always only 
about surviving, but that there is room for leisure and social contact. In fact, 
settlement migrants even prioritize their social lives over additional work that 
would allow them to ‘survive better’ according to the dominant perspective. This 
indicates that irregular migrants should be perceived as social beings who engage in 
meaningful social interaction with others. Moreover, their social lives affect their 
aspirations and hence the choices they make in other domains of life as well. For 
example, investment migrants may come to enjoy the company of their flat mates, or 
other friendships may evolve which make it harder to return to the country of origin 
and which eventually foster settlement aspirations. Likewise, parties may be 
primarily about fun and cultural display, but new social encounters at these 
gatherings may lead to job opportunities or social support. This means that in order 
to properly understand the ways in which irregular migrants live in receiving 
societies, their social lives should be taken into consideration as well.  
10.2.5 Transnational perspective 
So far little research has been devoted to the transnational engagements of irregular 
migrants. My findings have therefore filled a gap in our understanding of the 
transnational activities irregular migrants undertake. Furthermore, the results are 
relevant, because they run contrary to expectations about irregular migrants’ 
transnational engagements in the literature, which presume that transnational 
activities are not common among immigrants because of the obstacles they face.  
My findings indicate that many irregular migrants frequently engage in 
transnational activities and therefore contradict these claims. In addition, my 
analysis revealed that their transnational engagements should be understood from a 
position of choice rather than limitations, which indicates that the underlying 
assumption of other research, that irregular migrants engage less in transnationalism 
when faced with exclusion, is to be questioned. Again, a focus on aspirations yields 
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vital insights. In the event that settlement migrants earn more, they do not 
necessarily remit more. Instead, they mostly choose to spend their extra earnings on 
their own family in the receiving society. In addition, an increase in income will 
most likely not make legalization migrants remit more but actually work less. Only 
investment migrants increase their economic transnational activities if they earn 
more.  
The findings concerning the transnational activities of irregular migrants not 
only fill an empirical knowledge gap, but they also have implications for our 
understanding of the way irregular migrants live in receiving societies. 
Transnational engagements affect aspirations, which in turn affect incorporation. In 
fact, some irregular migrants are incorporated in a specific way because of their 
transnational engagements. Investment migrants for example sacrifice many things 
for their economic transnational projects. Moreover, increasingly troubled relations 
with family and friends in the home country sometimes explain why irregular 
migrants stay even though their lives do not seem good from our perspective. 
Furthermore, the inability to see relatives and loved ones sometimes makes migrants 
change from settlement to legalization aspirations. This means that transnational 
engagements affect aspirations, and aspirations in turn impact outcomes in terms of 
incorporation.  
While researchers have scrutinized the relation between incorporation and 
transnational engagements, they have overlooked the fact that both are intertwined 
with aspirations. Studies have advanced by distinguishing between different types 
of transnational activity, but they also need to contextualize on the side of agency of 
the migrants to properly understand why migrants do or do not engage in certain 
types of transnational activities. Future research on transnationalism can therefore 
seriously benefit from taking aspirations into account as well. At the same time, 
research that studies the way irregular migrants live in western societies should 
seriously consider a transnational perspective. Such a perspective acknowledges that 
transnational engagements, aspirations and hence the outcomes in other domains 
are intertwined.  
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10.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has theoretically and empirically demonstrated the downsides of the 
dominant survival perspective, as well the benefits that can be gained by adopting 
an approach that focuses on structure and agency. In addition, I have indicated how 
our understanding of the ways in which irregular migrants live can be improved by 
shifting the level of analysis from communities to the level of individual aspirations. 
I therefore believe that future research can significantly benefit from taking 
aspirations into account.  
 As indicated in chapter 2, aspirations form a conceptual bridge between 
structure and agency, as aspirations are fed by needs and wants, as well as by 
perceived possibilities and constraints. Taking irregular migrants’ aspirations into 
account therefore does not imply that structural barriers are neglected. However, 
one can only determine which barriers and possibilities are relevant once the 
aspirations of irregular migrants are known. For example, one first needs to know if 
an individual migrant aspires to work, before it makes sense to analyze his or her 
opportunity structure in a labor market. Likewise, it makes little sense to analyze the 
sector of horticulture when determining the opportunity structure of settlement and 
legalization migrants who prefer to work for native private households. In other 
words, by analyzing irregular migrants’ aspirations researchers are able to see which 
structural barriers and opportunities are relevant for the migrants under study. 
Hence, instead of studying the effects of structural barriers on irregular migrants in 
general, future research needs to contextualize by focusing on the interplay between 
opportunity structures and aspirations.  
Furthermore, by focusing on individual aspirations instead of communities, I 
do not imply that communities are irrelevant for our understanding of the way 
irregular migrants live. Communities have for example appeared crucial in the lives 
of settlement migrants. However, irregular migrants also actively choose the 
communities they want to belong to, and membership may require much investment 
and effort. Moreover, it appears that the communities irregular migrants are part of 
are not always comprised of co-ethnics. In other words, while embeddedness in 
communities is relevant for our understanding of the ways in which irregular 
migrants live, these are not necessarily ‘ethnic’ communities or in another sense 
connected to the country of origin. My results have shown that researchers cannot 
determine which ‘communities’ are relevant for individuals beforehand. Future 
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research should therefore start on the individual level and analyze to which 
potentially relevant ‘communities’ irregular migrants belong or strive to gain access 
to.  
Another contribution to future research is that this dissertation offers a point 
of departure to develop contextualized theory. The typology constructed here 
cannot be simply abstracted to a general level, as it is situated in specific local 
contexts. Since aspirations are fed by perceived opportunities and constraints, they 
are connected to a particular context. Research conducted in other countries would 
therefore probably yield different numbers for each category. The same applies if 
this research is done at another point in time, because immigration policies are 
undergoing many changes (Broeders 2009). However, whereas different or changed 
policy-contexts undoubtedly result in different distributions of irregular migrants 
over the three categories of aspirations, future research has to determine if and how 
different structural contexts are associated with different types of aspirations and 
mechanisms. Moreover, future research needs to analyze if and how the 
configurations of capital required for the attainment of aspirations play a role under 
different conditions. It is by analyzing the mechanisms connected to aspirations in 
different countries or after policy changes that a focus on aspirations is able to take 
research on irregular migrants a step further. My analysis provides a theoretical 
point of departure that allows research to move beyond specific empirical contexts 
to engage in comparative efforts in order to arrive at contextualized theory. By 
analyzing how patterns of incorporation, transnational activities and required forms 
of capital are associated with aspirations in different contexts, this approach is able 
to provide insight into the interplay between structure and agency.  
This possibility of constructing contextualized theory is beneficial for the 
advancement of the field of research on irregular migrants, even though it is 
currently assumed that this is hardly feasible. Düvell (2006b) for example argues that 
the results from the United States cannot be easily applied to the European context. 
He claims that the theoretical conclusions from US research are biased, because 
research there is mostly concentrated on Mexican immigrants, whose characteristics 
tend to be too specific to be simply projected onto migrants of other origins (cf. 
Weeks et al. 2009). Düvell (2006c) simultaneously argues that irregular migration to 
Europe is unique, and he therefore calls for a separation of European and American 
research. I would argue the contrary: an approach that takes aspirations as a starting 
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point of analysis precisely allows for such comparative efforts to be made. These 
efforts allow us to contextualize the grounded theory that has been constructed here 
to divergent contexts.  
Moreover, scholars could assess the theory developed in this thesis by testing 
hypotheses derived from it. However, quantitative research efforts may be 
frustrated by the impossibility of drawing random samplings and because of the 
dynamic nature of aspirations. Finally, studying the latter is a worthwhile subject in 
its own right since aspirations are not a fixed trait but change over the course of a 
migrants’ career (cf. Massey 1986: 671). Future research should further scrutinize 
what makes aspirations change. Such an investigation allows for a more systematic 
understanding of the ways in which irregular migrants’ aspirations, incorporation, 
transnational activities, and the forms of capital required for the attainment of 
aspirations are intertwined.  
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NOTES 
1 See http://www.isa-sociology.org/congress2010/rc/rc31.htm 
2 See for more information: Van Meeteren et al. 2007b; 2008) 
3 See for more information: Burgers and Engbersen 1999; Engbersen et al. 1999; Engbersen et al. 
2002 and Leerkes et al. 2004 
4 Jaarverslag 2008, Dienst Vreemdelingenzaken, retrieved from http://www.dofi.fgov.be on 8 
December 2009, p. 122 
5 Jaarverslag 2008, Dienst Vreemdelingenzaken, retrieved from http://www.dofi.fgov.be on 8 
December 2009, p. 122 
6 Telephone consultation with Dutch immigration authorities on November 26 2009 
7 Information retrieved from www.vreemdelingenrecht.be at 3 December 2009 
8 All interviewed respondents who work for organisations have been provided ficticious names 
in order to guard their anonymity. I use different names in order to demonstrate that I quote 
different people.  
9 Retrieved from http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/778954/verdonk-wil-blijven-beslissen-over-
schrijnende-gevallen.html and http://www.dag.nl/binnenland/schrijnende-gevallen-mogen-
17235 on 8 December 2009 
10 See for example www.vreemdelingenrecht.be. Information retrieved on december 3 2009 
11 The information in this paragraph was retrieved from www. vreemdelingenrecht.be and: 
Newsflash numbers regularisation. Edition 27/11/2009. Nr. 13/09. Newsflash issued by de 8vzw 
edited by Vlaams Minderhedencentrum.  
12 Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen periode januari-juni 2009. Ministerie van Justitie. Retrieved 
from: http://www.justitie.nl/onderwerpen/migratie/asiel/pardonregeling/ on 3 December 
2009 
13 Respondents have been assigned fictitious names for reasons of readability and to demonstrate 
that I quote different respondents. These names refer to the ethnic background of the 
respondents, meaning that Turkish respondents have been given Turkish names, Moroccan 
respondents have been given Moroccan names etc. However, any religious affiliations or cultural 
meanings attached to these names are unintentional. This is common practice in qualitative 
research involving irregular migrants (Chavez 1998; Hagan 1998; Mahler 1995). See appendix 4 
for an overview of the respondent numbers corresponding to the fictitious names 
14 The OCMW are the Belgian social services responsible for the provision of medical care to 
irregular migrants 
15 What could be done is determine the relevance of different forms of capital in being able to 
access the regularization campaign. Hagan (1994) has indicated that lack of social capital makes 
some irregular migrants unaware of the regularization program being held. But as my fieldwork 
was long over at the time the program was issued, I have not gathered any data that would allow 
me to make statements in this respect. 
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APPENDIX 1: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS – OVERVIEW 
OF RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Respondent nr  Nationality Gender    Age   In Belgium since 
1   Bulgarian Man       23  2001 
2   Bulgarian Man       49     1999 
3   Bulgarian Man       19     2004 
4   Bulgarian Man       35  2001 
5   Bulgarian Man       36  2002 
6   Bulgarian Man       26  2004 
7   Bulgarian Man       35  2002 
8   Bulgarian Woman 21  2003 
9   Bulgarian Man       25  2003 
10   Bulgarian Man      41  1998 
11   Bulgarian Woman 31  2000 
12   Bulgarian Man       33  2001 
13   Bulgarian Man       38  1999 
14   Bulgarian Man       21  2002 
15   Bulgarian Man       28  2001 
16   Bulgarian Man       31  1997 
17   Bulgarian Man       32  2001 
18   Bulgarian Man       27  2003 
19   Bulgarian Man       25  2003 
20   Bulgarian Man       43  2000 
21   Bulgarian Man       39  2002 
22   Bulgarian Woman 19  2003 
23   Bulgarian Man       40  2002 
24   Bulgarian Man       22  2001 
25   Bulgarian Man    19  2004 
26   Bulgarian Woman 32  2003 
27   Bulgarian Man     28  2002 
28   Bulgarian Man     24  2004 
29   Bulgarian Man     28  2003 
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30   Bulgarian Man       27  2003 
31   Congolese Man       27  2004 
32   Congolese Woman 38  2004 
33   Congolese Man         20  2004 
34   Congolese Man  Unknown 2003 
35   Congolese Man       37  2004 
36   Congolese Man        39  2003 
37   Congolese Man        23  2002 
38   Congolese Man        38  2002 
39   Congolese Woman 31  2003 
40   Congolese Man  Unknown 1994 
41   Congolese Man        47  2001 
42   Congolese Man        34  2000 
43   Congolese Woman 33  2001 
44   Congolese Man        35  1998 
45   Congolese Man        31  2001 
46   Congolese Woman 44  2001 
47   Congolese Man        31  2003 
48   Congolese Man        21  2004 
49   Congolese Man        37  2003 
50   Congolese Man       32  2000 
51   Congolese Man       30  2005 
52   Congolese Woman 33  1999 
53   Congolese Man        38  2002 
54   Congolese Man        38  2003 
55   Congolese Man        38  1999 
56   Congolese Man        37  2005 
57   Congolese Man        51  2002 
58   Congolese Man        35  2004 
59   Congolese Woman 24  1999 
60   Congolese Man  35  2004 
61   Moroccan Man        29  2000 
62   Moroccan Man        26  2001 
63   Moroccan Man        41  1998 
64   Moroccan Man        36  2002 
65   Moroccan Man        22  2002 
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66   Moroccan Man        25  2003 
67   Moroccan Man        28  2002 
68   Moroccan Man        35  2000 
69   Moroccan Man        30  2001 
70   Moroccan Man        28  2002 
71   Moroccan Man        22  2004 
72   Moroccan Man        26  2002 
73   Moroccan Man        37  1998 
74   Moroccan Man        29  2000 
75   Moroccan Man        27  2002 
76   Moroccan Man        29  2002 
77   Moroccan Man        27  1998 
78   Moroccan Man        23  2003 
79   Moroccan Man        29  2004 
80   Moroccan Man        29  2003 
81   Moroccan Man        29  2002 
82   Moroccan Man        25  2003 
83   Moroccan Man        38  2000 
84   Moroccan Man        30  2003 
85   Moroccan Man        33  2001 
86   Moroccan Man        28  2004 
87   Moroccan Man        28  2001 
88   Moroccan Man        24  2004 
89   Moroccan Man        25  2004 
90   Moroccan Man        25  2000 
91   Turkish Man     29  1995 
92   Turkish Man     27  1997 
93   Turkish Man      36  1987 
94   Turkish Man      22  1999 
95   Turkish Man      26  2001 
96   Turkish Man      20  2003 
97   Turkish Man      35  2002 
98   Turkish Man        44  1980 
99   Turkish Man        25  2002 
100   Turkish Man        27  2002 
101   Turkish Man        27  2001 
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102   Turkish Man        28  2002 
103   Turkish Man        31  2000 
104   Turkish Man        40  1995 
105   Turkish Man        36  1997 
106   Turkish Man        44  1989 
107   Turkish Man        35  2001 
108   Turkish Man        26  2002 
109   Turkish Man        23  2002 
110   Turkish Man        33  1999 
111   Turkish Man        43  1994 
112   Turkish Man        27  2002 
113   Turkish Man        29  2000 
114   Turkish Man        24  2003 
115   Turkish Man        31  1998 
116   Turkish Man        33  1999 
117   Turkish Man        27  2002 
118   Turkish Man        36  2001 
119   Turkish Man        36  1995 
120   Turkish Woman 22  2004 
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APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH IRREGULAR 
MIGRANTS – OVERVIEW OF RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Resp. nr Origin  Gender Age Length of stay     Country 
121  Ecuador Woman 40-50  11-12 Belgium 
122  Bangladesh Man  30-40  8-9 Belgium 
123  Ecuador Woman 50+  6-7 Belgium 
124  Bolivia  Woman 50+  2-3 Belgium 
125  Chile  Man  30-40  2-3 Belgium 
126  Congo  Man  30-40  4-5 Belgium 
127  Colombia Woman 30-40  8-9 Belgium 
128  Algeria Man  30-40  5-6 Belgium 
129  Ecuador Man  30-40  6-7 Belgium 
130  Ecuador Woman 30-40  6-7 Belgium 
131  Iran  Man  40-50  6-7 Belgium 
132  Kazakhstan Man  30-40  6-7 Belgium 
133  Mauretania Man  20-30  3-4 Belgium 
134  Rwanda Man  30-40  5-6 Belgium 
135  Bolivia  Woman 30-40  2-3 Belgium 
136  Chile  Man  30-40  2-3 Belgium 
137  Chile  Man  40-50  3-4 Belgium 
138  Bolivia  Woman 30-40  2-3 Belgium 
139  Syria  Woman 30-40  3-4 Belgium 
140  Turkey Woman 20-30  7-8 Belgium 
141  Nigeria Man  30-40  4-5 Belgium 
142  India  Man  40-50  3-4 Belgium 
143  Congo  Man  40-50  3-4 Belgium 
144  Ecuador Woman 50+  6-7 Belgium 
145  Morocco Man  20-30  5-6 Belgium 
146  Ecuador Woman 40-50  6-7 Belgium 
147  Ecuador Man  40-50  6-7 Belgium 
148  Cuba  Woman 50+  7-8 Belgium 
149  Colombia Man  20-30  2-3 Belgium  
150  Guatemala Man  30-40  5-6 Belgium 
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151  Ecuador Woman 30-40  5-6 Belgium 
152  Morocco Man  30-40  4-5 Belgium 
153  Oezbekistan Man  40-50  4-5 Belgium 
154  Nepal  Man  30-40  6-7 Belgium 
155  Ecuador Woman 30-40  7-8 Belgium 
156  Ghana  Woman 40-50  6-7 Belgium 
157  Chile  Man  30-40  5-6 Belgium 
158  Turkey Man  30-40  7-8 Netherlands 
159  Moldova Man  40-50  6-7 Netherlands 
160  Morocco Man  40-50  14-15 Netherlands 
161  Sierra Leone Man  20-30  6-7 Netherlands 
162  Turkey Man  40-50  9-10 Netherlands 
163  Surinam Man  50+  21-22 Netherlands 
164  Guinea Man  20-30  4-5 Netherlands 
165  Morocco Man  40-50  16-17 Netherlands 
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWS WITH ORGANIZATIONS 
 
1. Steunpunt Algemeen Welzijnswerk – Berchem 
2. Protestants Sociaal Centrum – Vluchtelingenwerk – CAW De Terp – Antwerp 
3. Transithuis – CAW Artevelde – Gent 
4. Inloopcentrum De Vaart – CAW Metropool – Antwerp 
5. Onthaalteam Amok – CAW Metropool – Antwerp 
6. De Mutsaard – CAW de Mare – Antwerp 
7. CAW Leuven – Leuven 
8. CAW Mozaïek - Brussel 
9. Vlaams Minderhedencentrum – Brussel (koepel) 
10. De Acht vzw – Integratiecentrum Antwerpen Stad – Borgerhout 
11. Integratiecentrum Foyer – Brussel 
12. Intercultureel netwerk Gent – Integratiecentrum stad Gent – Gent 
13. Prisma vzw – Integratiecentrum provincie Antwerpen – Mechelen 
14. ODiCe vzw – Integratiecentrum Oost-Vlaanderen – Gent 
15. Provinciaal Integratiecentrum Vlaams-Brabant – Leuven 
16. Stedelijke (integratie)diensten 
17. Contactpunt Integratie – Gent 
18. Integratiedienst – Antwerp 
19. Dienst Asiel- en Vluchtelingenbeleid – Gent 
20. Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten – Brussel 
21. OCMW Gent – Dienst Vreemdelingen - Gent 
22. OCMW Gent -  Dienst Administratie Gezondheidszorg – Gent 
23. OCMW Antwerpen – kabinet voorzitter - Antwerp 
24. Sociaal Centrum Plein – OCMW Antwerpen – Antwerp 
25. Vzw Medmigrant – Medisch Steunpunt Irreguliere migranten – Brussel 
26. Inloopteam Pothoek – Kind en Gezin – Antwerp 
27. Artsen Zonder Grenzen – Antwerp and Brussel 
28. Oriëntatiepunt Gezondheidszorg Oost-Vlaanderen – Gent 
29. Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen – Begeleiding vluchtelingen naar hoger 
onderwijs – Antwerp 
30. Pina 18 – Sociale Zaken dienst Integratie – Onthaalbureau voor Nieuwkomers – 
Antwerp 
31. Stedelijke Basisschool De Wereldreiziger – Antwerp 
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32. Huis van het Nederlands Brussel vzw – Brussel 
33. VSKO – Brussel 
34. Onthaal Nieuwkomers Oost-Vlaanderen vzw – Gent 
35. Ghapro vzw (Gezondheidshuis voor Antwerpse Prostitutie) – Antwerp 
36. Free Clinic (opvang drugsverslaafden) – Antwerp 
37. Boysproject – Antwerp 
38. PICUM – Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants – 
Brussel 
39. EVA-Centrum - Steunfonds irreguliere migranten – Ekeren 
40. Bond zonder Naam vzw – Antwerp 
41. Kerkasiel.anders – Oecumenisch netwerk van lokale initiatieven met 
asielzoekers, nieuwe migranten en irreguliere migranten – Brussel 
42. YWCA – Antwerpen vwz – Antwerp 
43. INFOPUNT Latijns-Amerikaanse Federatie – Antwerp 
44. Caritas International – Brussel 
45. Huize Triest – Gemeenschapshuis Tabor – Gent 
46. Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen – Brussel 
47. VLOS vzw (Vluchtelingen Ondersteuning Sint Niklaas) – Sint-Niklaas 
48. Vluchtelingendienst.be vzw – Mechelen 
49. Sint-Egidiusgemeenschap – Antwerp 
50. Fedasil – Brussel 
51. ACV – Antwerp 
52. Stichting LOS – Utrecht 
53. Emmaus – Den Haag 
54. STEK – Den Haag 
55. STEK Migrant churches – Den Haag 
56. Streetcare – Den Haag 
57. Apotheek Transvaal – Den Haag 
58. OKIA – Den Haag 
59. Vrouwen eten – Den Haag 
60. Pharos – Utrecht 
61. Drugpunt – Den Haag 
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APPENDIX 4: FICTITIOUS NAMES AND RESPONDENT 
NUMBERS 
 
Ficticious name  Respondent number 
Adel       86 
Adil     160 
Abdeslam      82 
Albert     143 
Alexandre    126 
Andrei     159 
Antonia    121 
Arda     112 
Armine     68 
Arshan    131 
Badr      72 
Bela      32 
Benjamin    129 
Brahim     61 
Camila     155 
Catalina    127 
Chavdar      7 
Constanza    138 
Dakarai    133 
Dembah    164 
Diego     125 
Dimitar      28 
Dnari     161 
Efunsegun    141 
Emilia     151 
Emre     100 
Fasila       46 
Fernanda    144 
Fernando    136 
Florencia    146 
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Gökdeniz    101 
Gökhan     93 
Göksel     102 
Gzifa     156 
Hakan     116 
Halil     103 
Hassan     62 
Houssine    145 
Ignacio    157 
Ilian       9 
Illiass      78 
Isidora     123 
Issam      74 
Jamal      73 
Javier     149 
Javiera     130 
Kamel      64 
Kazim     115 
Kiril       6 
Kwami    163 
Kyiaki        55 
Lazzat     153 
Lucas     137 
Maboula      33 
Marouane    152 
Martina    124 
Matias     147 
Mehdi      66 
Mehmet     94 
Mohammed    165 
Murat     110 
Musa      95 
Mustafa     15 
Nabil      63 
Nadir      67 
Nawang    154 
Nihat      96 
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Önder      15 
Oudry      36 
Prince      34 
Radimir    132 
Rakesh    142 
Rasja     139 
René      38 
Rüstü      91 
Semih      99 
Servet      92 
Shabani     53 
Sinan      29 
Sofia     138 
Songül     120 
Tarek     128 
Tolga     107 
Tümer     105 
Tuncay    114 
Tuyishime    134 
Ûsko     158 
Valentina    148 
Vincente    150 
Volkan      4 
Warsi     122 
Younes     65 
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
Leven zonder papieren. Aspiraties, incorporatie en transnationale activiteiten van irreguliere 
migranten in de Lage Landen 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de vraag hoe irreguliere immigranten leven in de Lage 
Landen. Hoewel irreguliere migranten – ook wel ‘illegale migranten’, ‘illegalen’ of 
‘mensen zonder papieren’ genoemd – hier officieel niet mogen verblijven, is hun 
aanwezigheid in de Lage Landen steeds vanzelfsprekender geworden. Dit geldt 
voor westerse landen in het algemeen, maar desondanks is er nog weinig onderzoek 
gedaan naar de manier waarop irreguliere migranten daar leven. Pas halverwege de 
jaren negentig zijn de eerste Europese onderzoekers zich met deze vraag gaan 
bezighouden. Veel van hun studies zijn exploratief en hebben vooral beschrijvende 
kennis opgeleverd over onderwerpen als huisvesting, werk en de 
gezondheidssituatie van irreguliere migranten. Theorievorming is nog beperkt en 
heeft zich voornamelijk op twee vlakken ontwikkeld. Er zijn theoretische debatten 
ontstaan rond de vraag wat voor patronen van incorporatie er kunnen worden 
onderscheiden en hoe deze te verklaren zijn, en rond de vraag welke vormen van 
kapitaal relevant zijn voor irreguliere migranten.  
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt uitvoerig ingegaan op het onderzoek dat rond deze twee 
discussies is verricht. In het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt kritiek geleverd op 
de dominante onderzoekspraktijk. Een eerste punt van kritiek is dat veel 
onderzoekers een zogenaamd ‘slachtofferperspectief’ hanteren. In plaats van de 
vraag te stellen hoe irreguliere migranten leven of hoe zij geïncorporeerd raken, 
vragen veel onderzoekers zich af hoe irreguliere migranten er in slagen om te 
‘overleven’ in westerse landen. Vertrekkend vanuit dit slachtofferperspectief richten 
zij zich vooral op de belemmeringen die irreguliere migranten ondervinden, 
waardoor een belangrijk deel van het leven van irreguliere migranten en de 
activiteiten die zij ondernemen onderbelicht is gebleven. Zo is er weinig aandacht 
voor sociale mobiliteit omdat er vanuit wordt gegaan dat irreguliere migranten hun 
positie niet kunnen verbeteren zonder hun status te legaliseren. Bovendien is er 
weinig aandacht voor de agency van irreguliere migranten. En door een eenzijdige 
focus op overleven is er nauwelijks onderzoek gedaan naar de transnationale 
activiteiten die irreguliere migranten mogelijkerwijs ondernemen. 
Een tweede punt van kritiek is gericht op de gangbare praktijk van het 
vergelijken van ‘etnische gemeenschappen’. Om de vraag te beantwoorden hoe het 
komt dat sommige irreguliere migranten er beter in slagen om te ‘overleven’ dan 
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andere, wordt er vaak gewezen op verschillen in solidariteit binnen etnische 
groepen. Zo zouden Turkse irreguliere migranten er beter in slagen om te 
‘overleven’ (vastgesteld aan de hand van werk en inkomen) dan Marokkaanse 
omdat de Turkse migranten meer worden geholpen door hun eigen gemeenschap 
dan de Marokkaanse. Met andere woorden, irreguliere migranten behorend tot de 
ene gemeenschap zouden er vanwege het dominante patroon van solidariteit binnen 
hun etnische gemeenschap beter in slagen om te ‘overleven’ dan migranten die 
behoren tot een andere groep. Deze benadering is echter om vier redenen 
problematisch.  
Ten eerste worden er zogenaamde etnische gemeenschappen met elkaar 
vergeleken die qua aard en achtergronden sterk verschillen. Het is daarbij soms 
onduidelijk of deze etnische gemeenschappen meer zijn dan door de onderzoekers 
geconstrueerde categorieën die losstaan van de betekenisverleningen van de 
betrokkenen. Men vergelijkt bijvoorbeeld de ‘Afrikaanse gemeenschap’ met de 
‘Turkse gemeenschap’, maar aangezien Afrika een continent is dat verscheurd wordt 
door oorlog is het twijfelachtig of er onder Afrikaanse irreguliere migranten echt een 
idee van een ‘Afrikaanse gemeenschap’ bestaat. 
Ten tweede gaan irreguliere migranten niet noodzakelijkerwijs alleen maar 
om met, en worden zij niet uitsluitend geholpen door mensen uit hun eigen etnische 
gemeenschap. Met andere woorden, sociale netwerken en etnische netwerken 
overlappen niet volledig. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor irreguliere migranten die 
afkomstig zijn uit een land waaruit er weinig andere migranten in de Lage Landen 
wonen. Zij moeten wel met andere mensen dan leden van hun etnische 
gemeenschap omgaan. Bovendien blijkt uit ander onderzoek dat juist contacten 
buiten de eigen groep vaak zorgen voor sociale mobiliteit. Om te analyseren waarom 
sommige irreguliere migranten beter ‘overleven’ dan anderen zou men daarom niet 
alleen sociaal kapitaal binnen etnische gemeenschappen moeten onderzoeken, maar 
zou men juist ook de hulp van relatieve buitenstaanders in de analyse moeten 
betrekken. Bovendien zou men niet, zoals nu meestal het geval is, louter irreguliere 
migranten moeten onderzoeken die behoren tot grote gemeenschappen maar juist 
ook diegenen die niet tot een grote etnische groep behoren in de analyse betrekken. 
Ten derde moeten de hulpbronnen die potentieel aanwezig zijn in (etnische) 
sociale netwerken worden geactiveerd voordat men er iets aan heeft. Louter de 
aanwezigheid van sociaal kapitaal in een gemeenschap is niet genoeg, en het ene 
individu slaagt er beter in dan de ander om deze hulpbronnen te mobiliseren.  
Ten vierde wordt er doorgaans vertrouwd op wat respondenten zeggen over 
de solidariteit binnen hun gemeenschap. Hun oordeel over ontvangen steun is 
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echter afhankelijk van hun motieven en van de context waarin zij zich bevinden. Zo 
zal een irreguliere migrant die tijdelijk verblijft om snel wat geld te verdienen 
positief staan tegenover iemand die hem helpt aan werk voor 5 euro per uur, terwijl 
iemand die zich hier vestigt dit waarschijnlijk beschouwt als uitbuiting. Het is 
daarom beter om niet gemeenschappen als uitgangspunt van analyse te nemen, 
maar de motieven van individuele irreguliere migranten. Omdat motieven 
gedurende het verblijf kunnen veranderen is het daarbij belangrijk om aandacht te 
besteden aan hun huidige doelen in plaats van hun oorspronkelijke 
migratiemotieven.  
In het tweede deel van hoofdstuk 2 wordt daarom een alternatieve 
benadering uiteengezet die individuele aspiraties tot beginpunt van analyse maakt. 
Aspiraties zijn de doelen die irreguliere migranten nastreven, en een focus op 
aspiraties ondervangt het eerste kritiekpunt doordat er daarmee aandacht wordt 
besteed aan de agency van irreguliere migranten. Aspiraties zijn niet perse strikt 
rationeel maar worden gevormd in de habitus. Zij worden gevoed door enerzijds 
subjectieve culturele waarden en dromen, en anderzijds door objectieve 
mogelijkheden. Daarom is het niet zo dat een benadering die uitgaat van aspiraties 
geen rekening houdt met belemmeringen: aspiraties vormen juist een conceptuele 
brug tussen structurele belemmeringen en de agency van irreguliere migranten. 
Aan de hand van deze alternatieve benadering worden in het proefschrift de 
volgende drie onderzoeksvragen beantwoord: 
 
1. Welke patronen van incorporatie van irreguliere migranten kunnen 
worden onderscheiden en hoe kunnen deze worden begrepen? 
2. Welke transnationale activiteiten ondernemen irreguliere migranten 
en hoe kan dit worden begrepen? 
3. Welke vormen van kapitaal hebben irreguliere migranten nodig om 
hun aspiraties te realiseren? 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt uitgelegd dat een zogenaamde ‘grounded theory’-benadering is 
gebruikt om deze vragen te beantwoorden, waarbij het doel is om theorie te 
construeren middels kwalitatief onderzoek. In dit proefschrift zijn vier soorten data 
geanalyseerd: 120 semi-gestructureerde interviews met irreguliere migranten, 
veldaantekeningen en memo’s geschreven op basis van intensieve omgang met 
irreguliere migranten, 45 open interviews met irreguliere migranten, en 61 
interviews met organisaties die met irreguliere migranten te maken hebben. De 
analyse is vooral gegrond in de interviews en de omgang met irreguliere migranten. 
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De interviews met organisaties zijn vooral gebruikt om een beeld te krijgen van de 
context en ter validatie van de bevindingen.  
De semi-gestructureerde interviews met irreguliere migranten zijn 
uitgevoerd door een team onderzoeksassistenten. Zij probeerden via sleutelfiguren 
respondenten te werven, en daarnaast werden potentiële respondenten 
aangesproken in cafés, theehuizen, een parochiehuis of op straat. Tot slot werd 
gebruikt gemaakt van de zogenoemde 'sneeuwbalmethode'. Deze is eerder op een 
succesvolle manier toegepast bij de werving van irreguliere migranten en helpt bij 
het creëren van een vertrouwensbasis omdat contact wordt gemaakt via een persoon 
die men goed kent.  
 Naast de door onderzoeksassistenten gehouden interviews heeft de auteur in 
de steden Antwerpen en Den Haag gewoond om irreguliere migranten te 
observeren en interviewen. Respondenten werden gevonden in kerken, op straat, via 
organisaties en met behulp van de sneeuwbalmethode. Gedurende het veldwerk 
had de auteur dagelijks contact met irreguliere migranten, waarvan veel notities zijn 
bijgehouden. Een aantal van de migranten die werden geobserveerd is ook 
geïnterviewd.  
  De onderzoeksassistenten hebben vier migrantengroepen geïnterviewd: 
Marokkanen, Turken, Bulgaren en Congolezen. De Bulgaren hebben een Turkse 
achtergrond en de Congolese groep bestaat grotendeels uit afgewezen asielzoekers. 
Omdat dit grote migrantengemeenschappen zijn heeft de auteur ook irreguliere 
migranten geïnterviewd die niet tot een grote groep behoren. Door respondenten uit 
25 herkomstlanden te interviewen is gezorgd voor variatie in de onderzoeksgroep, 
en ook de theoretische selectie van respondenten heeft hier aan bijgedragen.  
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de beleidscontext geschetst waarin het leven van 
irreguliere migranten in de Lage Landen gestalte krijgt. Aandacht wordt besteed aan 
beleidsmaatregelen om de aanwezigheid van irreguliere migranten tegen te gaan, en 
de mogelijkheden die irreguliere migranten hebben om hun verblijf te legaliseren.  
In hoofdstuk 5 komen de aspiraties van irreguliere migranten aan bod. Er 
blijken drie typen aspiraties te kunnen worden onderscheiden: investerings-, 
verblijfs- en legalisatieaspiraties.* Investeringsmigranten zijn in de Lage Landen om 
geld te verdienen waarmee ze investeringen kunnen doen in hun land van 
herkomst. Ze willen terugkeren wanneer ze voldoende hebben gespaard. Vaak 
                                                             
* Omwille van de leesbaarheid wordt steeds gesproken over investeringsmigranten, 
verblijfsmigranten en legalisatiemigranten in plaats van migranten met investeringsaspiraties, 
migranten met verblijfsaspiraties en migranten met legalisatieaspiraties. 
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sparen ze voor een specifieke investering zoals voor het beginnen van een eigen 
onderneming of het financieren van een bruiloft. Hun verblijf wordt gezien als 
tijdelijk en fungeert als een middel om een doel in het land van herkomst te 
bereiken. Verblijfsmigranten zijn daarentegen gericht op het opbouwen van een 
bestaan in de Lage Landen. Voor hen is het leven in de Lage Landen dus geen 
middel maar het doel. Zij willen een bestaan opbouwen dat ze beter achten dan het 
leven dat ze hadden in het land van herkomst. Legalisatie van hun situatie zou een 
prettige bijkomstigheid zijn, maar ze beschouwen dit niet als noodzakelijk. 
Legalisatiemigranten ambiëren daarentegen wel een legaal verblijf. Zij willen net als 
verblijfsmigranten in de Lage Landen verblijven, maar dan wel legaal. Terwijl 
verblijfsmigranten het gevoel hebben dat ze gedurende hun illegale verblijf aan hun 
nieuwe leven kunnen bouwen, begint voor legalisatiemigranten het nieuwe leven 
pas na legalisatie. Hun leven staat in het teken van het bemachtigen van een legale 
verblijfsstatus.  
Irreguliere migranten uit specifieke herkomstlanden hebben vaak specifieke 
aspiraties vanwege de omstandigheden in deze landen. Zo zullen migranten uit 
Congo bijvoorbeeld niet snel investeringsaspiraties hebben vanwege de instabiele 
situatie in hun herkomstland. Herkomstlanden en aspiraties overlappen echter niet 
volledig: uit veel landen zijn migranten met alle drie de typen aspiraties afkomstig. 
Aspiraties kunnen bovendien gedurende het verblijf veranderen, en er is geen 
sprake van een standaardtraject of een hiërarchie in aspiraties, waarbij migranten 
beginnen met investeringsaspiraties en eindigen met legalisatieaspiraties.  
Het onderscheid tussen de drie typen aspiraties is bovendien van belang 
omdat er verschillende definities van succes mee gepaard gaan. Zo is er in de 
ervaring van een verblijfsmigrant geen sprake van succes wanneer hij zeven dagen 
in de week, tien uur per dag zou moeten werken, en zijn kamer moet delen met vier 
anderen. Voor een investeringsmigrant kan dit echter deel van zijn strategie zijn. Een 
legalisatiemigrant kan een baan aangeboden krijgen waarmee hij relatief veel 
verdient en weinig hoeft te werken, maar hij zal dit niet ervaren als een manier om te 
komen tot succes. Dit betekent dat irreguliere migranten met verschillende aspiraties 
verschillende strategieën moeten hanteren om hun aspiraties te realiseren. Voor 
migranten met legalisatieaspiraties zijn er twee typen strategieën te onderscheiden. 
De eerste strategie is gericht op het verwerven van verblijfspapieren via een 
huwelijk met een Nederlander, Belg of immigrant met voldoende verblijfsrecht. 
Irreguliere migranten die gebruik maken van de tweede strategie proberen hun 
verblijf te legaliseren middels procedures.  
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In hoofdstuk 6 en 7 staat de eerste onderzoeksvraag centraal. Hoofdstuk 6 
draait om functionele incorporatie, en gaat in op de vraag hoe irreguliere migranten 
in hun basisbehoeften voorzien. Patronen in huisvesting en werk en andere bronnen 
van inkomen worden geanalyseerd omdat hier debatten over worden gevoerd in de 
wetenschappelijke literatuur, of omdat er sprake is van strijdige 
onderzoeksuitkomsten. Het is dus niet de bedoeling om uitspraken te doen over de 
functionele incorporatie van irreguliere migranten, maar om een bijdrage te leveren 
aan lopende discussies. Het blijkt dat de verschillende strategieën die gepaard gaan 
met uiteenlopende aspiraties aan de basis liggen van specifieke patronen van 
incorporatie. Met dit inzicht kunnen vastgelopen debatten over de relatie tussen 
inkomen en geld dat besteed wordt aan huisvesting, de geografische spreiding van 
irreguliere migranten, het werk dat zij doen, de uitbuiting die zij ervaren, en formele 
en informele steun die zij ontvangen worden vlotgetrokken. Door aspiraties in de 
analyse te betrekken wordt bovendien duidelijk dat strijdige onderzoeksuitkomsten 
veelal kunnen worden begrepen vanuit verschillen in aspiraties.  
Investeringsmigranten willen gedurende hun verblijf zoveel mogelijk 
werken, zodat ze snel met de benodigde investeringen kunnen terugkeren naar hun 
land van herkomst. Ze werken zes of zeven dagen in de week en maken lange 
dagen. Ze zijn bovendien vaak bereid om slechte werkomstandigheden en een 
relatief laag loon voor lief te nemen, omdat het werk tijdelijk is en omdat ze hun 
verdiensten in het land van herkomst willen besteden, waar het leven veel 
goedkoper is en de lonen nog veel lager. Om kosten te besparen wonen 
investeringsmigranten vaak zeer eenvoudig en delen zij woonruimte met andere 
irreguliere immigranten. Indien ze geen of weinig werk hebben zijn ze afhankelijk 
van het commerciële circuit om geld te lenen, tenzij ze in de Lage Landen 
familieleden of goede vrienden hebben. De steun die wordt geboden aan 
investeringsmigranten is echter altijd van korte duur. Ze hebben doorgaans geen 
toegang tot steun van organisaties.  
Het leven van verblijfsmigranten is minder eenzijdig gericht op werk. Om 
een bestaan op te bouwen willen verblijfsmigranten vooral stabiel werk doen dat 
niet seizoensgebonden is en een betrouwbare stroom van inkomsten garandeert. Zij 
werken ook het liefst doordeweeks en op reguliere tijden, vooral diegenen die 
kinderen hebben. Verblijfsmigranten werken bij voorkeur voor private huishoudens. 
Hier lopen ze de minste kans om aangehouden te worden, en bovendien betalen 
Belgische en Nederlandse huishoudens de hoogste lonen en ervaren irreguliere 
migranten hier de beste arbeidsomstandigheden. Wanneer het niet lukt om dit soort 
werk te vinden zijn ze gedwongen om het werk te doen dat investeringsmigranten 
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doorgaans verrichten. Omdat ze de harde omstandigheden en lange dagen 
doorgaans niet goed vol houden werken ze dan meestal slechts periodes van een 
aantal maanden aan een stuk. In tegenstelling tot investeringsmigranten voelen 
verblijfsmigranten zich uitgebuit als ze dit soort werk moeten doen. Ze krijgen 
weinig betaald en kunnen zo niet het leven leiden dat ze willen.  
Omdat verblijfsmigranten een bestaan willen opbouwen zijn zij bereid meer 
geld te besteden aan hun woning dan investeringsmigranten. Zij delen doorgaans 
alleen een kamer met andere migranten wanneer dit economisch gezien niet anders 
kan, meestal in het begin van het verblijf. Veel verblijfsmigranten wonen bovendien 
liever in rustige buitenwijken dan in de centraal gelegen immigrantenwijken. Voor 
verblijfsmigranten die afkomstig zijn uit herkomstlanden waaruit er veel 
immigranten in deze wijken wonen – zoals Turken en Marokkanen – is dit echter 
niet het geval, zij wonen juist vaak in immigrantenwijken. Wanneer 
verblijfsmigranten niet genoeg inkomsten uit werk genereren proberen zij sociale 
steun te mobiliseren. Omdat verblijfsmigranten niet altijd familieleden hebben op 
wie ze kunnen terug vallen investeren ze in informele systemen van solidariteit. 
Irreguliere migranten die deel uit maken van dergelijke systemen kunnen hier een 
beroep op doen in tijden van nood. Omgedraaid worden zij geacht anderen in nood 
te helpen indien ze hiertoe in staat zijn. Verblijfsmigranten kunnen meestal alleen 
tijdelijk – in het begin van hun verblijf – terugvallen op organisaties en zijn daarom 
meestal aangewezen op deze solidariteitssystemen of steun van familieleden.  
Legalisatiemigranten willen zo min mogelijk werken omdat zij informele 
arbeid als een groot risico beschouwen. Wanneer irreguliere migranten worden 
aangehouden voor informele arbeid reduceert hun kans op legalisatie en daarmee 
op het realiseren van hun aspiraties. Daarom vermijden legalisatiemigranten werk 
zoveel mogelijk. Zij werken vaak parttime en alleen voor zover het noodzakelijk is 
om in hun basisbehoeften te voorzien. Zij werken bovendien bij voorkeur voor 
particuliere huishoudens omdat het risico om opgepakt te worden daar het kleinst is 
en er voldoende mogelijkheden zijn voor parttime werk.  
Omdat legalisatiemigranten zo min mogelijk werken hebben zij veel steun 
nodig om in hun levensonderhoud te kunnen voorzien. Ze prefereren dit zelfs boven 
werken, en vaak weten ze vanuit meerdere bronnen steun te mobiliseren. Ze 
ontvangen vaak de meest uitgebreide steun van organisaties omdat ze een 
perspectief op legaal verblijf hebben. Daarnaast ontvangen veel legalisatiemigranten 
die verwikkeld zijn in legalisatieprocedures steun van Belgen en Nederlanders. 
Legalisatiemigranten die gericht zijn op een huwelijk worden vaak ondersteund 
door familieleden. Familieleden bieden kost en inwoning en ondertussen zoekt de 
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hele familie mee naar een huwelijkskandidaat. Organisaties helpen hen wegens het 
ontbreken van een formeel perspectief op legalisatie niet structureel.  
Uit hoofdstuk 6 blijkt dat verschillende patronen van functionele incorporatie 
begrepen kunnen worden door te kijken naar verschillende aspiraties. Bovendien 
blijkt dat indien de aspiraties van irreguliere migranten veranderen, de gehanteerd 
strategieën ook veranderen en daarmee patronen van functionele incorporatie. In 
hoofdstuk 7 wordt aangetoond dat dit ook geldt voor patronen van sociale 
incorporatie. In dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de vraag wat irreguliere migranten doen 
in hun vrije tijd en met wie zij hun vrije tijd doorbrengen. Vanwege het gangbare 
slachtofferperspectief gaan onderzoekers er meestal impliciet vanuit dat irreguliere 
migranten nauwelijks mogelijkheden hebben om een sociaal leven te leiden 
aangezien ze druk bezig zijn met ‘overleven’. Uitgedaagd door het dominante 
perspectief heeft een klein aantal onderzoekers bezwaar gemaakt tegen dit 
eenzijdige beeld van sociale isolatie door de uiteenlopende sociale activiteiten die 
hun respondenten ondernemen te beschrijven. In dit hoofdstuk blijkt dat een analyse 
die uitgaat van aspiraties helpt begrijpen waarom sommige irreguliere migranten 
inderdaad sociaal geïsoleerd leven en geografisch immobiel zijn terwijl anderen een 
rijk sociaal leven hebben. 
Het sociale leven van investeringsmigranten wordt gekenmerkt door sociale 
isolatie. Zij hebben weinig vrije tijd omdat ze veel werken en ze willen in hun 
schaarse vrije tijd zo min mogelijk geld uitgeven zodat ze sneller voldoende hebben 
gespaard om te kunnen terugkeren. Avonden en vrije dagen brengen ze daarom 
veelal thuis door in het gezelschap van hun huisgenoten. Omdat ze terug willen 
keren vinden zij het niet de moeite waard om te investeren in sociale relaties. Zij 
hebben daardoor een beperkte sociale kring. 
Verblijfsmigranten willen een bestaan opbouwen in de Lage Landen en  
waarderen daarom de vrije tijd die ze hebben en proberen deze te vullen door leuke 
dingen te doen. Ook willen ze hun nieuwe omgeving leren kennen. Ze maken soms 
uitstapjes en zijn veel mobieler dan investeringsmigranten. Veel verblijfsmigranten 
hebben meerdere plaatsen bezocht en sommigen zijn zelfs in buurlanden geweest. 
Bovendien hebben zij een rijker sociaal leven en een groter sociaal netwerk dan 
investeringsmigranten. Hun vrije tijd brengen ze door met familie, vrienden en 
kennissen, die veelal afkomstig zijn uit hetzelfde herkomstland. Verblijfsmigranten 
zijn ook vaak lid van culturele organisaties die activiteiten organiseren rond hun 
herkomstland.  
Legalisatiemigranten die gericht zijn op procedures hechten geen bijzondere 
waarde aan vrije tijd omdat ze er doorgaans veel van hebben, aangezien ze weinig 
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werken. Ze brengen veel van hun vrije tijd door rond charitatieve instellingen waar 
ze komen voor sociale steun. Bovendien zoeken ze actief Nederlanders en Belgen op, 
en volgen ze vaak taalcursussen om aan hun ‘integratie’ te werken. Door goed te 
integreren hopen zij sneller in aanmerking te kunnen komen voor een 
verblijfsvergunning. Omdat ze weinig werken en niet veel ondernemen buiten 
organisaties om hebben ze geen groot sociaal netwerk. Er komen echter 
immigranten met diverse achtergronden bij charitatieve organisaties waardoor het 
sociale netwerk van deze legalisatiemigranten relatief divers is in vergelijking met 
de andere categorieën. Legalisatiemigranten die hun aspiraties proberen te 
realiseren door een huwelijkspartner te vinden besteden veel hun vrije tijd aan deze 
zoektocht. Zij gaan veel uit om potentiële partners te ontmoeten en bevinden zich 
veel op straat of op internet.  
In dit hoofdstuk wordt duidelijk dat de sociale activiteiten die irreguliere 
migranten ondernemen afhankelijk zijn van hun aspiraties. Hiermee wordt een 
uitweg geboden uit de gepolariseerde discussie in de literatuur. Bovendien blijkt dat 
belemmeringen wel degelijk belangrijk zijn om patronen van sociale incorporatie te 
begrijpen, maar dat irreguliere migranten met verschillende aspiraties anders 
reageren op deze belemmeringen.  
Hoofdstuk 8 draait om de tweede onderzoeksvraag. Ondanks het vermeende 
gebrek aan transnationale activiteiten wordt duidelijk dat irreguliere migranten wel 
degelijk transnationaal actief zijn. Het type activiteiten dat zij ondernemen blijkt 
bovendien afhankelijk van hun aspiraties. Daarnaast wordt aangetoond dat ook het 
niet ondernemen van specifieke transnationale activiteiten kan worden begrepen 
vanuit hun aspiraties; dit vloeit dus niet noodzakelijkerwijs voort uit structurele 
belemmeringen. 
Investeringsmigranten geven zo min mogelijk geld uit in de Lage Landen. In 
plaats daarvan zenden zij een groot deel van hun inkomsten naar het land van 
herkomst, of sparen ze het om het daar bij terugkeer te investeren. Omdat 
investeringsmigranten niet in de Lage Landen willen blijven zijn zij sociaal 
georiënteerd op het herkomstland, en besteden zij tijd en energie in het 
onderhouden van sociale contacten met het herkomstland.  
Verblijfsmigranten sturen een kleiner deel van hun inkomen naar het 
herkomstland en zij bellen hun familieleden ook minder vaak – variërend van een 
keer per maand tot eens per week. Hun referentiekader is de ontvangende 
samenleving. Door allerlei culturele activiteiten gericht op het herkomstland 
reproduceren ze een idee van het herkomstland in de Lage Landen.  
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Omdat legalisatiemigranten zo min mogelijk werken sturen ze geen geld naar 
het herkomstland. Veel legalisatiemigranten die zich richten op procedures zijn 
afkomstig uit landen die geteisterd worden door instabiliteit. Zij hebben het contact 
met familie en vrienden in het herkomstland daarom soms verloren. Een deel van 
deze legalisatiemigranten onderneemt politieke transnationale activiteiten in de 
hoop dat de situatie in hun herkomstland hierdoor zal verbeteren. Daarnaast is hun 
politieke transnationale participatie vermoedelijk instrumenteel gemotiveerd: door 
duidelijk te maken dat de problemen in hun herkomstland ernstig zijn hopen zij hun 
kansen op legalisatie te vergroten. Legalisatiemigranten die gericht zijn op een 
huwelijk ondernemen niet veel transnationale activiteiten – zij zijn vooral bezig met 
het vinden van een huwelijkspartner. 
In hoofdstuk 9 staat de derde en laatste onderzoeksvraag centraal. Hoewel het 
slachtofferperspectief er vanuit gaat dat opwaartse sociale mobiliteit voor irreguliere 
migranten niet is weggelegd, blijkt in dit hoofdstuk dat sommige irreguliere 
migranten er wel degelijk in slagen om hun positie te verbeteren. De mate waarin zij 
hierin slagen hangt nauw samen met de mate waarin zij hulpbronnen als sociaal, 
cultureel of economisch kapitaal kunnen mobiliseren. Over het belang van 
verschillende kapitaalsoorten voor irreguliere migranten zijn onderzoeksresultaten 
tot op heden niet eenduidig. Volgens veel onderzoekers is sociaal kapitaal van 
doorslaggevend belang, terwijl volgens anderen cultureel kapitaal cruciaal is. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt beargumenteerd dat een discussie over het belang van 
kapitaalsoorten voor irreguliere migranten in het algemeen geen theoretisch inzicht 
biedt. Om de vraag te beantwoorden welke vormen van kapitaal relevant zijn voor 
irreguliere migranten is het nodig om te zien waarvoor het kapitaal wordt ingezet. 
Daarom wordt in dit hoofdstuk onderzocht welke kapitaalsoorten relevant zijn voor 
irreguliere migranten om hun aspiraties te verwezenlijken.  
Het blijkt dat voor het realiseren van elk van de drie typen aspiraties 
specifieke kapitaalsoorten nodig zijn. Indien investeringsmigranten specifieke 
beroepscompetenties (cultureel kapitaal) hebben die zij kunnen gebruiken in de 
Lage Landen worden zij relatief goed betaald. Wanneer ze al een baan hebben 
geregeld voor vertrek uit het herkomstland kunnen ze bovendien makkelijker werk 
kunnen vinden dat aansluit bij hun competenties. Cultureel kapitaal in de vorm van 
beroepscompetenties beneden het legale plafond blijkt voor investeringsmigranten 
van doorslaggevend belang, mits gecombineerd met sociaal kapitaal in de zin van 
transnationale netwerken waarmee al in het herkomstland werk in de Lage Landen 
kan worden gearrangeerd. 
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Voor verblijfsmigranten is sociaal kapitaal van cruciaal belang, zowel in de 
vorm van sterke familiale- en vriendschapsbindingen (‘strong ties’) voor sociale 
steun als in de vorm van lossere, verbindende netwerkrelaties (‘weak ties’) die nodig 
zijn voor het vinden van werk. Beide vormen van sociaal kapitaal zijn nodig en 
vullen elkaar aan. Voor verblijfsimmigranten is een combinatie van ondersteunend 
en verbindend sociaal kapitaal (‘social support’ en ‘social leverage’) van 
doorslaggevend belang. 
Het is moeilijk om te bepalen welke vormen van kapitaal relevant zijn voor 
legalisatiemigranten die zich richten op procedures. Vanwege het gebrek aan 
transparantie in procedures is het ondoenlijk om de kansen op legalisatie realistisch 
in te schatten. De analyse is hier daarom enkel gericht op legalisatiemigranten die 
iemand zoeken om mee te trouwen om zo hun verblijf te legaliseren. Voor 
legalisatiemigranten die een huwelijkspartner zoeken uit de eigen etnische kring is 
het van belang om familie te hebben in de Lage Landen, omdat op die manier een 
vertrouwensrelatie tussen de families kan ontstaan die anders afwezig is. Voor 
legalisatiemigranten die een Belg of Nederlander proberen te vinden om mee te 
trouwen is het relevant om de taal te spreken en de belangrijkste culturele 
conventies te kennen. Voor legalisatiemigranten die een schijnhuwelijk willen kopen 
is economisch kapitaal van belang, of sociaal kapitaal dat hierin kan worden 
omgezet. Voor legalisatiemigranten is het kapitaal dat zij nodig hebben dus 
afhankelijk van het type huwelijksmarkt waar zij zich op begeven. 
Veel irreguliere migranten blijken echter niet in staat om hun aspiraties te 
verwezenlijken. Zij hebben niet zozeer een gebrek aan kapitaal in het algemeen – 
hoewel dit soms ook voorkomt – maar vooral een gebrek aan de juiste kapitaalsoort 
die benodigd is om hun specifieke aspiraties te realiseren. Ook dit maakt duidelijk 
dat het belangrijk is niet naar het belang van kapitaalsoorten in het algemeen te 
kijken, maar te onderzoeken in welke contexten welke kapitaalsoort doorslaggevend 
is. 
Aan de hand van de drie centrale onderzoeksvragen worden in hoofdstuk 10 
de belangrijkste bevindingen samengevat en de implicaties hiervan geschetst. Ten 
eerste blijkt uit dit proefschrift dat een benadering die uitgaat van aspiraties 
theoretische inzichten biedt die normaliter door het slachtofferperspectief aan het 
oog onttrokken worden. Ten tweede blijkt dat vaak ten onrechte wordt 
verondersteld dat verschillen in solidariteit binnen etnische gemeenschappen aan de 
basis liggen van patronen van incorporatie. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat patronen 
van incorporatie worden gecreëerd doordat irreguliere migranten strategisch 
handelen op basis van uiteenlopende aspiraties. Dit betekent dat waar er bij 
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oppervlakkige beschouwing etnische patronen van incorporatie lijken zijn, hier 
dikwijls andere mechanismen aan ten grondslag liggen. Ten derde maakt het 
onderzoek duidelijk dat irreguliere migranten sociale mobiliteit niet louter in 
economische zin duiden. Men kan dan ook niet eenvoudigweg een ‘objectieve’ maat 
als inkomen gebruiken om positieverbetering vast te stellen. Zonder inzicht in de 
aspiraties van irreguliere migranten zou men geneigd zijn sommige irreguliere 
migranten als kansarme slachtoffers te bestempelen terwijl zij hun migratie zelf als 
succes typeren. Ten vierde laat de analyse zien dat het leven van irreguliere 
migranten niet alleen draait om ‘overleven’ maar dat zij, afhankelijk van hun 
aspiraties, diverse sociale activiteiten ondernemen. Om te begrijpen hoe irreguliere 
migranten leven in ontvangende landen is het van belang deze sociale dimensie mee 
te nemen in onderzoek. Deze maakt namelijk deel uit van de afwegingen die zij 
maken; onder bepaalde omstandigheden wordt vrije tijd bijvoorbeeld geprefereerd 
boven extra werk. Ten vijfde toont dit proefschrift dat onderzoek naar het leven van 
irreguliere migranten baat heeft bij het hanteren van een transnationaal perspectief, 
omdat transnationale activiteiten, aspiraties en incorporatie met elkaar verknoopt 
blijken te zijn. Tot slot wordt aanbevolen om in vervolgonderzoek meer aandacht te 
besteden aan de aspiraties van irreguliere migranten, en om individuen in plaats van 
etnische gemeenschappen tot het uitgangspunt van de analyse te maken.  Op die 
manier kan bijvoorbeeld de hier ontwikkelde ‘grounded theory’ verder 
gecontextualiseerd worden middels onderzoek in andere contexten, en kan er licht 
worden geworpen op de vraag wat irreguliere migranten van aspiraties doet 
veranderen. 
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